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Abstract
India and Pakistan are currently engaged in a competition for escalation dominance. While New Delhi is preparing for a limited conventional campaign against Pakistan, Islamabad is pursuing limited nuclear options to deter India. Together, these trends could increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. India, for example, might conclude that it can launch an invasion without provoking a nuclear reprisal, while Pakistan might believe that it can employ nuclear weapons without triggering a nuclear exchange. Even if war can be avoided, these trends could eventually compel India to develop its own limited nuclear options in an effort to enhance deterrence and gain coercive leverage over Pakistan.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Notes
1 For a recent discussion of these trends, see Charles E. Costanzo, ‘South Asia: Danger Ahead?’ Strategic Studies Quarterly 5/4 (Winter 2011), 92–106.
2 On India’s recent military modernization efforts and their potential implications for regional stability, see Walter C. Ladwig III, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine’, International Security 32/3 (Winter 2007/08), 158–90; Ali Ahmed, ‘Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine’, Comparative Strategy 31/5 (Nov. 2012), 453–68; and Zafar Khan, ‘Cold Start Doctrine: The Conventional Challenge to South Asian Stability’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/3 (Dec. 2012), 577–94. On Pakistan’s expanding nuclear program, including its apparent pursuit of battlefield nuclear weapons, see Vipin Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability’, International Security 34/3 (Winter 2009/10), 38–78; Andrew Bast, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus’, Washington Quarterly 34/4 (Fall 2011), 73–86; Shashank Joshi, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: Déjà Vu?’ Washington Quarterly 36/3 (Summer 2013), 159–72; and Christopher Clary, ‘The Future of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program’, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner (eds), Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research 2013).
3 On the debate between nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists, see especially Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton 2003).
4 The stability-instability paradox was introduced in Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury (ed.), Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing 1965). On the application of this dynamic to South Asia, see Michael Krepon, ‘The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia’, in Michael Krepon, Rodney W. Jones, and Ziad Haider (eds), Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 2004); and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Nuclear Stability in South Asia’, International Security 33/2 (Fall 2008). For a thoughtful counterargument that highlights the differences between the US-Soviet competition and the India–Pakistan rivalry, see Paul S. Kapur, ‘India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe’, International Security 30/2 (Fall 2005).
5 Peter D. Feaver, ‘Neooptimists and the Enduring Problem of Nuclear Proliferation’, Security Studies 6/4 (Summer 1997), 105–6.
6 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945–2013’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69/5 (Sep./Oct. 2013), 80. On the current size and composition of both arsenals, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67/4 (July/Aug. 2011); Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/4 (July/Aug. 2012), 96–101; and ‘Comparing India and Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear Weapons Capabilities’, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, 15 Nov. 2013. For background on both nuclear programs, see George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, updated ed. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2001); and Feroz H. Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford UP 2012).
7 Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 19 March 2013.
8 Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control arrangements have long been suspected of including some pre-delegation. See Timothy Hoyt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia’, Asian Survey 42/6 (Nov./Dec. 2001), 966.
9 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia UP 2001), 127.
10 John H. Gill, ‘India and Pakistan: A Shift in the Military Calculus?’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research 2005), 237.
11 Kapur, ‘India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace’, 138.
12 Gill, ‘India and Pakistan’, 255; and Ashley J. Tellis, ‘Stability in South Asia’, Documented Briefing (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1997), 20.
13 Dinshaw Mistry, ‘Tempering Optimism about Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia’, Security Studies 18/1 (Jan. 2009); Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Escalation Control, Deterrence Diplomacy, and America’s Role in South Asia’s Nuclear Crises’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/3 (Dec. 2012), 554–76; and Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington DC: Brookings 2013).
14 Ashley J. Tellis, ‘South Asia’, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (eds), Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research 2001), 227. This assumption may no longer hold, however, given persistent tensions between Washington and Islamabad over issues such as US counterterrorism operations on Pakistani territory, in particular the Abbottabad raid in 2011.
