Rational choice and the Chinese discourse on the Unity of the Three Religions (sanjiao heyi 三教合一)

Abstract

One of the major hypotheses of the religious-economy model is that the more unregulated the religious market is, the more diversity and pluralism will be found, the more competition there will be, and the higher the level of participation is to be expected. The article discusses this hypothesis in light of the pre-modern Chinese discourse on the Unity of the Three Religions (sanjiao heyi 三教合一). Since the rational-choice-based model is not able to provide an explanation for this specific concept, this article proposes the definition of a new case of a regulated pluralism defined by its claim to give up competition, and suggests a new kind of threefold monopoly independent from coercive measures by the state. Some explanations for this new case are provided and the usability of rational-choice theory in analysing the data gained outside of the European frame of the model is discussed. As the author will show, the religious-economy model appears only to be able to follow historical analysis and adapt its propositions accordingly; the model itself seems to be far too narrow and too undifferentiated to reliably include analyses of Chinese religions.

Keywords:

• rational-choice theory
• Chinese religions
• Three Teachings (sanjiao)

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Max Deeg and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on this paper.

Notes

¹‘Firm’, in Stark's usage, denotes what otherwise is called a (religious) tradition/school/movement.

²In his Yudao lun (喻道論), Sun Chuo writes: ‘[The Confucian sages] Duke of Zhou and Confucius are like the Buddha and the Buddha is like the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. These are probably just designations of outer and inner aspects. Therefore it works as imperial in front of an emperor and as kingly in front of a king. The term “fo” is Sanskrit and in [the language] of the Jin it has the meaning of “awakened”. “Awakened” means “to get the meaning” and denotes an insight into the things. It is like Meng Ke [Mencius] taking the sages to be those who are the first to awaken (cf. Mengzi 5A7 and 5B1, J.G.), both point to one and the same. To appropriately respond to the social affairs of the times and follow the course of the things you probably also have to meet the timely moment. The Duke of Zhou and Confucius rescued the world in times of utmost distress, the Buddha illuminated its roots. Together they can be taken as head and tail, what they lead to is not different.’ (‘周、孔即佛, 佛即周、孔, 蓋外內名之耳。故在皇為皇, 在王為王。佛者梵語, 晉訓覺也。覺之為義, 悟物之謂。猶孟軻以聖人為先覺, 其旨一也。應世軌物, 蓋亦隨時。周、孔救極弊。佛教明其本耳。共為首尾, 其致不殊。’) Cf. Yudao lun in Hongming ji (弘明集), beginning of chap. 3.

³The sanjiao discourse in my view proves Mollier's hypothesis wrong that Buddhists and Daoists merely wanted to ‘maintain liturgical and evangelical monopolies’ (Mollier 2008: 19).

⁴See the multiple and shifting functions of officials employed in governmental religious policy in Hucker (1985): no. 101 (p. 108), no. 1652 (p. 196), no. 1656 (p. 196), no. 2625 (p. 248), no. 3485 (pp. 295–6), no. 5976 (p. 468), also pp. 404–405 and 488–489 cf. also De Groot [1903–1904: 105–106] and Eichhorn (1973: 213, 260, 313, 340). Other religions included for example Manichaeism, Mazdaism, Nestorianism, Islam and others.

⁵Examples of this can be found in times when the state favoured one over the other and allowed one institution to control the other such as, for example, the Quanzhen-Daoists under their leader Chan Chun who was given special privileges by Genghis Khan through two imperial edicts in 1223 and 1227, which led to the destruction of hundreds of Buddhist monasteries and temples, and the devastating reverse of the Buddhists after 1258. Cf. Eichhorn (1973: 305–307) with reference to Taishō 52, 2116, 0766–0767 (Bianwei lu 辨偽錄). Cf., with same reference, Liu (1984: 3–95, 65–67).

⁶See the studies of Kohn (1995) and Mollier (2008).

⁷Campany supports this point with linguistic evidence when, discussing Chinese pre-modern notions of what we call ‘religion’, he points out that ‘metaphorical expressions that gather up multiple texts, ideas, practices, and persons and picture them as a “path” or a “teaching” are used in contrastive situations, where a difference is being encountered and negotiated’ (Campany 2003: 313).

⁸An early example of this compositional structure is Emperor Xiaozong's (孝宗) (r. 1163–1189) ‘Discussion of [Han Yu's] “Yuan Dao” (Yuandao lun 原道論 or Yuandao bian 原道辯)’ written in 1181 against Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824).

⁹Cf. Berling 1980: Chapters five and six. Kenneth Dean writes: ‘Lin Zhao'en's own philosophical efforts at syncretic systematization are generally considered to have achieved rather modest results. …] In his effort to demonstrate the relationship among Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist concepts, Lin seldom provides more than an equation of terms. There is little sustained analysis of the correspondence of concepts embedded within their original philosophical or theological system.” Cf. Dean (1998: 23). Although the Lin Zhaoen cult which develops later in China's Southeast and takes Lin Zhaoen as Master of the Three-in-One starts with the aim of revitalising Confucianism, it follows its very own historical dynamics. Cf. Dean (1998: 24ff).

¹⁰See Qisong's works ‘Fei Han 非韓’, ‘Fu jiao bian 輔教編’, ‘Yuan jiao 原教’, ‘Xiao lun 孝論’, cf. Ch'ien (1986: 11–12).

¹¹By using the expression ‘institutionalised reality’ I acknowledge the existence of religious practices that address numinous personnel from all three religions in various forms. I do, however, not know of any institutionalised form of such religious practice that was accepted by an authoritative institution (exerting impact beyond the local level) of any one of the three teachings at any time in Chinese history.

¹²A first complete translation has been published by Taylor (1983). Parts of the essay have been translated by Langlois and Sun (1983). See also Taylor (1977) and my own new translation with analysis of this essay (Gentz, forthcoming), an essay that, according to Judith Berling ‘is quite obscure and does not lend itself to coherent translation’ (Berling 1980: 275, fn. 40).

¹³This position is based on the writings of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 (Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵) (1139–93) and Wang Yangming.

¹⁴This position is based on the writings of the Cheng brothers, Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–85) and Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107), as well as Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200).

¹⁵‘While Stark's model might not work for this particular discourse and on a national level, it might very well work on a local level where discourse and reality would also be much better connected. We should not forget that China is indeed an empire and cannot be studied on the same level of aggregation as smaller units (countries, even the USA)’, a comment of the unknown reviewer that I gratefully insert here to moderate my point.

¹⁶‘To my mind, the main reason why modern Chinese literary practice does not allow itself to be schematised as easily in terms of only two conflicting principles, the way Bourdieu described modern French literary practice, is the presence of a third principle, partly but not fully heteronomous, which motivates modern Chinese writers to consider, as part of their practice, the well-being of their country and their people. It would be incorrect to view this “political principle” as part of the autonomous principle, for two reasons: first, because overly utilitarian writing has never been accorded high literary value by the Chinese literary community and, second, because “politically correct” writers can be upwardly mobile in terms of “political capital” within the field, even if they are immobile in terms of “symbolic capital”.’ Hockx (1999: 12).