Abstract
Scholars regularly mobilise the concept of policy paradigm to characterise successive periods in which certain ideas appear to structure policymaking. While this concept proved useful to establish that ideas matter, it is time to start thinking about ideas in ways that better resonate with actors' practices. This article introduces and empirically illustrates two conceptual alternatives. First, it looks at international monetary relations from 1944 through the early 1970s. Instead of simply labelling this period as ‘Keynesian,’ it shows that the enduring centrality of gold was a pivotal practice among policy makers. Second, it considers the governance of the Eurozone in the run-up to the crisis of the 2010s. Rather than viewing this period as ‘neoliberal,’ it highlights a new discursive repertoire of governance that produced both austerity and unconventional policies. In sum, practices and repertoires help to make sense of elements of continuity, ambiguity and contestation that are often obscured by ideational analysis.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Jonathan Khamkaji, Claudio Radaelli, Femke Van Esch, the journal editors and two anonymous reviewers for their extensive feedback and suggestions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Cabinet Memorandum. The Washington Conversations on Article VII. Memorandum by the Minister of State. W.P. (44) 81, February 7, 1944 (p. 15).
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pdfs/small/cab-66-46-wp-44-81-31.pdf
2 Press conference of President Charles de Gaulle, Paris, Elysée Palace, February 4, 1965. https://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00105/conference-de-presse-du-4-fevrier-1965.html (Our translation)
3 New York Times, August 16, 1971, p. 1.
4 Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS] 1969-1976 Volume 3, Document 179, September 24, 1971.
5 See for example FRUS 1969-1976, Volume 3, Document 174, September 6, 1971; FRUS 1969-1976, Volume 3, Document 183, October 14, 1971.
6 FRUS 1969-1976, Volume 3, Document 187, Editorial note.
7 FRUS 1969-1976, Volume 3, Document 181, September 25, 1971.
8 This subsection and the next draw from Jabko (Citation2019).
9 European Council Conclusions, p. 6. Brussels. March 26, 2010.
10 Interview, French President’s Office, November 3, 2010
11 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-2_en.pdf (p. 1), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2010/pdf/ee-2010-2_en.pdf (p. 1), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee-2011-1_en.pdf (p. 1)
13 Interview, French President’s office, Paris, November 3, 2010.
15 European Council, “Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU: Report of the Task Force to the European Council,” Brussels. October 21, 2010.
16 Ibid., p. 1.
18 ECB, Verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi. London. July 26, 2012.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Nicolas Jabko
Nicolas Jabko is Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. His research interests include neoliberalism, sovereignty and crisis politics. He is the author of Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985–2005 (Cornell University Press, 2006) and other works focused on European politics and political economy in comparative perspective. [[email protected]]
Sebastian Schmidt
Sebastian Schmidt is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. His research interests include the application of pragmatist thought to international relations theory and the sociological underpinnings of security strategies. He is the author of Armed Guests: Territorial Sovereignty and Foreign Military Basing (Oxford University Press, 2020). [[email protected]]