Reidian Dual Component Theory defended

Abstract

For Reid perception, broadly speaking, was a complex of two very different mental states. Calling such views dual component theory, A. D. Smith questions whether any such theory, and whether Reid's version in particular, is a viable theory of perception. The aim of this paper is to defend Reidian Dual Component Theory from Smith's critique. Answering Smith's critique reveals the depth and resilience of Reid's approach to perception, highlighting specifically the continued interest of his thought about the relationship between sensation and perception, the nature of illusion, the immediacy of perception, and the content of perceptual belief.

Keywords::

• Thomas Reid
• sensation
• perception
• direct realism
• dual component theory

Notes

^1. The association of Reid's works with the works of his fellow travelers Oswald and Beattie is often noted by Reid's critics. See Somerville (1995) for a discussion of the association in Hume's ‘enigmatic parting shot;’ also see (Kant 2004, 66) and (Priestley 1978).

^2. Falkenstein (2002) and (2000) offers important criticisms of some of Reid's central ideas; for criticism in the mode of sympathetic reconstruction see Hamilton's notes and dissertations in (Reid 1895), and (Wolterstorff 2001).

^3. See Pelser (2010) and Smith (2001) for discussion of the wisdom of this decision. As Smith notes (2002, 73), objections to the belief requirement constitute another line of critique of Reidian DCT not addressed here.

^4. Buras (2006) thinks Reid's view is not only consistent with the claim that sensations take themselves as objects, but requires it. See Ganson (2008) for textual and philosophical arguments to the contrary.

^5. The connection is only loosely causal because of Reid's understanding of the strict and proper sense of causation, which always implies agency. But the constant conjunction of distinct events in experience suffices for the attribution of causation in the loose and popular sense; see (1997, 59).

^6. To my knowledge, Reid never considers the possibility that the connection is established by a sort of mistake. Smith reads Hume as offering this sort of explanation (2002, 77). The vulgar are taken simply to mistake their sensations for mind-independent external objects. But the consistency of the connection clearly favors explanation in terms of laws.

^7. The main arguments I take Reid to be alluding to can be found in sections 18–20 of Berkeley's Treatise (1998, 109–110); and section 1.4.2 of Hume's Treatise (2000, 125–144).

^8. The interpretation of Reid's sign theory sketched here agrees with Copenhaver (2004), who puts the point in terms of the lack of any intrinsic feature that makes sensations them signs of external objects.

^9. See (Copenhaver 2010) and (van Cleve 2004) for further discussion of the differences between original and acquired perception.

^10. It is not vital to my argument in this section to determine whether Smith's cases are in fact, as I suggest, instances of acquired perception. As explained below, mismatch cases are possible in original perception as well. Giovanni Grandi notes, however, that Smith's cases fundamentally involve the perception of the location (or change of location, i.e., movement) of colors, and that Reid may indeed believe that the perception of the location of colors is an original perception. Reid does say that sensations of color suggest not only the present existence of certain external qualities, but also suggest ‘individual direction and position’ of those qualities in relation to the eye (1997, 99).

^11. The key point for my argument is that the suppression of natural cognitive responses is possible, and Reid explicitly allows that in some cases acquired perceptions ‘efface’ original perceptions in the way suggested here (2002, 236). But in other cases he suggests that our original perceptual response is impervious to change by custom (1997, 154). I am not sure on what basis Reid would distinguish the two.

^12. The concern goes at least as far back as Hamilton (see Reid 1895). For a sample of the more recent literature, see Madden (1986), Chapell (1989), Pappas (1989), Buras (2002), van Cleve (2004) and Copenhaver (2004).

^13. The same considerations weigh against the claim that sensations are not objects of awareness in perception because of their alleged transparency or diaphanous character, as in (Harman 1990).

^14. Indeed, I made the same point in my own discussion of the problem (Buras 2002, 472–473).

^15. It is hard to see how Smith could disagree with this, given his insistence on the claim that our sensations are never wholly overlooked (2002, 79).

^16. Here, again, my approach agrees with Copenhaver (2004).

^17. Some Reid scholars do just this, e.g., (van Cleve 2004, 111–121).

^18. I have raised doubts about whether Reid actually thought of perceptual conception in terms of acquaintance, for instance (Buras 2008, 630–632).

^19. Grateful acknowledgement is hereby offered to students in graduate seminars on Reid at Baylor University, and to contributors to this volume, especially Giovanni Grandi, for comments on early drafts of this work.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Todd Buras

Todd Buras is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University.