The paradoxes of Utopian game-playing

Abstract

In The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, Suits maintains the following two theses: (1) game-playing is defined as ‘activity directed towards bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity’ and (2) ‘game playing is what makes Utopia intelligible.’ Observing that these two theses cannot be jointly maintained absent paradox, this essay explores the logical possibility that if (2) is true, then (1) must be false. More specifically, in the tradition of conceptual analysis it is argued that Suits’ definition of game-playing is too narrow inasmuch as it excludes really magnificent Utopian games of significance.

Keywords:

• Utopia
• significance
• game-playing
• paradox
• conceptual analysis

Notes

1. After demonstrating that Suits’ account of game-playing fails to include sprinting, Berman (2013) concludes that sprints are not games. And, insofar as his argument reflects an acceptance of Suits’ principle of inefficiency, I cannot include Berman as a critic of Suits in this regard. Nevertheless, for one who wishes to maintain that sprints are games, it is apparent that Berman raises some significant concerns about Suits’ principle of inefficiency.

2. Several scholars attending to Suits’ Utopian thesis have concluded it to be conceptually constrained, unsubstantiated, unintelligible, absurd, and/or contradictory (Bäck 2008; Holowchak 2007; Hurka 2014; Kretchmar 2006, 2008; Thompson 2004). Of these, Bäck (2008), Holowchak (2007), and Thompson (2004) take specific issue with Suits’ principle of inefficiency.

3. Prior to his death (2007) Suits was able to defend his definitional formulation (Suits 1981, 2006) as well as his proposed inter-relational model (Suits 1989, 2004) against a few concerns (Meier 1988; Schneider 2001; Schneider and Butcher 1997). However, it is worth noting that he was not able to respond to any of the later challenges issued against his characterization of the lusory attitude or those advanced against his proposal of a game-playing Utopia, with arguments championing the value and coherence of his theory ultimately left with some of his more sympathetic readers (Bradford 2003; Frias 2016, 2017; Hurka 2006, 2014; Innis 2001; Kolers 2015; Kretchmar 2006, 2008; McLaughlin 2008; Miah 2008; Royce 2013; Vossen 2000, 2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2014, 2016).

4. I am indebted to the editor, Paul Gaffney, and two anonymous reviewers with the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport for the judicious suggestions designed to enhance the clarity and argumentative impact of this essay.