History writing and nation building in post-independence Tajikistan

Abstract

Since the end of the Tajik civil war in 1997, the Tajik authorities have being seeking to instill a new national consciousness. Here the educational system plays a crucial role, not least the way history is taught. Through a state-approved history curriculum, the authorities offer a common understanding of the past that is intended to strengthen the (imagined) community of the present. In this article, we examine the set of history textbooks currently used in Tajik schools and compare them with Soviet textbooks, exploring continuities and changes in the understanding of the Tajik nation. We distinguish between changes in the perception of the national “self” and the new “other,” the Uzbeks, and introduce two intermediary categories: the Soviet/Russian heritage as an “external self” and Islam as an “internal other.” The main battle for the further delimitation of the Tajik “self” is likely to take place within the discursive gray zone between the two latter categories, where the authorities will have to find a balance between a continued secular state ideology and the heavy presence of Islam, as well as between a Soviet past and a Tajik present.

Keywords:

• Tajikistan
• nation building
• history curriculum
• self
• other

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Tim Epkenhans, Pål Kolstø, Iver B. Neumann, Stina Torjesen and Elana Wilson Rowe for feedback and comments on previous drafts. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 14th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), New York, 23–25 April 2009.

Notes

One may speak of a limited post-colonial turn in the works of, for example, Rahim Masov, the director of the Institute of History of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, but as yet this has not been reflected in the school books. For an overview of Tajik historical discourse since independence, see Laruelle (“The Return”).

For a discussion of the changes in Soviet interpretations of Russian colonialism in Central Asia and the inclusion of the region in the Russian Empire, see Tillett.

The authors of the Soviet textbooks include the only non-Tajik in our sample, Boris Litvinskiy. Litvinskiy, an archeologist, is a former protégé of Bobojon Gafurov, founder of Tajik historical discourse and First Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party (1946–1956). Litvinskiy's co-author, Akhror Mukhtarov, a historian, was a leading member of the Academy of the Sciences of the Tajik SSR, and Gafur Khaydarov a renowned professor of history. All three were born in the 1920s.

As with the Soviet textbooks, the new books have been written by prominent historians (Ya'qubov is, however, like Litvinskiy, an archeologist). Most of the authors are either affiliated with the Academy of Sciences or the Tajik National University and were born in the 1930s.

In this respect, the Soviet textbooks seem to have been more in conformity with the ideological standard than the master narrative developed by Bobojon Gafurov in his Brief History of the Tajik People from 1949 and The Tajiks: Most Ancient, Ancient, and Medieval History from 1972, both of which are much more ethnocentric in their approach. See also Laruelle (“The Concept” 184).

The idea of the Tajiks as the descendants of the Aryans is not a post-Soviet invention; it was indeed promoted as early as in the late 1940s by Bobojon Gafurov. As witnessed by our sample, however, the Aryan myth found its way into the history curriculum only after independence.

On the occasion of the anniversary, Rahmon spoke of the post-independence period as “the era of the rebirth of the ancient nations” (qtd. in Laruelle, “The Return” 54). Rahmon is also the author of several books on Tajik history, including The Tajiks in the Mirror of History: From the Aryans to the Samanids.

This is actually a questionable claim, as the Samanids contributed greatly to the firm establishment of Hanafi School Sunni Islam in Central Asia (see Tor).

In both the Soviet and contemporary textbooks, it is stated that during the rule of the Samanid Dynasty the ethnonym “Aryan” was replaced by “Tajik” (cf. Litvinskiy and Mukhtarov 38–39; Khojaev 47–49; Ya'qubov 205–07).

For a more critical evaluation of Rahmon's maneuverings during the Civil War, including his association with warlords like Sangak Safarov, see, for example, Buisson (130–33) or Nourzhanov.

In a study of the perceptions of “self” and “other” in Tajik literature from the 1970s to the early 1990s, Anaita Khudonazar nevertheless reveals that, despite the official discourse, Uzbekistan was frequently portrayed as the “evil stepfather” (Russia, on the other hand, held a more ambiguous position: both as a motherly figure and as a wicked step-mother). Within Tajik historiography, Marlene Laruelle (“The Return” 57), comparing Gafurov's works from the late 1940s and the 1970s, has pointed to a more open (by Soviet standards) criticism of the Uzbeks in the latter work.

