The aesthetic and affective matrix of pre-reflective sensemaking at the origins of the relationship between subject and world: A dialogue between Kant’s Third Critique and psychoanalysis

ABSTRACT

The authors discuss the relevance of aesthetic and affective experience at the heart of the human being’s capability to relate to the world and to found relations of sense. Faced with anguish that the world can be meaningless and with fear of uncertainty/chaos, trust and hope are needed for the world to be a hospitable place for existence. Such experience is aesthetic, sensitive and affective before being rational, reflective and deliberative. Through a dialogue between Kant, Winnicott and Bion, it is shown how foundation of trust is based on two essential aspects: (1) The illusion that reality was created to allow us to live in it (namely, the fictionality is a prerequisite for each possible development of psyche) and (2) this illusion is not generated by a solipsistic activity of the human mind; rather, it is made possible starting from the primordial relationship with the other, by containing anguish, nourishing trust and hope, and supporting psychic development and elaboration of progressive forms of symbolisation. The authors discuss how these points have a profound aesthetic implication through deepening the reflection on the ontogenetic development of the psyche, the complex intertwining between primary and secondary processes, and clinical implications.

La matrice esthétique et affective de la mise en sens pré-réflexive à l'origine de la relation entre le sujet et le monde : un dialogue entre la troisième critique de Kant et la psychanalyse

Les auteurs discutent de la pertinence de l'expérience esthétique et affective au cœur de la capacité de l'être humain d'être en relation avec le monde et d'instaurer des relations de sens. Face à l'angoisse d'un monde dénué de sens et à la peur de l'incertitude/chaos, la confiance et l'espoir sont des conditions nécessaires garantissant l'existence d'un monde hospitalier. Une telle expérience est esthétique, sensible et affective avant d'être rationnelle, réflexive et délibérative. Par le biais d'un dialogue entre Kant, Winnicott et Bion, les auteurs montrent comment le fondement de la confiance repose sur deux aspects essentiels : 1) l'illusion que la réalité a été créée pour nous permettre d'y vivre (à savoir, la fiction est un pré-requis du développement de la psyché) et 2) cette illusion n'est pas générée par une activité solipsiste de l'esprit humain ; elle est rendue possible grâce à la relation primordiale à l'autre, qui contient l'angoisse, nourrit la confiance et l'espoir et soutient le développement psychique et l'élaboration des formes progressives de symbolisation. Les auteurs discutent de la façon dont ces aspects entraînent des conséquences esthétiques profondes à travers l'approfondissement de la réflexion sur le développement ontogénique de la psyché, l'entrecroisement complexe entre les processus primaires et secondaires et les implications cliniques.

Die ästhetische und affektive Matrix der präreflexiven Sinneswahrnehmung an den Ursprüngen der Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Welt: Ein Dialog zwischen Kants Dritter Kritik und der Psychoanalyse

Die Autoren erörtern die Bedeutung der ästhetischen und affektiven Erfahrung im Zusammenhang mit der Fähigkeit des Menschen, sich auf die Welt zu beziehen und Sinnesbeziehungen herzustellen. Angesichts der Angst, dass die Welt bedeutungslos sein könnte, und der Furcht vor Ungewissheit/Chaos sind Vertrauen und Hoffnung notwendig, damit die Welt ein lebenswerter Ort bleibt, um zu existieren. Eine solche Erfahrung ist ästhetisch, sensitiv und affektiv, bevor sie rational, reflektierend und abwägend ist. In einem Dialog zwischen Kant, Winnicott und Bion wird gezeigt, wie das Fundament des Vertrauens auf zwei wesentlichen Aspekten beruht: 1) Der Illusion, dass die Realität geschaffen wurde, um uns zu ermöglichen, in ihr zu leben (d.h. die Fiktionalität ist eine Voraussetzung für jede mögliche Entwicklung der Psyche). 2) Diese Illusion wird nicht durch eine solipsistische Aktivität des menschlichen Geistes erzeugt. Vielmehr wird sie ausgehend von der ursprünglichen Beziehung zum anderen ermöglicht, indem sie Ängste contained, Vertrauen und Hoffnung nährt sowie psychische Entwicklung und die Ausarbeitung progressiver Formen der Symbolisierung unterstützt. Die Autoren erörtern, wie diese Punkte eine tiefgreifende ästhetische Implikation haben, indem sie die Reflexion über die ontogenetische Entwicklung der Psyche, die komplexe Verflechtung zwischen Primär- und Sekundärprozessen sowie die klinischen Implikationen vertiefen.

