Oil and intra-state conflict in Iraq and Syria: sub-state actors and challenges for Turkey's energy security

ABSTRACT

The continuing dependency on fossil fuels of the Middle East not only in Turkey's energy mix but also in world energy demand requires further analysis of oil and conflict in the region since the fall of Mosul in Iraq to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This article addresses the relationship between oil and conflict. Then, it examines the case of Turkey's increasing energy relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government to elucidate the implications of inter-state and intra-state conflict on regional interdependence in the region. The argument asserts that risks of an abrupt regime change or revolutionary regime formation in the aftermath of civil war in Syria and ethnic or sectarian violence in Iraq, which are highly associated with intra-state conflicts, present challenges for Turkey's energy security and most importantly for human security in the region.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Turkey's Energy Policy, 2006. Accessed in December 2007. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa; and MFA, Turkey's Energy Strategy. Accessed in January 2010. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa.

2. The first transport of gas via the TANAP project is planned for 2018. The pipeline will transport 16 bcm/year from the Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan via Turkey to Europe. Ten bcm/year will be exported by Azerbaijan and six bcm/year will be consumed in Turkey. The capacity of the pipeline is targeted to increase to 23 bcm/year in 2023 and to 31 bcm/year in 2026. The consortium members are SOCAR (the state oil company of Azerbaijan, with an 80% share), and BOTAS and TPAO, the state pipeline and oil companies of Turkey, respectively (total 20% share).

3. ‘Turkey approves Russian gas plan’, Wall Street Journal, 29 December 2011.

4. The new route for the planned pipeline with a capacity of 63 bcm could eventually be connected to Greece and distribute gas in the Southeast European energy markets. ‘Putin declares gas discount for Turkey, scraps South Stream’, Hürriyet Daily News, 1 December 2014; Andrew Roth, ‘In defeat, Putin diverts gas pipeline to Turkey’, New York Times, 3 December 2014.

5. ‘KRG pipeline for international export to be finished’, Hürriyet Daily News, 18 April 2013. The pipeline was completed at the end of 2013; and oil exports from the KRG region to Turkey via this pipeline have started.

6. ‘Turkey, Iraq work on Basra oil exports’, Hürriyet Daily News, 7 July 2012.

7. International Energy Agency. Accessed in May 2016. https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/subtopics/whatisenergysecurity/.

8. EMRA, Natural Gas Sector Report 2009 (Ankara: EMRA, 2010), p.32, 34; and EMRA, Natural Gas Sector Report 2014 (Ankara: EMRA 2015a), p.10.

9. EMRA, Petroleum Sector Report 2014 (Ankara: EMRA 2015b), p.6.

10. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR), Energy Balance Tables 2006–2012. Accessed in May 2016. http://www.enerji.gov.tr/tr-TR/EIGM-Raporlari.

11. EMRA, Petroleum Sector Report 2014, p.5 (see note 9).

12. Fiscal deficit of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) increased to 160 billion USD in 2015. It was reported that the persistent decline in oil prices since mid-2014 led to large export revenue losses (390 billion USD in 2015 and the expectation of a further 140 billion USD in 2016). For Algeria and the GCC, fiscal deficits are still expected to average 12% of GDP in 2016, and remain at 7% over the medium term. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook Update for the Middle East and Central Asia (Washington, DC: IMF 2016), p.2.

13. International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report. Accessed 14 April 2016. https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/.

14. T.C. Jones, ‘America, Oil, and War in the Middle East’, Journal of American History Vol.99, No.1 (2012), pp. 208–18.

15. J.D. Colgan, Petro-aggression: When Oil Causes War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

16. J.D. Colgan, ‘Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict’, International Organization Vol.64, No.4 (2010), p.661–694.

17. For major works in the literature about relationship between oil and secessionist conflicts, see P. Lujala, ‘Deadly Combat over Natural Resources’, Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.53, No.1 (2009), pp.50–71; and P.L. Billon, Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits and Politics of Resources (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2012).

18. For statistical frequency of civil wars in petrostates and non-petrostates, see J.D. Colgan, ‘Oil, domestic conflict, and opportunities for democratization’, Journal of Peace Research Vol.52, No.1 (2015), p.3–16.

19. In addition to spending effect, there are taxation and group formation effects in petrostates’ rentier economies that support authoritarian leadership. M. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp.63–110.

20. J.D. Colgan, ‘Oil and Revolutionary Governments’, pp.666–669 (see note 16).

21. Z. Maoz and N. Abdolali, ‘Regime types and international conflict, 1816–1976’, Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.33, No.1 (1989), pp.3–35.