15 Peter Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation’, in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2008), 138.
16 On the origins, characteristics, and evolution of Cold Start, see especially Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’; and Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization (Washington DC: Brookings 2010), 59–61.
17 Krepon, ‘The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia’, 21.
18 Harsh V. Pant, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for India and the World’, Comparative Strategy 24/3 (July 2005), 279; Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, ‘India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000), 130; and V.R. Raghavan, ‘Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia’, Nonproliferation Review 8/3 (Fall/Winter 2001), 6.
19 Quoted in C. Raja Mohan, ‘Fernandes Unveils “Limited War” Doctrine’, The Hindu, 25 Jan. 2000.
20 In recent years senior civilian and military officials in India have denied the existence of Cold Start, although New Delhi’s ambition to develop a capability along these lines seems to remain intact. N.V. Subramanian, ‘India Denies “Cold Start” Plan’, The Diplomat, 11 Sept. 2010, <http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2010/09/11/india-denies-cold-start-plan/>; and Lydia Polygreen and Mark Landler, ‘Obama is Not Likely to Push India Hard on Pakistan’, New York Times, 5 Nov. 2010.
21 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars?’, 176; Gill, ‘India and Pakistan’, 264.
22 Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture’, 158–9.
23 Bast, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus’.
24 Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001), 49.
25 Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, ‘Pakistan is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, US Says’, New York Times, 17 May 2009; David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, ‘Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to US Policy’, New York Times, 31 Jan. 2011; and Karen DeYoung, ‘New Estimates Put Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal at More Than 100’, Washington Post, 31 Jan. 2011.
26 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘Pakistan Appears to Be Building a Fourth Nuclear Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site’, Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief, 9 Feb. 2011.
27 Kristensen and Norris, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2011’, 91. See also David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘Pakistan Doubling Rate of Making Nuclear Weapons: Time for Pakistan to Reverse Course’, Institute for Science and International Security, Imagery Brief, 16 May 2011.
28 Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 65/5 (Sept./Oct. 2009), 84.
29 Changes in nuclear arsenal size, arsenal composition, and employment doctrine are closely interrelated. For instance, with a larger arsenal, Pakistan might not face a choice between reserving its nuclear weapons for use against Indian cities and employing them against opposing military forces. Instead, it could retain a second-strike capability for use against countervalue targets, even if it fields a significant number of battlefield weapons.
30 Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture’, 134; and Peter Lavoy, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine’, in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (eds), Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford UP 2005), 284.
31 Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, ‘Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan’, Landau Network–Centro Volta (Jan. 2002).
32 Lavoy, ‘Islamabad’s Nuclear Posture’, 139. See also Zafar Iqbal Cheema, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control’, in Planning the Unthinkable, 179.
33 Gregory S. Jones, ‘Pakistan’s “Minimum Deterrent” Nuclear Force Requirements’, in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 90–1; and A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, ‘The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battle-Field Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large-Scale Indian Conventional Attack’, Pakistan Security Research Unit, Brief No. 61, 11 Nov. 2010.
34 Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Pakistani and Indian Nuclear Doctrine’, in Sagan, Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford UP 2009), 234.
35 Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’, 56–7. See also Vipin Narang, ‘What Does it Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 57/3 (June 2013).
36 Mark Hibbs, ‘Nuclear Energy 2011: A Watershed Year’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/1 (Jan./Feb. 2011), 16–17. See also Shashank Joshi, ‘New Year, New Problem? Pakistan’s Tactical Nukes’, The Diplomat, 2 Jan. 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/02/pakistans-new-nuclear-problem/>.
37 Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR], Press Release No. PR 94/2011-ISPR, 19 April 2011, <http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=1721>; and ISPR, Press Release No. R17/2013-ISPR, 11 Feb. 2013, <http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2239&search=1>.
38 Michael Krepon, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability’, Stimson Center, 10 Dec. 2012, 17. See also Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 2012’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5 (Sept./Oct. 2012), 103.
