Bureaucratic Structure and Administrative Behaviour: Lessons from International Bureaucracies

Abstract

This article contributes to a growing literature on international bureaucracy by exploring the relationship between bureaucratic structure and administrative behaviour. The ambition of this study is twofold: first, it explores the extent to which international bureaucracies combine two inherent behavioural logics: a logic of hierarchy and a logic of portfolio. Second, two key empirical lessons are used to modify four conventional claims in existing research. Drawing on a rich body of data from three international bureaucracies (the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat, and the WTO Secretariat), this study suggests that administrative behaviour among international civil servants is profoundly shaped by the bureaucratic structures of international bureaucracies. Variation in the abovementioned behavioural logics is conditioned by two aspects of bureaucratic structure: First, the accumulation of relevant organisational capacities at the executive centre of international bureaucracies, and second, the vertical and horizontal specialisation of international bureaucracies.

Acknowledgements

This study is financed by the Norwegian Research Council (‘DISC: Dynamics of International Secretariats’). An earlier version of this article was presented at the workshop ‘The Transformation of the Executive Branch of Government in the EU’, ARENA, University of Oslo, 4–6 June 2009. I am particularly indebted to the comments from two referees, the editors, Michael W. Bauer and Morten Egeberg. All usual disclaimers apply.

Notes

1. By contrast, informal structures contain non-codified normative structures.