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Abstract
It is a common view among philosophers of language that both propositions and sentences are structured objects. One obvious question to ask about such a view is whether there is any interesting connection between these two sorts of structure. The author identifies two theses about this relationship. Identity (ID) – the structure of a sentence and the proposition it expresses are identical. Determinism (DET) – the structure of a sentence determines the structure of the proposition it expresses. After noting that ID entails DET, the author argues against DET (and therefore also against ID). This argument is based on considerations to do with unarticulated constituents, but it is not ultimately empirical. As well as answering a question suggested by contemporary theories of propositions, the conclusion is significant because some, but not all, of the theories of propositions currently popular entail ID and/or DET. Unless there is a response to the argument here, those theories are refuted.
Acknowledgements
I thank Herman Cappelen, Ephraim Glick, Matthew McGrath, and audiences at Arché and CSMN for helpful comments on earlier versions of the ideas presented here. I also thank David Hunter and Gurpreet Rattan, the editors of the Canadian Journal of Philosophy special issue in which this paper is published, for useful suggestions and comments. Some of this paper is based on Hodgson (Citation2013).
Notes
1. Stanley cites a reprint of Gilbert Harman's paper.