Persuasion as tool of education: The Wittgensteinian case

Abstract

In this paper, I aim to explore what role persuasion plays in the early education of children. Advocating Wittgenstein, I claim that persuasion involves imparting to a pupil about a particular world-picture (Weltbild) by showing rather than explaining. This because we cannot introduce a child to the hinges of a world-picture through a discursive argument. I will employ the remarks of Wittgenstein in On Certainty (1969) (OC) to define what persuasion (Überredung) is. I will make use of the notes regarding seeing-an-aspect from the Philosophical Investigations (2009) to clarify such a notion. Afterwards, I will contextualise this in early-childhood education and conclude providing some examples of how persuasion solidifies hinges.

Keywords:

• Wittgenstein
• hinge
• Persuasion
• teaching
• Weltbild

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the participants of the workshop Philosophy and Education: Exploring their interaction and dynamic relationship workshop organised by the Center for Knowledge and Society (CEKAS) for their precious feedback on this work, in particular, Luca Moretti, Ben Kotzee and Mike Coxhead.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Alessio Persichetti was born on 27 September 1991 in Rome (Italy). He obtained a MA in Philosophical Sciences from Roma Tre university (Rome, Italy). He is pursuing his PhD at the University of Aberdeen (Scotland, UK). His field of expertise are Logic & Philosophy of Logic, Philosophy of Language, Wittgenstein, and Philosophy of Education.

Notes

1 Henceforth, I will use “educator” to mean any adult who persuades a child about a world-picture; they could be either the schoolteacher or the parents or anyone else.

2 This stance towards hinges resembles the attitude towards a rule rather than a propositional belief (cf. Moyal-Sharrock, 2004, pp. 38–40).

3 I am not claiming that introducing a child to a world-picture and radical disagreement on hinges are the same thing. I merely draw an analogy from the latter to explain the former.

4 I specify that my reconstruction focuses on the use of “persuasion” made in OC. I am not claiming that Wittgenstein meant “persuasion” only with this meaning—since one can use persuasion to mean “convincing someone with sound rational arguments”. Otherwise, it would contradict the Wittgensteinian assumption that “meaning is use”. Simply, I am narrowing the discussion to the use of persuasion concerning the introduction of a pupil to a world-picture.