22. E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder, ‘Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War’, International Organization Vol.56, No.2 (2002), pp.297–337.

23. Z. Maoz, ‘Joining the club of nations: Political development and international conflict, 1816–1976’, International Studies Quarterly Vol.33, No.2, (1989), pp.199–231.

24. Revolutionary regime formation is defined as a process which ‘entails intense and violent struggle between an indigenous population and a colonial power, or between factions or sub-state entities, leading to the establishment of one or more states’. It should be noted that the argument predicts not levels of conflict involvement but levels of conflict initiation. Z. Maoz, ‘Joining the club of nations’, pp.204, 206 (see note 23).

25. For an analysis of intra-state conflict risks, N.B. Weidmann and I. Salehyan, ‘Violence and Ethnic Segregation: A Computational Model Applied to Baghdad’, International Studies Quarterly Vol.57, No.1 (2013), pp.52–64; P. Lujala, ‘Armed civil conflict and rebel access to natural resources’, Journal of Peace Research Vol.47, No.1 (2010), pp.15–28; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.56, No.4 (2004), pp.563–95; and J.D. Fearon and D.D. Latin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review Vol.97, No.1 (2003), pp.75–90.

26. Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade, Küresel Ticarette Türkiye'nin Yeniden Konumlandırılması: Dış Ticarette Yeni Rotalar (Ankara: Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 2011), p.23.

27. ‘Foreign companies resume regular activity in Kurdistan’ KRG News, 1 October 2014. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=52312.

28. ‘1500 Türk yatırımcı Irak'ın kuzeyinde’ (1500 Turkish investors in northern Iraq) Sabah, 26 January 2014.

29. $5.1 billion in 2009, $6 billion in 2010, 8.3 billion in 2011, $10.8 billion in 2012 and $10.8 billion in 2014. Turkish Statistical Agency, Foreign Trade Statistics. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1046.

30. Excluding the exports in December 2015.

31. For a historical review of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, see N.G. Loizides, ‘State Ideology and the Kurds in Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol.46, No.4 (2010), pp.513–27; M.H. Yavuz, ‘Five stages of the construction of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey’, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics Vol.7, No.3 (2001), pp.1–24; and W. Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

32. For an historical overview of the PKK's emergence and its challenge to the state, see N.A. Özcan, PKK (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) Tarihi, İdeolojisi ve Yöntemi (Ankara: ASAM, 1996); J. Jongerden and A.H. Akkaya, ‘Born from the Left: The Making of PKK’ in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue edited by M. Casier and J. Jongerden (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.123–142; A.H. Akkaya and J. Jongerden, ‘PKK in the 2000s, Continuity Through Breaks?’ in Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue edited by M. Casier and J. Jongerden (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp.143–62.

33. Kemal Kirişçi, ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy’ in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy edited by L.G. Martin and D. Keridis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp.277–320.

34. For an analysis of Turkish foreign policy under Ahmet Davutoğlu, see Z. Arkan and M. Kınacıoğlu, ‘Enabling “ambitious activism”: Davutoğlu's vision of a new foreign policy identity for Turkey’, Turkish Studies (published online 30 May 2016); and N. Karacasulu, ‘Interpreting Turkey's Middle East Policy in the Last Decade’, All Azimuth Vol.4, No.1 (2015), pp.27–38.

35. I. Kalın, ‘US-Turkish Relations under Obama: Promise, Challenge and Opportunity in the 21st Century’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies Vol.12, No.1 (2010), pp.93–108.

36. A. Shadid, ‘Resurgent Turkey Builds Influence Across Iraq’, The New York Times, 5 January 2011.

37. ‘Turkey's Erdogan in first visit to Iraq Kurd region’, Reuters. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-turkey-kurds-idUSLDE72S2CD20110329.

38. For the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy, see P. İpek, ‘The Role of Energy Security in Turkish Foreign Policy (2004-2016)’ in Turkish Foreign Policy: International Relations, Legality and Global Reach edited by P. Gözen (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming in March 2017).

39. Among Iraq's 18 provinces, Kirkuk has the second largest oil production and the second largest proven oil reserves, after Basra.

40. The Iraqi constitution, Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.

41. One definition could be oil fields currently producing oil and gas. Another could refer to all discovered structures of oil in Iraq, producing or not. If all undeveloped fields are considered ‘present fields’, then there is no confusion; if they are not, some of the giant fields that have been partially developed would create conflict.

