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Abstract
The ability to extract fully the contextualized interpretations of Michael Attaleiates’ Historia is a rather difficult task without the parallel study of sources chronicling the same period. This article reconsiders Attaleiates’ justification for the division of the army by Diogenes before the battle of Mantzikert in 1071, and argues that the author is as critical of this emperor’s strategy as his close contemporary, Psellos, though his criticism is more subtly formulated. Another section discusses a gap in the narrative structure of the Historia and goes on to fill it with information derived from the Hyle Historias of Bryennios and from the chronicles of al-Bundari and Ibn al-‘Adim.
Notes
† In memory of my PhD supervisor, Professor Frank R. Trombley.
1 Of the two critical editions of Attaleiates’ Historia (Pérez-Martín Citation2002; Tsolakis Citation2011), the most recent will be preferred.
2 Shepard (Citation1975, 220). That Attaleiates appears to be a source favourable to Diogenes has been also postulated by Cheynet (Citation1980, 418).
3 The Continuator of Skylitzes, the copyist of Attaleiates, provides us with a slightly different version in saying: καταϕρονήσας δὲ τούτων ὡς ὀλιγοστῶν (Having utterly disregarded those (i.e. the Turkish garrison) as being the smallest [in number]) (Tsolakis Citation1967, 144.17–18). The translation of all quotations in this paper is my own.
4 “Having therefore regarded with utter contempt the enemy garrison in Mantzikert as unable to resist his assault and having also split another, the most numerous, portion of the army, he entrusted its leadership to one of the notables, the magister Joseph Trachaneiotes, also giving him a not contemptible body of infantry”.
5 Liddell, Scott, and Jones (Citation1940, 920); Sophocles (Citation[1900] 2003, 649).
6 Dimitrakos (Citation1964, Vol. 8, 3778).
7 Adler ([Citation1928–Citation38] Citation1971, Vol. 3, 63).
8 “περιϕρονήσαντες δὲ τούτων οἱ βάρβαροι, ὡς ἤδη καταστραϕέντων καὶ καταστρατηγηθέντων ὁλοσχερῶς” (Since the barbarians neglected them [i.e. the Roman men], because they had been already defeated and completely overcome); and, “οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ βασιλέως θράσει καὶ προθυμίᾳ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐναντίων περιεϕρόνουν … ” (The emperor's soldiers, with over-boldness and zeal, contemned the great number of the enemy …).
9 For the translation of the incomplete part of this protasis here, the text of the Continuator of Skylitzes (144.27) has been used.
10 “Considering this well the emperor divided the army, hoping to rapidly subdue Mantzikert, as indeed occurred, to shortly arrange the [affairs] in it and thus to return to his own [troops]. And if a certain [need will press] and they (i.e. Diogenes and the army remaining to himself) are involved in a battle unexpectedly, to recall by couriers his own [troops] which were not a great distance away. … and for this reason, the split from him of the army was not contrary to reason, and also it was not a thought without strategic calculation … ”.
11 “The Armenian infantry, after attacking the wall outside the citadel and having made many attacks, took it without resistance when the sun was setting fast in the west”.
12 After recounting Tarchaneiotes’ despatch to Chliat, Attaleiates moves to a new section that begins as: “παραβαλὼν δ᾿ ὁ βασιλεὺς εἰς τὸ Μαντζικίερτ” (When the emperor came close to Mantzikert) (117.7). This enhances the impression that the event in question chronologically precedes the arrival of the imperial army in front of the gates of Mantzikert.
13 The same view is shared by Nicolle (Citation2013, 51), but he does not explain how he reached his conclusion.
14 “ … for it was reported that they (i.e. the troops at Chliat) were being attacked by a number of 10,000 enemy soldiers”.
15 We know from John Skylitzes (Thurn Citation1973, 462.54–63) that the city of Mantzikert was surrounded by a triple curtain wall securing sustainable supplies of spring water. Its seizure by the Armenians in less than a day was, therefore, an enormous achievement, if it is kept in mind that Tughrul Beg was ceaselessly storming it for thirty days in the past, until he finally lifted the siege.
16 See note 2. Also, Krallis (Citation2006, 177–178; Citation2012, 133). Krallis, who argues for a disagreement between Attaleiates and Psellos concerning emperor Diogenes, builds his case on a wider basis than that of the battle of Mantzikert. There are, however, strong indications that the views of the two contemporary historians are quite identical. This concurrence may, I believe, explain why Attaleiates’ “refutation of the Chronographia failed before the force of Psellos’ all-too-human portraits of conjugal tensions”, as Krallis asserts at p. 94 of his book. Since the topic falls outside the scope of the present paper, it will be the subject of a future project.
