A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea

Abstract

Maritime security in the South China Sea faces a number of challenges, ranging from lower-level nontraditional threats to traditional politicostrategic considerations, including the potential for conflict between regional states over territory or marine resources and the possibility of conflict between major powers. This article focuses on the major South China Sea sea lines of communication, regional naval developments, and a case study of Chinese opposition to military operations in its South China Sea exclusive economic zone. It argues that Beijing is again exhibiting a more assertive posture to bolster its strategic position in the South China Sea while the other South China Sea states are also asserting their claims and developing naval capacity.

Keywords:

• maritime security
• sea lines of communication
• strategic geography

Notes

1. Michael Leifer, “The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia,” Pacific Review 4 (1991): 126–136. See also, more recently, Sam Bateman, “Building Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia: The Promise of International Regimes” in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, eds. Kwa Chong Guan and John K. Skogan (London: Routledge, 2007), 97–116.

2. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.

3. Sam Bateman, “UNCLOS and Its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime,” IDSS Working Paper No. 111 (Singapore: Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies, April 2006), 2.

4. John H. Noer, with David Gregory, Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1996), Figures 17–20, 63–66.

5. International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas, Special Publication No. 23, 3rd ed. (Monte Carlo: IHO, 1953), 30–31.

6. International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas, IHO Publication S-23, draft 4th ed. (IHO, 2002).

7. Ibid., at 6-6-6-8.

8. For a discussion on the geographical scope of the South China Sea, please refer to Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, “Semi-enclosed Troubled Water: A New Thinking on the Application of the 1982 UNCLOS Article 123 to the South China Sea,” Ocean Development & International Law  41(3), 2010, pp. 281–314, at 299–301.

9. See (UK) Admiralty, Ocean Passages for the World, 5th ed., NP 136 (Taunton: United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, 2004), chap. 7.

10. Data averaged and compiled from various U.S. government sources, including the Department of Defense, Energy Information Administration, and Office of Naval Intelligence.

11. Data from the Port Klang Vessel Traffic Service.

12. Ocean Passages for the World, supra note 9, at 166–172.

13. Ibid., at 240–243.

14. Ibid., at 203–204.

15. See Chris Rahman, “The International Politics of Combating Piracy in Southeast Asia,” in Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 183–198.

16. United States, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009, Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009), 31.

17. Clive Schofield, “Dangerous Ground: A Geopolitical Overview of the South China Sea” in Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, eds. Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (London: Routledge, 2009), 14–18.

18. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global International Waters Assessment. South China Sea: Regional Assessment 54 (Kalmar, Sweden: University of Kalmar, 2005), 40–41.

19. Meryl J. Williams, Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia's Fisheries, Lowy Institute Paper 20 (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007), 27.

20. See Clive Schofield, “A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?” Jane's Intelligence Review, November 2000, 37. Itu Aba is now manned by the civilian Taiwan Coast Guard Administration.

21. Greg Austin, China's Ocean Frontier: International Law, Military Force and National Development (St Leonards, New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 132 and 380–381.

22. Schofield, “Dangerous Ground,” supra note 17, at 11 and 22, n. 24.

23. Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 in Respect of the Southern Part of the South China Sea, Executive Summary, May 2009, available at the Web site of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.

24. Vietnam Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf Pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Partial Submission in Respect of Vietnam's Extended Continental Shelf: North Area (VNM-N), Executive Summary, April 2009, available at the Web site of the Commission, supra note 23.

25. People's Republic of China, Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations, Doc. CML/17/2009, New York, 7 May 2009; and Letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations, Doc. CML/18/2009, New York, 7 May 2009, available at the Web site of the Commission, supra note 23.

26. See Sam Bateman and Clive Schofield, “Outer Shelf Claims in the South China Sea: New Dimension to Old Disputes,” RSIS Commentaries, 1 July 2009 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University).

27. The report was first publicized by Bill Gertz, “China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, 18 January 2005.

28. See, for example, Andrew Selth, “Burma, China and the Myth of Military Bases,” Asian Security 3 (September 2007): 279–307.

29. See Geoffrey Till, “The South China Sea Dispute: An International History,” in Bateman and Emmers, supra note 17, at 36.

30. James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, 2008), 53.

31. L. C. Russell Hsiao, “In a Fortnight: PLA General Advises Building Bases in the South China Sea,” Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, 24 June 2009, 1–2.

32. Holmes and Yoshihara, supra note 30, at 53.

33. See Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China's Territorial Integrity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).

34. Eric Frécon, “Piracy in the South China Sea: Maritime Ambushes off the Mangkai Passage,” RSIS Commentaries, 20 February 2009.

35. Sam Bateman, “Coast Guards: New Forces for Regional Order and Security,” AsiaPacific Issues, No. 65, January 2003, 5.

36. Tim Fish, “Submarine Programmes Top SE Asian Wish Lists,” Jane's Navy International, April 2010, 27.

37. Ibid., at 26.

38. Ibid., at 27.

39. Ibid., at 27.

40. Brunei, however, is now trying to sell its relatively new ships, probably because they are too large and sophisticated for Brunei's needs and its capacity to operate them.

41. See Eric Grove, “Carrier Waves: Programmes Speak of an Enduring Appeal,” Jane's Navy International, November 2007, 31–32.

42. Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, (Canberra: Department of Defence, May 2009), 81. For an analysis, see Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, “Australia's 2009 Defense White Paper: A Maritime Focus for Uncertain Times,” Naval War College Review 63 (Winter 2010): 69.