La matrice estetica e affettiva della creazione preriflessiva di senso alle origini della relazione tra soggetto e mondo. Un dialogo fra la Terza Critica di Kant e la psicoanalisi

Gli autori discutono il ruolo centrale che l'esperienza estetica e affettiva ha per la capacità dell'essere umano di rapportarsi al mondo e fondare relazioni di senso. A fronte dell'angoscia che il mondo possa essere privo di senso, e di una concomitante paura dell'incertezza e del caos, occorrono fiducia e speranza perché il mondo possa risultare un luogo ospitale per l'esistenza. Prima ancora di essere razionale, riflessiva e deliberativa, un'esperienza di tal genere è estetica, sensoriale e affettiva. Attraverso un dialogo tra Kant, Winnicott e Bion, si mostra qui come il senso di fiducia si fondi su due aspetti essenziali: 1) l'illusione che la realtà sia stata creata per permettere a noi di viverci dentro (in altre parole, la finzione è un prerequisito per qualsiasi possibile sviluppo della psiche); 2) tale illusione non è creata da un'attività solipsistica della mente umana, ma è resa possibile a partire dalla relazione primordiale con l'altro, attraverso il contenimento dell'angoscia, il nutrimento di fiducia e speranza e il sostegno dello sviluppo mentale e dell'elaborazione di forme man mano più evolute di simbolizzazione. Gli autori mostrano come questi punti implichino profondamente la dimensione estetica, concentrando la loro riflessione sullo sviluppo ontogenetico della psiche, sul complesso intrecciarsi dei processi primari e secondari e sulle implicazioni di tutto ciò a livello clinico.

La matriz estética y afectiva de la capacidad prerreflexiva de dar sentido en el origen de la relación entre el sujeto y el mundo: diálogo entre la tercera crítica de Kant y el psicoanálisis

Los autores estudian la importancia de la experiencia estética y afectiva que es central en la capacidad de los seres humanos de vincularse con el mundo y encontrar relaciones de sentido. Frente a la angustia de que el mundo carezca de sentido y al temor a la incertidumbre o el caos, se requiere confianza y esperanza a fin de que el mundo sea un lugar hospitalario. Esa experiencia es estética, sensible y afectiva, antes que racional, reflexiva y deliberativa. Se muestra, mediante un diálogo entre Kant, Winnicott y Bion, cómo la confianza se funda en dos aspectos esenciales: 1) la ilusión de que la realidad fue creada para permitirnos vivir en ella (es decir, la ficcionalidad como prerrequisito de todo desarrollo posible de la psique) y 2) esta ilusión no es generada por la actividad solipsista de la mente humana, más bien se hace posible a partir de la relación primordial con el otro, mediante la contención de la angustia, la alimentación de la confianza y la esperanza, y el apoyo al desarrollo psíquico y a la elaboración de formas progresivas de simbolización. Los autores analizan cómo estos puntos tienen una profunda implicación estética mediante la profundización de la reflexión sobre el desarrollo ontogenético de la psique, el complejo entretejido entre los procesos primarios y los secundarios, y las implicaciones clínicas.

