Differential Responsiveness in Europe: The Effects of Preference Difference and Electoral Participation

Figures & data

Table 1 Overview of the variables and description of the data

	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Redistributive spending	22.62	22.50	4.31	12.80	31.00
Support general population	72.73	74.58	12.02	38.01	93.23
Low-income support	79.48	81.08	10.46	43.44	96.50
High-income support	65.14	64.71	14.10	31.79	95.25
Difference in mean preference	0.38	0.39	0.17	0.02	0.85
50% vote threshold	0.84	1.00	0.37	0.00	1.00
Government ideology	−2.40	−3.83	14.38	−37.81	48.19
Annual % growth GDP	2.27	2.50	3.87	−18.00	12.20

Table 2 Differences in levels of support for redistribution between income groups

	Mean (standard error)	Difference (standard error)
Low-income support	79.481 (0.971)
		4.406*** (0.370)
Middle-income support	75.075 (1.078)
		9.938*** (0.556)
High-income support	65.137 (1.310)

Note:

Results are based on a t-test.

* p value ≤ 0.10

** p value ≤ 0.05

*** p value ≤ 0.01.

Figure 1 Differences in support for redistribution between income groups

Table 3 General and differential responsiveness on redistributive spending

	Total social expenditure in % GDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Support general population	–0.053*	–0.051**
	(0.030)	(0.026)
Low-income support			–0.196***	–0.088*
			(0.059)	(0.048)
High-income support			0.087*	0.010
			(0.049)	(0.038)
Government ideology		–0.055**		–0.086***
		(0.024)		(0.028)
Annual % growth GDP		–0.692***		–0.700***
		(0.094)		(0.108)
Intercept	26.722***	28.423***	32.967***	31.211***
	(2.208)	(1.983)	(2.119)	(2.383)
N	104	104	104	101
N of countries	25	25	25	25
Adjusted R-square	0.734	0.825	0.662	0.820

Notes:

Models report results from Prais–Winsten regression analyses. Jackknifed panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged with one year. Model (1) excludes Denmark 2009 and 2011; model (2) excludes Estonia 2009 and Greece 2011; model (3) excludes Ireland 2011 and Israel 2011; model (4) excludes Estonia 2009, Greece 2011, Norway 2007, 2009, and 2011, because these cases could not be predicted by the models and have too high leverage on the general results.

* p value ≤ 0.10

** p value ≤ 0.05

*** p value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.

Table 4 Differential responsiveness and preference difference between income groups

	Total social expenditure in % GDP
	(5)	(6)
Low-income support	–0.012	–0.017
	(0.169)	(0.222)
High-income support	–0.002	–0.025
	(0.138)	(0.161)
Difference in mean preference	26.580	8.785
	(16.401)	(22.984)
Low-income supp.*difference	–0.541*	–0.280
	(0.287)	(0.407)
High-income supp.*difference	0.285	0.238
	(0.194)	(0.205)
Government ideology		–0.050**
		(0.025)
Annual % growth GDP		–0.561***
		(0.117)
Intercept	23.542***	26.789***
	(6.077)	(8.871)
N	105	106
N of countries	25	25
Adjusted R-square	0.614	0.771

Notes:

Models report results from Prais–Winsten regression analyses. Jackknifed panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged with one year. Model (5) excludes Czech Republic 2003, because this case could not be predicted by the model and has too high leverage on the general results.

* p value ≤ 0.10

** p value ≤ 0.05

*** p value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.

Figure 2 Marginal effects of preferences, conditioned on preference difference (model 5)

Table 5 Differential responsiveness and voter turnout

	Total social expenditure in % GDP
	(7)	(8)
Low-income support	–3.310***	–2.707***
	(1.223)	(0.968)
High-income support	1.732*	1.387
	(0.961)	(1.113)
Turnout	–5.202***	–4.638**
	(1.763)	(1.809)
Turnout²	0.043***	0.039***
	(0.013)	(0.014)
Low-income supp.* turnout	0.106***	0.092***
	(0.040)	(0.031)
High-income supp.* turnout	–0.052	–0.043
	(0.032)	(0.034)
Low-income supp.* turnout²	–0.001***	–0.001***
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)
High-income supp.* turnout²	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Government ideology		–0.076**
		(0.030)
Annual % growth GDP		–0.676***
		(0.117)
Intercept	176.026***	152.077***
	(57.0465)	(57.687)
N	106	104
N of countries	25	25
Adjusted R-square	0.714	0.800

Notes:

Models report results from Prais–Winsten regression analyses. Jackknifed panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged with one year. Model (8) excludes Estonia 2009 and Greece 2011, because this case could not be predicted by the model and has too high leverage on the general results.

* p value ≤ 0.10

** p value ≤ 0.05

*** p value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.

Figure 3 Marginal effects of preferences, conditioned on voter turnout (model 8)

Table 6 Differential responsiveness and change in spending

	∆ social expenditure in % GDP
	(9)	(10)
Low-income preference	3.237**	–93.103**
	(1.586)	(38.522)
High-income preference	–1.521	54.877**
	(1.150)	(21.139)
∆Difference in mean preference	40.483**
	(16.522)
∆Low-income pref.*difference	–13.768**
	(6.125)
∆High-income pref.*difference	4.848
	(3.729)
Turnout		–5.764**
		(2.576)
Turnout²		–0.044**
		(0.019)
Low-income pref.* turnout		3.238***
		(1.199)
High-income pref.* turnout		–1.969***
		(0.662)
Low-income pref.* turnout²		–0.026***
		(0.009)
High-income pref.* turnout²		0.016***
		(0.005)
∆Government ideology	–0.017	–0.036*
	(0.021)	(0.020)
Annual % growth GDP	–0.556***	–0.610***
	(0.114)	(0.109)
Intercept	–5.557*	174.335**
	(3.335)	(83.055)
N	80	80
N of countries	24	24
Adjusted R square	0.442	0.512

Notes:

Models report results from Prais–Winsten regression analyses. Jackknifed panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged with one year. Model (9) and (10) exclude Greece 2011 because this case could not be predicted by the model and has too high leverage on the general results.

* p value ≤ 0.10

** p value ≤ 0.05

*** p value ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.

Note, also, that the main independent variable is now the mean answers to the statement ‘the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels’, with the (recoded) categories 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither agree nor disagree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree.

Figure 4 Marginal effects of preferences, conditioned on changes in preference difference (model 9)

Figure 5 Marginal effects of preferences, conditioned on voter turnout (model 10)