Winning Peace Frames: Intra-Ethnic Outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

Abstract

Ethnic outbidding in divided societies can have dire political consequences, ranging from the derailment of peace processes to inter-ethnic warfare. This article investigates the conditions contributing to successful outbidding within the framework of protracted peace negotiations by using the contrasting cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Evidence demonstrates that successful outbidders are able to exploit the fears of their communities with respect to inter-ethnic compromise while identifying appropriate strategies and opportunities for redressing these grievances. The article demonstrates that the degree of outbidding success over the long term derives from combining diagnostic and prognostic frames linked to credible political and constitutional strategies.

Notes

1. In 1992, the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to facilitate talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiating parties by outlining a plan of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.

2. In Cyprus, the post-partition electoral system prevents Greek Cypriots voting for Turkish Cypriot parties and vice versa. In Northern Ireland, only 7 per cent of Catholics would consider voting for the leading Unionist party, the DUP, and only 3 per cent of Protestants would consider voting for the leading Nationalist party, Sinn Féin in a recent poll. As a majority of Catholics are Nationalist and a majority of Protestants are Unionist, the terms are often used interchangeably. Though debated among academics, religion is seen as a good indicator of group behaviour in Northern Ireland. See LucidTalk 2012 poll: http://www.lucidtalk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/120530BelfTelResTbles-14Qs.pdf

3. Northern Ireland was established under the Government of Ireland Act 1920 which partitioned Ireland, creating two separate governments in the North and South of the island. Cyprus has been ‘de facto’ partitioned since 1974. The international community recognises only the Republic of Cyprus but not the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) which was declared unilaterally in 1983.

4. The Sunningdale Agreement established a power-sharing executive between moderate Nationalist and Unionist parties, which fell in 1974 after the Ulster Worker’s Council, supported by anti-Sunningdale Unionists, declared a strike bringing Northern Ireland to a standstill (Walker 2004).

5. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement established a power-sharing government with an arbitration role for the British and Irish governments and crucially had the support of hard-line Nationalists and some hard-line Unionists (McGarry and O’Leary 2009).

6. More developed than earlier peace proposals, the Annan Plan outlined the structure of governance under a federated Cyprus, as well as proposals for dealing with every single detail of administration in a reunited Cyprus (Yakinthou 2009).

7. The 1998 Agreement allows for Northern Ireland to remain part of the UK or to become part of Ireland should a majority in Northern Ireland and Ireland wish either scenario to be so.

8. Interviews with UUP Member of the European Parliament Jim Nicholson and former UUP adviser Dr Brian Crowe (2009).

9. Proposed greater British–Irish government cooperation and an ‘Irish dimension’ granting the Irish government a greater say in Northern Irish affairs.

10. Interview with DUP Party Support Clive McFarland (2010).

11. Decommissioning refers to the handing over of weapons by paramilitary groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (linked with Sinn Féin) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (Unionist militants).

12. Unionists were also facing an existential threat, through the principle of consent. Interview with academics and activists David Officer and Yiouli Taki, Index Cyprus (2010).

13. NI Life and Times (2003): http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2003/Political_Attitudes/REFORMOK.html

14. Interview with Queen’s University Belfast academic Professor Graham Walker (2010).

15. Interview with Graham Walker (2010) and Peter Weir, DUP MLA (2009).

16. In 1972, the British government imposed direct rule in response to the worsening security situation, meaning governance in Northern Ireland was carried out by the Northern Ireland Office in Westminster.

17. This agreement updated the 1998 Belfast Agreement, abandoning the cross-community voting procedure for First Minister and Deputy First Minister. They would instead be drawn from the largest parties, saving the hard-line parties from voting for each other’s candidate.

18. Interview with Graham Walker (2010).

19. Interview with Clive McFarland (2010).

20. Annan Plan V was put forward in simultaneous referendums in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities; a 65 per cent majority of Turkish Cypriots accepted the Plan in the April 2004 referendum.

21. The Enosis (Union) movement represented an aspiration among Greek Cypriots to unite with the Greek ‘motherland’, and was categorically opposed by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots (Kitromilides 1979).

22. The EOKA B organisation was one of the forces in the internal fighting among Greek Cypriots before 1974. It campaigned against President Makarios and sought the abolition of the Republic of Cyprus, aiming for immediate unification with Greece (Papadakis 1998).

23. Interviews with DISY former members of parliament Katie Clerides, Christos Pourgourides, Christos Stylianides; former and current presidents of the party Glafkos Clerides and Nikos Anastasiades (2009).

24. EUROKO subsequently absorbed another party from the right, the New Horizons (NEO).

25. Interview with Nikos Anastasiades (2009).

26. Interview with Yiouli Taki and David Officer (2010).

27. Interview with Katie Clerides (2009).

28. See survey data from Kaymak et al. (2008).

29. For instance, a 65 per cent majority deemed the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation ‘tolerable’ or ‘satisfactory’. UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) Survey (2007): http://www.cypruspolls.org/SurveyUNFICYP.pdf

30. Interview Glafcos Clerides (2009); Nicos Anastasiades (2009); DISY’s international secretary Alexandros Sinka (2010).

31. 63 per cent deemed a continuation of the status quo ‘entirely unacceptable’ in the Cyprus 2015 poll (2009): http://www.cyprus2015.org/

32. Interview with DISY’s Policy Director, Christoforos Fokaides (2012).