KEYWORDS:

• Affects
• aesthetics
• fictionality
• intersubjectivity
• pre-reflectivity
• psychoanalytical transitionality

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Although, according to some authors, Bion misunderstands Kantian concepts (Green 1998; Noel-Smith 2013), Bion surprisingly argues for the importance of “intuiting” – while recognising the impossibility for the intellect and rational knowledge – the ultimate reality of the patient’s mind and what is occurring in psychoanalytic sessions. André Green states, “Kant was an important reference for Bion. But contemporary philosophers will probably complain of Bion's misunderstandings when interpreting Kant's conceptions for his own use” (Green 1998, 653).

2 The “nous” in Plato and Aristotle indicates a type of direct, immediate, timeless understanding – a thought, we would say today, intuitive, holistic and naturally “synthetic,” that captures the links and connections between things beyond the mediation of language and the analytical construction of discourse.

3 Kant defines imagination (Einbildung, Einbildungskraft) as “the faculty of representing an object even without its presence, in intuition” (see Critique of Pure Reason; Kant 1787, 185–187). It is the synthetic faculty par excellence that is responsible for providing concepts with a corresponding sensitive intuition and even, in the Third Critique, for making any type of synthesis possible in general. Imagination is considered an intermediate and mediating faculty between sensitivity and intellect, always straddling these two dimensions and at the same time irreducible to them.

4 By this formula, in philosophy, the realistic conception of truth is expressed as an agreement or correspondence between reality and our knowledge, linguistic and conceptual representation of it. This is a conception of Aristotelian origin, taken up in the Middle Ages by St Thomas Aquinas and widely present in modern and contemporary philosophy, in particular in the rationalistic tradition (Leibniz and Hegel) but also in analytical philosophy.

5 In this context, the mother is not only the mother–object but also the mother–environment as she can ensure the conditions of the experience of the infant.

6 As Civitarese and Ferro (2022) notably argue, the fictionality is the real basis of making experience and of growing both in play and in analysis.

7 This is a distinction, fundamental for psychoanalysis, that emerges very early in Freud (1900, 1911). The primary process is unconscious and aimed directly at an immediate discharge of the drive in order to provide pleasure and alleviate bodily and psychic excitatory tension. Mainly governed by the unconscious mechanisms of condensation and displacement, it allows the psyche to move freely from one representation to another, without the constraint of the principle of non-contradiction (Freud 1900; Matte Blanco 1975; Salvatore et al. 2022) and of the others’ logical links. The secondary process, which develops gradually and only subsequently, expresses the subject’s nascent ability to delay the time between the need and its satisfaction. Connected to alert thinking, attention, self-monitoring, reasoning, judgement, it is characterised by stable and distinct representations, connected by logical connections.

8 It is in this outpouring that – beyond real purposes or Kantian intentions – the theme of empathy would be announced, which is the ability to think by putting oneself in the place of the other (Arendt 1978; Ferrario 2002, 2009; Tossici 2007). It should be emphasised, however, that in Kant’s sensus communis, the reference is still to the plurality of others and not to the other in its singularity, which instead characterises transitional phenomena.

9 According to Bion, only through an intersubjective function of rêverie (understood as a re-reading of Kleinian projective identification) can unthinkable emotions and brute sensations be transformed into elements for thoughts. This function is not dissimilar to that exercised in Kantian aesthetic judgement by the imagination which, through its concept-free schematisation, gives shape to those preliminary aggregates of sense from which thought begins. Notably, Bion (1962, 1965; see also Noel-Smith 2013) seems to be aware when defining alpha elements as phenomena, in the Kantian sense, contrasting them with beta elements, which, still in Kantian terms, the subject feels as “things in themselves” (Bion 1962).

10 The sublime represents in Kant a specific experience, namely a setback for the imagination in the attempt to give sense to the world. In the case of the sublime, in fact, “one has to deal not with the ‘form’ of the sobject, with a ‘free play of the faculties’ [as in the case of beauty], but rather with their inability to give thoroughness and legality to representations” (Garroni 1992, 212).