Vulnerabilities, Exploitation, Exclusion, and Social Trauma of Half-Widows in Shafi Ahmad’s the Half Widow (2012)

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size

Notes

¹ “Half-widows are the wives of the disappeared men in Kashmir, who are uncertain about the status and whereabouts of their husbands. However, since this category does not have the legitimacy of the law, and is born out of the identity of the disappeared man, it is not justiciable in a court of law” (Bhattacharya 2016).

² The irony of the half-widows is the lingering hope that their husbands might be alive and may return one day. This is the reason why, in popular media, these women are also known as “waiting women.” (Dsouza 28).

³ The notion of hegemony “has its roots in the writings of Gramsci and is essentially a position of dominance attained through relative consensus rather than regular force, even if underpinned by force (Gramsci 1971)” (Jewkes et al. S113-S114).

⁴ Joyce McCarl Nielson et al. in their article (2000) show that “heteronormativity itself is gendered via the homosexualization of disruptive men and heterosexualization of disruptive women and compulsory heterosexuality operates differently for women and men,” (283) and focuses “on men and women’s violation of sexual norms, which could make them transgressive. Moreover, patriarchy in a social set up mobilizes “heteronormativity through routine activities in which, gender, sexuality, and heterosexuality stay interconnected” (Jackson 117).

⁵ “Gender, race, class, and compulsory heterosexuality extend deep into the unconscious and outward into the social structure and material interests” (Pease 45)’ and “heterosexualities generally, but not necessarily, align with sexual behaviors and desires orientated to the other, as opposed to the same, gender” (Dean 537).

⁶ “The patriarchal order prohibits forms of emotion, attachment, and pleasure that patriarchal society itself produces. Tension develops around sexual inequality and men’s rights in marriage, around the prohibition on homosexual affection (given that patriarchy constantly produces homo-social institutions) and around the threat to social order symbolized by sexual freedoms” (Connell 86).

⁷ The relationship of structure within the confines of social institutions rests on Connells’ assumption that “the structure is more than another term for ‘pattern’ and refers to the intractability of the social world. It reflects the experience of being up against something, of limits on freedom; and also the experience of being able to operate by proxy” (Connell 92). She further writes, that “the concept of social structure expresses the constraints on social practice” and “the constraints on social practice operate through a more complex interplay of powers and through an array of social institutions” (Connell 92). The structure, constraint, and practice all are pinioned to each other and work in entirety.

Connell refers to Arthur Gidden’s (1984) “theory of structuration,” that “emphasizes the recursive relationship between social structure and individuals. That is, social structures shape individual, but simultaneously, individuals shape the social structure” (Risman 432), meaning to say that “human practice always presupposes social structure, in the sense that practice necessarily calls into play social rules or resources. The structure is always emergent from practice and is constituted by it” (Connell 94). Connell, however, differs with Gidden’s attempt to render a current framework for social theory and emphasizes, the point that Gidden has missed is that “being constituted by everyday practice, the structure is vulnerable to major changes in practice. In this sense, “practice can be turned against what constrains it; so the structure can be deliberately the object of practice” (quoted in Maharaj 53). Moreover, Connell’s reference to Juliet Mitchell and Gayle Rubin’s accounts of social structures pinpoint that they thrive as patterns of practice, with the categorical difference with each other yet with an evident overlap which engenders the subjection of women. In this article we assume social structures as a pattern of practice that functions conjointly with social institutions.

⁸ Roland Verwiebe writes that “Social Institutions are a system of behavioral and relationship patterns that are densely interwoven and enduring, and function across an entire society. They order and structure the behavior of individuals by means of their normative character. Institutions regulate the behavior of individuals in the core areas of society: a) family and relationship networks carry out social reproduction and socialization; b) institutions in the realm of education and training ensure the transmission and cultivation of knowledge, abilities and specialized skills; c) institutions in the labor market and economy provide for the production and distribution of goods and services; d) institutions in the realm of law, governance, and politics provide for the maintenance of the social order; e) while cultural, media and religious institutions further the development of contexts of meanings, value orientations, and symbolic codes” (1).

⁹ “Sexuality is a broader term referring to all erotically significant aspects of social life and social beings, such as desires, practices, relationships, and identities.” (Jackson 106).

¹⁰ “The number of men rigorously practicing the hegemonic pattern in its entirety may be quite small. Yet, the majority of men gain from its hegemony, since they benefit from the patriarchal dividend, the advantage men in general gain from the overall subordination of women” (Connell 79).

¹¹ Stereotyping of divorced and widowed women are universally present, “in the context of Iraq-Iran war divorced or widowed women are considered as a burden on their families, while their sexuality is considered insatiable” (Bulbeck 181). Ann Newton-Levinson (2014) while researching about the “sexuality and stigma of Ethiopian widowed or divorced women find that a common assumption goes that they have more sexual desires and their sexuality is often perceived as unrestrained, and unpredictable, hence something that must be monitored or reined by the community” (920).

¹² Syed Mohammad Ali (2004) with reference to the rights of Muslim women whose husbands have disappeared during wars especially writes that, “Both the Quran and the Hadith are silent regarding the waiting period of a wife if the husband is missing and cannot be communicated with. In view of the absence of any authority from the Quran or from the Hadith, a reasonable period of waiting should be sufficient for the wife to be free from the marriage with such a person. However, the Hanafi jurists took a very unreasonable and oppressive view on this question. Thus Imam Abu Hanifa opined that women in such cases should wait for 120 years. Imam Yusuf asked for an unreasonably long waiting period for 100 years for women in this position. Imam Shafii recommended seven years waiting for wives of the mafqud-ul-khabar. However, other jurists approach the issue more reasonably. Imam Malik recommended four years in such cases. Ibn Musayyal opined, when a person becomes mafqud in the course of the fighting, his wife shall wait for a year” (72).