The Different Trajectories of Italian Electoral Reforms

Abstract

Italy is the only established democracy where two major electoral reforms took place inthe last 20 years (respectively in 1993 and 2005). Adopting Renwick's approach, which distinguishes between elite majority imposed and elite–mass interaction reforms, the article analyses electoral reforms in Italy in the post-World War II period. By examining the long-term importance of electoral rules in Italian politics, it argues that PR played a uniquely fundamental role in shaping both the so-called Italian ‘First Republic’ and the still unfulfilled transition towards a reformed political system. By focusing on the main determinants which brought about the two most recent reforms, it becomes apparent that, in the last two decades, the ever-changing party system format contributes to the cyclical salience of electoral reform as a possible means of accomplishing the never-ending transition towards a more stable political settlement.

Notes

1. According to Article 138 of the Italian Constitution, the latter is amended by both Chambers through a double approval procedure. An approval popular referendum can only be held if the law has been approved by each Chamber in the second vote without a majority of two thirds of its members (as happened in 2006, see below).

2. Average disproportionality index (Lsq) in the 1958–87 period was comparatively very low: 2.71, as compared to 3.64 in 1948–53 (Lijphart 1994: 161).

3. To my knowledge, it was in 1958 that Italy was first defined as a case of ‘unstable stability’ (Carey and Carey 1958). This same oxymoron was used, almost 30 years later, in analysing the state of the Italian political system in the presentation of the activities of the new Yearbook Italian Politics/Politica in Italia (1987).

4. Among the critics, Giovanni Sartori dubbed the system ‘Mattarellum’ after the name of its rapporteur, playing somehow with the word, as ‘matto’ in Italian means crazy.

5. Calderoli admitted, during the campaign for the 2006 election, that the law was a ‘porcata’, literally a pig's dinner, aptly built up in order to make more difficult the centre-left victory in the following election.

6. I thank Alan Renwick for suggesting this possible, tentative, pattern.