Lobbying during government formations: do policy advocates attain their preferences in coalition agreements?

Figures & data

Table 1. Multilevel logistic regression models predicting whether a policy advocate attained their policy preferences.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Party support	2.57***
	(0.15)
Right-wing support		1.43***
		(0.20)
Right-wing support* Business		1.30***
		(0.32)
VVD support			0.63*
			(0.28)
VVD support* Business			2.81***
			(0.45)
CDA support				2.25***
				(0.24)
CDA support* Business				0.31
				(0.36)
Business	0.19	−0.25	−0.22	0.15
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Controls
Access	0.51	0.38	0.42	0.37
	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Coalition size	0.06*	0.06+	0.05	0.05+
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Pro policy change	−3.84***	−3.62***	−3.53***	−3.41***
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.34)
Constant	1.35***	1.90***	1.97***	1.66***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.36)
Letter random intercepts	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of requests	2,281	2,281	2,281	2,281
Number of letters	346	346	346	346
AIC	1,954	2,123	2,176	2,122
BIC	1,994	2,169	2,222	2,168

+ p < 0.10,

*p < 0.05,

**p < 0.01,

***p < 0.001.

Figure 1. The marginal effect of gaining the support from a party on preference attainment.

Note: The marginal effect is expressed in increases in predicted probabilities for different sets of actors, based on Table 1. Calculated for both right-wing parties (grey triangles, model 2), the VVD (blue squares, model 3) and the CDA (yellow dots, model 4) [Colour on line]. All other variables kept at their mean. 95% confidence intervals.