42. Anbar, Duhok, Babail, and Diwaniya provinces have no developed or discovered oil and gas fields. The ethnic and sectarian distribution of the population in oil- and gas-rich provinces favours relatively Shi'ite and Kurdish people, except for Kirkuk, which is a multi-ethnic province.

43. J. Payne and P. Mackey, ‘Update 2-Iraqi Kurdistan Starts Independent Crude Oil Exports’, Reuters, 8 May 2013. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/08/kurdistan-crude-exports-idUSL5E9C843R20130108.

44. US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, 11 December 2012. Accessed 18 May 2016. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/12/201811.htm.

45. ‘Turkey's Botas to build new pipeline for Kurdish gas’, Platts Oilgram News, 8 October 2013.

46. E. Peker, ‘Turkey-Kurds Deal on Oil Riles Iraq’, Wall Street Journal, 15 May 2013.

47. The pipeline with a capacity of 150,000 barrels per day (b/d) that can be extended to 200,000 b/d, linked the Genel Energy-operated Taq field with the Khurmala field, and Dohuk is linked into a 300,000 b/d pipeline to the Baghdad-controlled Fishkabour metering station. A new tie-in-station is constructed at Fishkabour, which can link the pipeline into Kirkuk–Ceyhan just before the Turkish border, but political and legal processes have stalled its operation. D. O'Byrne and S. Elliott, ‘Turkey open to talks on Kurdish oil pipeline’, Platts Oilgram News, 29 August 2013.

48. The gas pipeline will transport a minimum of 10 bcm/year to Turkey, while the oil pipeline has a planned capacity of minimum 1 million b/d. The amount of gas to be carried by 2025 may comprise 30% of Turkey's gas consumption. E. Peker, ‘Kurds, Turkey edge toward oil deal’, Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2013; and C. Camlıbel, ‘2014 a turning point for Kurdish oil and gas’, Hürriyet Daily News, 24 November 2014.

49. In 2007, the Kurdish parliament passed its own petroleum law. Exxon-Mobil and Chevron (US), Total (France), Gazprom (Russia), DNO (Norway), and Addax Petroleum (China) have agreements with the KRG.

50. ‘Turkey aware of Iraqi concerns on KRG oil’, Hürriyet Daily News, 1 November 2013.

51. ‘Turkey, Iraq refresh vows to mend ties’, Hürriyet Daily News, 20 November 2014.

52. ‘Kurds realize dream as Baghdad loses grip on north Iraq’, Reuters, 14 June 2014. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/iraq-security-kurds-idUSL5N0OT36U20140613.

53. For an analysis of the divergence between PYD and Iraqi Kurds, see T.F. Paasche, ‘Syrian and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation’, Middle East Policy Vol.22, No.1 (2015), pp.77–88.

54. For details, see O. Ali, ‘The Implications of the War on ISIS in Kurdistan’, ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs 10, (Ankara: ORSAM, September 2014), pp.5–7.

55. ‘PKK, PYD are the same, Barzani says’, Hürriyet Daily News, 23 March 2016 and ‘Kurdistan Regional Government condemns PKK officials statements’, Kurdistan Regional Government News, 18 February 2016. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=54250.

56. Pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa. After security forces opened fire on demonstrators, the unrest triggered nationwide protests. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands demanding President Bashar al-Assad's resignation were taking to the streets across the country. Violence escalated as rebel brigades were formed to battle against government forces; and the country descended into civil war in 2012.

57. C. Yengisu, ‘Suicide Bomber Is Identified as a Turk Suspected of ISIS Ties’, The New York Times, 23 July 2015.

58. The JDP government lost its 13 years of majority rule due to electoral gains of the HDP (13% of the total votes) in the June 2015 election. For the inconsistencies in the JDP's policy about the Kurdish question and the reasons, see M.H. Yavuz and N.A. Özcan, ‘The Kurdish question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party’, Middle East Policy Vol.13, No.1, (2006), pp.103, 107–11.

59. Tolga Tanış, ‘Turkey, US have differences, Chuck Hagel says’ Hürriyet Daily News, 29 June 2015; ‘Earlier intervention could have prevented the rise of ISIL, Turkish PM tells CNN’ Hürriyet Daily News, 28 July 2015; to read the transcript of the CNN interview, see http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1507/27/ampr.01.html. Accessed 14 August 2016.

60. ‘U.S. Jets to Use Turkish Bases in War on ISIS’, The New York Times, 24 July 2015.

