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Abstract
In Afghanistan, there has been much talk about, and international support for dealing with past injustices by developing transitional justice mechanisms. Reconciliation is being promoted as a nation-building strategy. This article argues that the implementation of transitional justice poses several challenges. First, a significant component of such a strategy is based on reconciliation taking place internally among competing armed groups and ethnic identities with the goal of transforming Afghan society. This assumes the cause of past conflicts to be internal and along ethnic divisions which limits the accountability for war crimes. It also considers violence and crimes of war as a thing of the past, ignoring the present situation. Furthermore, given the ongoing war between the US-led forces and the Taliban, insecurity and escalating levels of violence one has to question whether transitional justice can take place during a war. This article concludes that transitional justice is interconnected to perceptions of security and stability. The analysis of the present situation in Afghanistan poses critical questions as to whether memories of victims can be considered as the past in the midst of war.
Acknowledgements
A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2010 ASN conference in New York. I would like to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this paper.
Notes
1. More specifically the Transitional Justice Unit.
2. The popularity in the implementation of transitional justice in post conflict societies has not been without controversy. See Kerr and Mobekk (Citation2007, 8).
3. For a discussion on the expansion of the field of transitional justice see Teitel (Citation2008, 1).
4. See, for example, De Greiff and Duthie (Citation2009, 19).
5. Miller (Citation2008, 270) argues that causes of conflict such as economic recourses and inequality must be addressed as part of reconciliation efforts.
6. The issue of amnesty continues to be controversial particularly in cases where blanket amnesties were granted. For more on this see Ludwin King (Citation2010, 577).
7. These two cases are some of the earliest in the implementation of Truth Commissions. They also set as examples and lessons learned for the South African Truth Commission. For more on these cases see Nino (Citation1991, 2619).
8. Some literature discusses specific case studies such as South Africa. See Mamdani (Citation2000, 176).
9. The South African case has often been considered as a model of success for other Truth Commissions. Accounts of its success vary. See Gibson (Citation2004, 201).
10. Demilitarization is often considered as a pre-condition to peace negotiations.
11. The US military response to 11 September 2001 attacks was named “Operation Enduring Freedom”.
12. The imposition of democracy has been particularly popular since the end of Cold War. See Haass (Citation1998, 170).
13. For more on this argument see Walter (Citation1999, 127).
14. This is particularly more evident in the aftermath of US military intervention.
15. Despite political stability, reconciliation at the local level remains unresolved. See Atashi (Citation2011, 211).
16. Although not related to its mandate regarding transitional justice the AIHRC also monitors current human rights violations by foreign troops and violence against children and women.
17. In Cambodia, for example, extensive documentation, research and archiving have played a significant role in efforts by civil society groups to address past crimes with little government support.
18. For a discussion on Justice System in Afghanistan see Jones Pauly and Nojumi (Citation2004, 843).
19. With the majority of respondents (53.7%) suggesting that all are responsible.
20. Gacaca is broadly considered as the traditional system of reconciliation based on restorative justice in Rwanda.
21. In 12 December 2005, the government adopted a five-point “Action Plan” mapping the road for reconciliation similar to the process of reconciliation in South Africa.
22. Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef was a former Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan.
23. Attempts at political talks between the USA and the Taliban started as early as 2007.