43. See, generally, Chris Rahman, “The Rise of China as a Regional Maritime Power: Strategic Implications for a New Century,” PhD dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2003.

44. For details on PLA maritime forces, see the generally reliable SinoDefence.com Web site, available at www.sinodefence.com/navy/default.asp.

45. Ibid.

46. See the map Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009, supra note 16, at 23.

47. See Bruce A. Elleman, “Maritime Territorial Disputes and Their Impact on Maritime Strategy: A Historical Perspective,” in Bateman and Emmers, supra note 17, at 46–48.

48. See the SinoDefence Web site, supra note 44; and Richard D. Fisher, “Satellite Imagery Confirms Nuclear Sub Base in China,” Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 April 2008, 4.

49. Ibid.

50. The concept of SSBN bastions, protected by concentric layers of defensive capabilities, was developed by the Soviet Union during the cold war. For analysis, see Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 193–197.

51. See “Naval Chief Details Chinese Wishlist,” Jane's Navy International, May 2009, 5; and “Speculation Mounts over PRC's Aircraft Carrier Plan,” Taipei Times, 7 March 2009.

52. Kang Jua, “China Doesn't Need Super Navy: Military Analysts,” Global Times, 21 April 2009.

53. See the two special issues of the journal Marine Policy devoted to the topic: Vol. 28 (January 2004) and Vol. 29 (March 2005).

54. For a further discussion on the debate as it stands in East Asia, see, for example, EEZ Group 21, Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone: A Commentary (Tokyo: Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 2006).

55. For a forceful but unconvincing Malaysian argument to this effect, see B. A. Hamzah, “EEZs: U.S. Must Unclench Its Fist First,” RSIS Commentaries, 9 April 2009.

56. See Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in the Indo-Pacific Region, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 22 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre―Australia, 2008), 8–12 and 31–35.

57. See Sam Bateman, “Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Operations in Asia,” RSIS Commentaries, 21 February 2007 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University).

58. As quoted in “Trapped Behind the Lines,” The Australian, 3 April 2001, 1.

59. “‘Spyplane’ Loss a Big Blow for U.S. Intelligence,” Jane's Navy International, May 2001, 8.

60. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 56(1).

61. For an analysis, see Martin Tsamenyi and Barry Snushall, “The Legal Dimension of Maritime Military Operations,” in Positioning Navies for the Future: Challenge and Response, ed. Jack McCaffrie (Sydney: Sea Power Centre—Australia and Halstead Press, 2006), 111–132.

62. Ibid., at 122.

63. Ibid., at 116.

64. Ibid., at 116. See also Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 7 December 1944, 9th ed., 2006, ICAO Doc. 7300/9, arts. 1–3.

65. See “U.S. Angered by Chinese Naval Manoeuvres,” The Australian, 10 March 2009; “USN-PLA South China Sea Incident,” Associated Press, 10 March 2009; “China Says U.S. Provoked Naval Incident,” International Herald Tribune, 10 March 2009; and “Surveillance Ship ‘Did Not Violate Law,’ Says DoD,” Jane's Navy International, April 2009, 6.

66. As quoted in “FM: U.S. Naval Ship Violates Int'l, Chinese Law,” China Daily, 10 March 2009.

67. As quoted in “Violation of China's Sovereignty Never Allowed,” China Daily, 10 March 2009.

68. As quoted in “Obama–Yang Discuss U.S.-China Sea Dispute on the Sidelines of Improved Cooperation,” Associated Press, 15 March 2009.

69. See Kaye, supra note 56, at 31.

70. Tsamenyi and Snushall, supra note 61, at 113–121.

71. LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 301.

72. Ji Guoxing, “The Legality of the ‘Impeccable Incident,’” China Security 5 (Spring 2009): 18–19.

73. Tsamenyi and Snushall, supra note 61, at 122.

74. LOS Convention, supra note 2, arts. 56, 87, 238–241.

75. Tsamenyi and Snushall, supra note 61, at 128.

76. Sam Bateman, “Clashes at Sea: When Chinese Vessels Harass U.S. Ships,” RSIS Commentaries, 13 March 2009, 2 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University). For an explanation of the U.S. position, see Patrick J. Neher, Raul A. Pedrozo, and J. Ashley Roach, “In Defence of High Seas Freedoms,” RSIS Commentaries, 24 March 2009 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University); and Captain Raul Pedrozo, JAGC, USN, “Close Encounters at Sea: The USNS Impeccable Incident,” Naval War College Review 62 (Summer 2009): 106–107.

77. “USN-PLA South China Sea Incident,” Associated Press, 10 March 2009.

78. Cited in “Blair: China Gets ‘More Aggressive’ Against U.S. Ships,” Washington Times, 11 March 2009.

79. Cited in ibid.

80. “Destroyer to Protect Ship Near China,” Washington Post, 13 March 2009.

81. “Beijing to Deploy More Ships to the South China Sea,” Times (UK), 19 March 2009.

82. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Scher, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, on “Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia,” 15 July 2009, 5.

83. “Chinese Sub Smashes U.S. Destroyer's Sonar,” The Australian, 13 June 2009.

84. As quoted in “Sub, Sonar Collision ‘Inadvertent,’” Global Times, 15 June 2009.

85. Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety, Beijing, 19 January 1998.

86. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the Sea, Moscow, 25 May 1972, as amended by a 1973 Protocol and a 1998 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes. The latter was agreed by the Russian Federation, which succeeded the Soviet Union with respect to all rights and obligations relating to the agreement.

87. See PRC Letters, supra note 25.