History Trumps Government Unpopularity: The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum

Abstract

This analysis explains why Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU and how the 50% turnout requirement was achieved fairly easily. It argues that most Poles appeared to accept the historical significance of the referendum and de-coupled the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in an extremely unpopular government. This occurred because most key political and social actors, including the opposition parties, called for a Yes vote, while, at the same time, a vigorous campaign by pro-EU civic organisations presented a ‘non-political’ face to the campaign. Although the No camp made tactical errors and had difficulties staying focused on its main arguments, lack of both access to the public media and a convincing or attractive alternative made it extremely difficult for them to mount an effective campaign. At the same time, the stability of the opinion polls in the years leading up to the referendum suggested that most Poles had already made their minds up about the issue well in advance. In spite of the low levels of trust in political parties, partisan cues appeared to be a better predictor of referendum voting behaviour than socio-economic and demographic factors.

Notes

For other interesting analyses of the impact of EU accession on Polish domestic politics see Millard (1998); Blazyca and Kolkiewicz (1999); Kolarska-Bobińska (1999); Bielasiak (2002); and Słomczyński and Shabad (2003).

See, for example, Reed 2001.

Cf. McManus-Czubinska et al. (2003).

Cf. Truszcyński (2002). A January 2003 CBOS poll found that 46% of respondent regarded the outcome of the negotiations as a success compared to only 17% that regarded it as a failure (CBOS 2003a). Under the agreement Polish farmers were to be paid up to 55% of the agricultural subsidies received by those in existing member states in 2004, 60% in 2005 and 65% in 2006. The difference between this and the EU's original offer was made up by funds from the Polish budget and transfers from the EU rural development fund. In addition, the government budget was to receive EU funds of €500 million immediately in 2004–06 rather than receiving the money through structural funds at a later date, thereby easing the pressure on the Polish state budget.

Cf. Stankiewicz (2003a).

This centred on allegations that Lew Rywin, a media mogul and film producer, had proposed in July 2002 that the newspaper publisher Agora pay US$17 million into Democratic Left Alliance party coffers in return for securing changes favourable to it in the government's draft media law. They came to light following publication of a tape-recorded conversation between Rywin and the Editor-in-Chief of the Agora-owned daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza Adam Michnik, where he was alleged to have made the proposition.

Observed by the author in a Peasant Party referendum broadcast.

See also the interview with Roman Giertych (Rzeczpospolita 2 June 2003).

See also the appeal by 82 Catholic-nationalist intellectuals published in the Nasz Dziennik daily and reproduced as ‘An Appeal to the Polish Nation’ (Apel do Narodu Polskiego) (Gazeta Wyborcza 13 May 2003). See also Szacki 2003.

In fact, one source estimated the amount spent by the Office for the EU Referendum together with the Economy and Agriculture Ministries on the European referendum at around 50 million złoties (Oktaba 2003).

The League of Polish Families subsequently attempted to get the referendum annulled on the grounds of their lack of access to the mass media (Rzeczpospolita 17 June 2003).

An April 2003 CBOS poll found that 20% of voters said that Radio Maryja would influence them when deciding how to vote, with 6% saying that it would influence them to a great or very great extent (CBOS 2003d).

Although he subsequently denied that he had shifted his position (Czaczkowska 2003b). Radio Maryja also continued to broadcast anti-EU commentary (Gazeta Wyborcza 28 May 2003).

Although there was some evidence that not all parish priests read the relevant extracts from the Pope's message (Czaczkowska 2003c). For a good account of the evolution of the church's attitudes towards Polish EU accession see Rzeczpospolita 6 June 2003.

There are no separate exit poll data for occupational groups but most opinion polls taken in the run-up to the referendum indicated that farmers were the only occupational group where there was an anti-EU majority. Research by Wasilewski reveals the lowest levels of support for (although still a majority in favour of) EU accession in counties where over 60% of the labour force are employed in agriculture (62.3%) compared with those where less than 10% are farmers (83.6%) (Wasilewski 2003).