Coalition agreements and governments’ policy-making productivity

Figures & data

Figure 1. Number of reforms per year over time and country.

Figure 2. Percent of coalitions with a coalition agreement over time.

Figure 3. Cabinet ideological conflict by presence of coalition agreement.

Table 1. The impact of coalition agreements on reform productivity.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Controls
Cabinet duration (in days)	1.001***	1.001***	1.001***
Unemployment	1.031+	1.031	1.033+
GDP growth	0.929***	0.929***	0.931**
Elderly	0.968*	0.967*	0.972**
Inflation	1.006	1.006	1.006
Cabinet ideological conflict	1.061*	1.059+	1.161
Cabinet type
Minority	Base	–	–
Surplus	0.989	0.872	1.322
Minimal winning	0.943	0.968	2.255***
Agreement	1.222*	1.300	1.589
Interactions
Agreement * Minority		Base	–
Agreement * MWC		0.969	0.407*
Agreement * Surplus		0.872	0.627
Agreement * Ideological conflict			0.895
Minority * Ideological conflict			Base
MWC * Ideological conflict			0.515***
Surplus * Ideological conflict			0.881
Agreement * Ideological conflict * Minority			Base
Agreement * Ideological conflict * MWC			1.945***
Agreement * Ideological conflict * Surplus			1.232
Constant	13.715***	13.339***	10.438***
Lnalpha	−1.743***	−1.743***	−1.799***
Country Random Effects Variance	0.019	0.018	0.024
N	150	150	150
Log pseudo likelihood	−628.984	−628.763	−626.693

Multi-level negative binomial count regression models. Random-effect coefficients and errors clustered by country. Incident Rate Ratios displayed. +.1, *.05, **0.01, ***0.001.

Figure 4. Additional reforms with coalition agreement by coalition type.

Figure 5. Predicted number of reforms by coalition type over ideological conflict.