This tendency is even more pronounced in the general historical discourse, in which, for instance, the above-mentioned Rahim Masov has been the source of virulent attacks on the Uzbeks (see, for example, Laruelle, “The Return” 61). Given his position and his close ties with the presidential administration, Masov's stand takes on a semi-official character.

Ya'qubov also claims that skull measurements have indicated that there was no intermixture of Turkic-Mongol origins in the Hephthalites (48–49). It should be noted that, of all the textbooks in the sample, Ya'qubov's is the most ethnocentric.

The Jadids were routinely denounced as “pan-Turkists” in Soviet historiography (cf., for example, the influential works of Bobojon Gafurov), although a distinction was made between these reformists and the so-called “Enlighteners,” who were judged to be progressive.

The absence of a clear Tajik voice in the delimitation deliberations has also been underlined by Western scholars (cf. Haugen 149–53).

As an estimated 15.3% of the population in Tajikistan is made up of ethnic Uzbeks, this othering of the Uzbeks not only implies an alienation of neighboring Uzbekistan but also undermines the prospects for national unity (in a civic, non-ethnic sense) in Tajikistan.

This stands in contrast to, for instance, the depiction of the Basmachis in contemporary history textbooks in Uzbekistan, where the Basmachis now are portrayed as “fighters for independence” (cf. “Absurdy istorii”).

Rahim Masov has explained the continued close relations between Tajiks and Russians by their “racial and linguistic proximity,” implying a common “Aryan heritage” (a heritage they do not share with the Turkic Uzbeks) (see Laruelle, “The Return” 61).

Ya'qubov recognizes that the traditional understanding of pre-Islamic religious life was one of religious diversity and refers to the works of Bobojon Gafurov, but argues that at the time of Gafurov insufficient research had been conducted on this topic.

The Zoroastrian heritage is actively promoted by the state authorities: in 2001, the Tajik authorities encouraged (on a voluntary/mandatory basis) the celebration of the 2700th anniversary of the holy scriptures of Zoroastrianism, the Avesta, and on President Rahmon's initiative UNESCO officially recognized 2003 as the “3000th Anniversary of the Zoroastrian Civilization.”

In 2008, Akbar Turajonzod, formerly the highest-ranking Muslim cleric in Tajikistan (1988–1991) and deputy chairman of the IRPT (1993–1999) raised a debate over the issue when in an open letter to the Minister of Education he declared that the history textbook authors had taken an “unprofessional, irrational, and sometimes insulting and offensive stance” toward Islam and Islamic values. “Even Soviet-era textbooks, which were openly atheistic, didn't deny historical facts like our current authors do,” he claimed (qtd. in Najibullah).

It should be added that the Ministry of Education of Tajikistan has introduced the history of religion as a mandatory course. The historical aspects are thus taught as a separate subject. From 2002 to 2007, the history of religion was taught in the 7th grade, and from then on in the 10th grade.

Cf. the 2009 introduction of a law on religion (“On the Freedom of Belief and Religious Organizations”) which severely reduces the possibility for non-state-supported mosques to operate in Tajikistan. The law declares Tajikistan a secular state, but at the same time gives preferential treatment to the state-controlled Hanafi School Islam.

Although President Rahmon completed the hajj in 1997, the Tajik elite are in many respects militantly secularist. The promotion the Samanid historical legacy, the Aryan civilization and Zoroastrianism have all been directed at marginalizing the role of Islam in Tajik politics (Marat 54).

Cf. the above-mentioned Uzbek re-evaluation of the Basmachi movement.

Ya'qubov refers to the ancient Aryans interchangeably as “Aryan” and “Tajik.”

An exception to this is Hakimov (70), who writes of “Tajiks outside the borders” (Tojikoni berunmarzi) and argues that half of the Tajik population was left outside of the Soviet boundaries in Afghanistan.

Another aspect of consumption is the actual penetration of the books. Post-independence Tajikistan has seen a partial breakdown in the educational system as a result of severe economic problems.