61. There have been serious allegations about Turkey's support for ISIS ranging from weapons smuggling to illicit oil trade to tolerating Islamist groups’ support for ISIS recruitment in poor neighborhoods in major cities and across border towns. A. Scott and A. Christie-Miller, ‘ISIS Starts Recruiting in Istanbul's Vulnerable Suburbs’, Newsweek, 12 September 2014; B. Guiton, ‘ISIS Sees Turkey as Its Ally: Former Islamic State Member Reveals Turkish Army Cooperation’, Newsweek, 7 November 2014; ‘Turkish Intelligence Helped Ship Arms to Syrian Islamist Rebel Areas’, Reuters, 21 May 2015. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-arms-idUSKBN0O61L220150521; and ‘İşte Erdoğan'ın yok dediği silahlar’, Cumhuriyet, 29 May 2015, pp.1, 11.

62. ‘The Kurds Should Not Be Left Out of the Opposition’, Daily Sabah, 25 July 2013.

63. Syrian Kurds formed three cantons: Hasaka (Jazira, north-east Hasakeh province), Kobane (Ayn al-Arab, west of Tal Abyad), and Afrin (Kurd Dagh, north-west of Aleppo).

64. For details of disagreement and strategic differences between Turkey and US on Syria and the PYD, see pro-government think-tank authors’ article Kılıç Kanat and Kadir Üstün. ‘US-Turkey Realignment on Syria’, Middle East Policy Vol.22, No. 4 (2015), pp.91–3.

65. The US military has given significant assistance to the YPG to aid its advances against ISIS, including the dispatch of 300 Special Operations troops who have been aiding the Raqqa offensive since May 2016. ‘Pentagon does about-face on U.S. troops wearing Kurdish patches in Syria’, Washington Post, 28 May 2016; ‘Kurds declare their own region in northern Syria’, Washington Post, 18 March 2016; ‘Erdogan calls on West to recognize PYD as terror group’, Anadolu Agency, 16 February 2016. Accessed 22 May 2016. http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/erdogan-calls-on-west-to-recognize-pyd-as-terror-group/522348; ‘PYD can never be reliable anti-Daesh partner: Turkish FM’, Anadolu Agency, 12 March 2016. Accessed 12 May 2016. http://aa.com.tr/en/world/pyd-can-never-be-reliable-anti-daesh-partner-turkish-fm/536154; and ‘Turkey warns US over “Kurdish corridor” in Syria’, Hürriyet Daily News, 7 January 2016.

66. The rentier petrostate impedes inclusive growth and human development, because oil wealth enables low taxation, spending effect and preventing opposition group formation. This rentier structure allows the ruling elite to distribute selective benefits to certain political and social groups in exchange for political support. For a systematic discussion and analysis of how oil impedes democratization, see M. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); K.A. Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1997); D. Vandewalle, Libya since Independence: Oil and State-Building (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

67. International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State. Middle East Report No. 144, 14 August 2013, pp.15–25, 29–34.

68. T. Dodge, ‘State and Society in Iraq Ten Years after Regime Change: The Rise of a New Authoritariansim’, International Affairs Vol.89, No.2 (2013), pp.241–57.

69. International Crisis Group, Make or Break, pp.1–3; D. Romano, ‘Iraq's Descent into Civil War: A Constitutional Explanation’, Middle East Journal Vol.68, No.4 (2014), pp.547–66.

70. For a review of the transnational dimensions of the Kurdish issue and democratization in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey in light of the recent events such as the Iraqi Peshmerga's transit through Turkey to aid the defence of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobane, the evacuation and protection of Yazidis besieged by the forces of ISIS, and the support offered to Turkey's Kurdish ‘peace process’ by the KRG President Massoud Barzani, see the last section in Conflict, Democratization and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria edited by D. Romano and M. Gurses (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

71. Revolutionary regime formation does not necessarily mean progressive and democratic regime establishment given the definition.

72. Although the PYD have been adamantly denying accusations, there were reports alleging the YPG's forced displacements and house demolitions. Amnesty International, ‘Syria: US ally's razing of villages amounts to war crimes’, 13 October 2015. Accessed 22 May 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/10/syria-us-allys-razing-of-villages-amounts-to-war-crimes/; and A. al-Masri, ‘Is there ‘systematic ethnic cleansing’ by Kurds in north-east Syria?’ Middle East Monitor, 21 June 2015. Accessed 22 May 2016. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/19356-is-there-systematic-ethnic-cleansing-by-kurds-in-north-east-syria.

73. ‘Iraqi Kurdish leader urges Russia, U.S. to coordinate in anti-IS fight’, Reuters, 3 October 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-russia-idUSKCN0RX0QJ20151003.