An economic agent in my brain? A critical analysis of multiple-self models in neuroeconomics

Abstract

Neuroeconomic multiple-self models describe individuals’ choices as the equilibrium of the interaction amongst neural sites modelled as economic agents. This approach aims at explaining some inter-temporal inconsistency problems and the rejection of unfair offers in ultimatum games. However, the experiments on these models do not provide replicable results. The standard view interprets this problem as due to inadequate econometric techniques. Conversely, this paper shows that the non-replicability problem arises from a conundrum of multiple-self models’ (MSMs) theory. It illustrates how the assumption of neuroeconomic agents is deduced from the revealed preferences theory applied to the neuro-level. Therefore, the paper shows how experiments on MSMs cannot test the assumption of neuroeconomic agents but only the empirical hypotheses that derive from it. This entails that the assumption of neuroeconomic agents is a tautology, which might generate hypotheses that do not robustly identify the neural correlates of behaviour.

Keywords:

• Multiple-self
• rationality
• functional stability
• non-replicability

JEL Classifications:

• B 21
• B 31
• B 41