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Abstract
The reconstruction of Mostar could have been a symbol of renewed multiethnic coexistence. Instead, it has become a synonym for failed institutions and divisions, mirroring the difficulties of the whole country. While imposition of both the 1996 and 2004 statutes establishing the city’s administrative units was connected with crisis, the city has also faced two major deadlocks, in 2008–2009 and 2012. In the first, a solution was imposed by the international community’s High Representative (HR). But the second remains unresolved, as the HR resists intervening. The aim of the paper is to analyze these impasses – moments when institutional change should have occurred, but for some reason did not. Even the solutions – acts of external imposition – might be treated at best as institutional pseudo-change that shows that imposed institutions have a particular inertia that resists change. The topic will be presented from the perspective of historical institutionalism, with special emphasis on the path-dependency approach, which refers here not only to the formal institutional structure of the city, but also to the decision-making processes in the moments of stalemate.
Acknowledgements
A previous version of this article was presented at the 20th Annual ASN World Convention in New York, 23–25 April 2015 and was selected for the 2015 Doctoral Students Paper award (category: the Balkans). I would like to thank Valery Perry for her comments as the discussant during the panel and Florian Bieber for helpful advice. Among many people who supported my field research in Mostar, Huss Oručević, Zlatko Serdarević, and the whole Center for Peace and Multiethnic Cooperation in Mostar deserve special thanks for their support and provided materials. I also thank all my interview partners for their time and remarks.
Notes
1. Defined as rules of the game, restricting and enabling actors’ behavior (North Citation1990), but here limited to political institutions – legally designed and established structures. Historical institutionalism sees them as formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy – in general, this approach associates institutions with organizations or rules promulgated by formal organization (Hall and Taylor Citation2006, 938).
2. Mostar was not the first case of an internationally administrated city. Due to their multiethnic populations, the Free City of Danzig after World War I was supervised by the League of Nations with a high commissioner as a head of the mission, and the Free Territory of Trieste was under the direct responsibility of the UN Security Council after World War II. An interesting case is Belfast from 1972 to 1998, when the British enacted “direct rule” for the whole region, substantially eroding the authority of local governance and freeing city councilors to be extreme (Bollens Citation2013, 341). Also in the region some post-conflict cities have received international support, including Mitrovica, with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo Administration, which is now focused on conflict prevention and mediation, and the Brčko District, with the OHR office suspended only in 2012 (see below). After the end of EUAM’s mandate, its responsibilities were transferred to a set of international organizations: the UN International Police Task Force, OSCE, the UN refugee agency, the Reconstruction and Return Task Force, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), and OHR-South, which was responsible for overall coordination of the civilian agencies (Bose Citation2002, 107).
3. While the international community assumed a “soft” protectorate role in the whole of Bosnia, in Brčko, there has been a “hard” approach (Perry Citation2009). In Dayton, parties were unable to resolve the Brčko question, so an administrative district under international supervision was created on 8 March 2000. The cornerstone of this approach was the formation of a new OHR office in Brčko (OHR-North) headed by a deputy high representative for Brčko equipped with powers that included promulgating binding regulations and orders, imposing a statute, and organizing local elections, as well as determining the length of the transition period (ICG Citation2003, 11; Moore Citation2013, 117–118). In this case also all changes were imposed by the international community, which also enforced their implementation. As the OHR office was formally suspended only in 2012, it is too early to observe any patterns that have appeared since then (the 2012 election of the mayor and the 2015 budgetary crises were subjected to rather informal institutional changes that triggered further problems).
4. In effect EUAM compromised the authority and image of the EU (Oručević Citation1996b, 13).
5. In 1996, the SDA took 21 seats on the City Council – the 16 reserved for Bosniaks and five for “Others,” while the HDZ received only the 16 reserved for Croats. In 1997, the balance of power remained similar, with just the mayor and his deputy, from the two parties, switching positions. In 2000, elections showed greater support for the SDP (nearly 13%), but the SDA and HDZ remained unchallenged. Elections in 2004, under the new statute, evidenced weakening of the two main nationalist parties – the SDA received only 24.9% of votes (four seats) and the HDZ votes fell to 36.6% (seven seats), but the dominance of the national Croat and the Bosniak voting blocs remained unchallenged (Bieber Citation2005, 428). The 2008 elections visibly weakened the HDZ (seven seats), with a surprisingly good result for the NSRzB (seven seats). The SDA (12 seats) and SDP (three seats) kept almost the same level of support (www.izbori.ba).
6. It was the EUAM that proposed the Central Zone as a seventh, jointly administered municipality and politically shared space in the city that should have fostered interaction between the two sides and provided a physical starting point for a reunited city.
7. As it was assumed, the Interim Statute divided the city into seven administrative districts: three Bosniak, three Croat, and one common Central Zone – it established Mostar as a “highly decentralized city with far-reaching power-sharing mechanisms that sought to counteract the territorial control of the communities, while at the same time institutionalizing ethnic divisions” (Bieber Citation2005, 422). In addition to the municipalities, there was a weak central city administration with a mayor, deputy mayor (whose election required a cross-community consensus), and quota-based City Council that was given jurisdiction over the shared Central Zone (Interim Statute Citation1996).
8. Among other enforced decisions that Croats refused to adopt might be mentioned the vital interest clause. In order to exclude Bosniaks from municipal institutions, the three Croat majority municipalities refused to adopt the clause as required by the City Interim Statute, which resulted in the OHR imposition of the clause on 6 July 1999, to little effect (ICG Citation2000, 45; Moore Citation2013, 62; OHR Citation1999).
9. SDU: Socijaldemokratska unija, Social Democratic Union. NSRzB: Narodna stranka radom za boljitak, People’s Party for Work and Betterment.
10. Fatima Leho (SDA) was the only one in favor of preserving the city municipalities, but also supported the transfer of substantial competencies to the city level. Željko Komšić (SDP) insisted on keeping the city municipalities, but reduced to four multiethnic units (Recommendations Citation2003: 18–20). All other members declined this proposal and it was not further discussed. For more on positions of particular parties, see ICG (Citation2003, 9–10) and Recommendations (Citation2003).
11. The new statute re-established Mostar as a single unit of government with strengthened authority for the central city administration, but the city municipalities have been reconstituted as “city areas” with city administration branch offices that continue to serve as electoral districts. The new statute also preserves most of the key power-sharing measures found in the Interim Statute with a changed electoral system for the City Council (Moore Citation2013, 63–64). However, if the statute does not discriminate significantly against any constituent people, it works strongly in favor of the SDA, since more than half of the City Council seats are elected in districts corresponding to the six old municipalities that, given the unequal size of the districts, create a “hidden threshold” that favors large parties that are strong in small districts (ICG Citation2009, 10; Statute Citation2004).
12. On December 14, 2004, Ljubo Bešlić was chosen as a new-old mayor with the support of 14 representatives from the coalition of the Croat parties and seven out of 10 representatives from the SDA during the third round of voting (Dnevni avaz Citation2014).
13. The position of the SDA was also not cooperative, despite pressure from the center. As Suad Hasandedić said,
We are the most numerous party in the City Council (12 seats) with the biggest support of 20,242 votes (HDZ had respectively seven and 16,258) while I have got the biggest number of votes – then, according to democratic principle, I should be the new mayor. (Fokus Citation2008)
14. A consequence of 16 September 2009, application submitted by the Caucus of Croat people in the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly for review of, among others, some provisions of the Statute of the City of Mostar.