17 On the allagion, see the discussion of Shepard (Citation1975, 223–225).
18 “For in the preceding battles not that much need arose for the Romans [who were] with the emperor so that his own unit – the usually named allagion – would put themselves at risk to fight. But while the other allagia were gaining the victory in advance, those files, which were hanging round the emperor, were staying away from the actual battles, having forgotten in a way how a raging battle and a clash [used to be]”. It is worth noticing that Attaleiates comes back to the quality and prowess of the troops sent to Chliat at 122.12–14: πλῆθος ὄντας οὐκ εὐαρίθμητον καὶ συνήθως ἀεὶ προπολεμοῦντας καὶ ἠσκημένους μᾶλλον τὴν πυρρίχιον ὄρχησιν. (It was a large multitude [of soldiers] who were more trained [than others] in the “dance of war” and always used to fight in the front line.)
19 Literally, “the emperor of generosity”. The translation of the noun “καλοκαγαθίας” is based on Lampe (Citation1961, 698). However, it is apparent from the narrative context that the “generosity” carries here a negative connotation. From this viewpoint, Polemis (Citation1997, 287) has accurately conveyed the meaning of the source language text and Attaleiates’ concept. Cf. Kaldellis and Krallis (Citation2012, 293) and Pérez-Martín (Citation2002, 120).
20 The treacherous role of Andronikos is stressed, though indirectly, by Bryennios who notes that “he was not entirely friendly to the emperor” (Gautier Citation1975, 115.13–14). See moreover the Continuator of Skylitzes, 149.9–12.
21 As regards Tarchaneiotes, Attaleiates says: ὁ στρατηγὸς τούτων μαθὼν τὴν τοῦ σουλτάνου κατ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπέλευσιν, ἄρας τοὺς ἀμϕ᾿ αὐτὸν ἅπαντας διὰ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας ϕυγὰς ἀγεννῶς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐνέβαλε, μηδένα λόγον τοῦ δεσπότου μήτε μὴν τοῦ εἰκότος ὁ δείλαιος θέμενος. (Upon learning the sultan's attack on the emperor himself, their general took all the ones who followed him and, fleeing, cowardly, through Mesopotamia, he rushed into Roman territory without the fearful general thinking of his master or the right) (122.19–23).
22 “And he uttered nothing sound, when being asked, for he liked to flatter the emperor”.
23 The same point of view is taken by Krallis (Citation2009, 173–174).
24 Attaleiates remarks: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς σαλπίσας τὸ ἐνυάλιον τὸν μόθον παραλόγως ἐκρότησε (In having [ordered] the warlike song to be given by trumpet, the emperor, falsely signalled) (124.5–6). The use of the adverb παραλόγως is indicative of the author's disagreement with the imperial decision to fight that battle. But earlier in the text Attaleiates says that the Turks had taken control of the river, trying to make the Byzantines suffer from thirst (122.1–2). Yet, Attaleiates is silent as to what alternatives Diogenes had at that difficult time.
25 On Attaleiates’ criticism of the emperors’ strategy and tactics, see Tsolakis (Citation1969, 189–204), and also the discussion of Vryonis (Citation2003, 23–34).
26 In line with this scholarship, see Markopoulos (Citation2003, 218–221), Papaioannou (Citation2013, 173), and Kaldellis (Citation1999, 19).
27 “Towards the conclusion of the actions [of the operation], and upon his retirement from the place (i.e. of Diogenes with his army) and the reunification, on the same day, with the [other portion of] the army that had been split off, the sultan, without warning, seized the land, and [accordingly] the plans that had been drawn up were hindered from being fulfilled”. On the role of Divine providence in the Historia of Attaleiates, see Hinterberger (Citation2003, 156–159).
28 On Byzantine land routes and transport, see Dimitroukas (Citation1998, 7–42, esp. 16–20).
29 I am grateful to the peer-reviewer for that detail.
30 “But while the third day had not yet gone by, the Turks launched an attack upon those who had departed away [from the body of the marching army] for the collection of grass; and they killed others, while they caught some alive. So, when the event was reported to the emperor, Basilakes was recalled at once. And he was being asked extensively about the Turks: who are those launching the attacks and where they are coming from”.
31 Dimitrakos (Citation1964, Vol. 9, 4609).
32 “Upon arriving in Cappadocia he immediately called his best generals to an assembly and a council related to the [impending] war”.
33 Instructions about foraging parties are found in the De re military (Dennis Citation1985, 308.22).
34 The pagination follows the edition of the texts by Sümer and Sevim (Citation1971). Their translation in English is provided by Hillenbrand (Citation2007, 60; 75).
35 Attaleiates, 120.4–18; Bryennios, 111.4–113.16.
36 In the Turkish translation of Sümer and Sevim (Citation1971, 13) the place of the battle is given as Rahve. See also, Hillenbrand (Citation2007, 38; and note 5 at page 49).
37 Hillenbrand (Citation2007, 60).
38 The text has been translated by Dostourian (Citation1993, 135). Matthew of Edessa stresses that this place was near Mantzikert.
39 “His incapacity (or, inexperience) of commanding an army [led him to] divide his forces” (Reinsch Citation2014).