39 ‘Pakistani Missile Seen as Response to India’s “Cold Start”’, Global Security Newswire, 21 April 2011; Sangeev Miglani, ‘Pakistan Builds Low Yield Nuclear Capability, Concerns Grow’, Reuters, 15 May 2011; and Sikander Shaheen, ‘Pakistan Successfully Fires Hatf-IX Missile’, The Nation, 12 Feb. 2013.
40 Maleeha Lodi, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Compulsions’, The News International, 6 Nov. 2012.
41 Costanzo, ‘South Asia: Danger Ahead?’; and Jones, ‘Nuclear Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia: Structural Factors’, 33.
42 Ladwig, ‘A Cold Start for Hot Wars’; and Narang, ‘Posturing for Peace?’
43 Krepon, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy and Deterrence Stability’, 20.
44 Shashank Joshi, ‘India’s Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/4 (Aug. 2013), 512–40. See also Gill, ‘India and Pakistan’, 243–44; Rahul Bedi, ‘Getting in Step: India Country Briefing’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 Feb. 2008; and Rahul Bedi, ‘Briefing: Defending Delhi, Running the Budgetary Obstacle Course’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 March 2012.
45 Cited in Saikat Datta, ‘DNA Exclusive: General VK Singh Tells PM Some Hard Truths’, Digital News and Analysis, 28 March 2012.
46 This is likely to be a significant concern in Islamabad given that Operation ‘Brasstacks’ – a major Indian military exercise near the border with Pakistan that was held in 1986–87 – was suspected in Pakistan as being a prelude to an invasion. See Kanti Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar 1995); S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford UP 2007), 85–90; and P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington DC: Brookings 2007), Ch. 3.
47 Ahmed, ‘Cold Start’, 460–63.
48 Sidhu, ‘India’s Nuclear Use Doctrine’; Pant, ‘India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure’; Ashley J. Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine: Exemplifying the Lessons of the Nuclear Revolution’, NBR Analysis 12/2 (May 2001); Stephen Philip Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington DC: Brookings 2001), Ch. 6; and Sunil Dasgupta and Stephen P. Cohen, ‘Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?’ Washington Quarterly 34/2 (Spring 2011), 167, 170–1. India’s nuclear posture has evolved in recent years, however, and may now include some weapons that are kept in a much higher state of readiness. See Vipin Narang, ‘Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture’, Washington Quarterly 36/3 (Summer 2013), 148–50.
49 Steve Coll, ‘The Stand-Off’, New Yorker, 13 Feb. 2006.
50 Joshi, ‘India’s Military Instrument’, 24; Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 482–8; Tellis, ‘India’s Emerging Nuclear Doctrine’, 17; Rajesh M. Basrur, ‘India’s Escalation-Resistant Nuclear Posture’, in Krepon et al., Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia, 61.
51 Dasgupta and Cohen, ‘Is India Ending its Strategic Restraint Doctrine?’, 170.
52 General V.K. Singh, quoted in ‘Nukes Only for Strategic Purposes: Army Chief’, The Indian Express, 16 Jan. 2012.
53 Quoted in Indrani Bagchi, ‘Strike by Even a Midget Nuke Will Invite Massive Response, India Warns Pak’, Times of India, 30 April 2013.
54 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews Progress in Operationalizing India’s Nuclear Doctrine’, 4 Jan. 2003, <http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html>. The doctrine also reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological attack against India ‘or Indian forces anywhere’.
55 Sagan, ‘The Evolution of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine’, 250, 252. In addition to this doctrinal flexibility, Vipin Narang notes that India is also developing some capabilities that could potentially be used as nuclear delivery systems against counterforce targets, including its Brahmos cruise missile and Prahaar ballistic missile, although neither has a declared nuclear role as of yet. Narang, ‘Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture’, 145–6.
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Notes on contributors
Evan Braden Montgomery
Evan Braden Montgomery is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). In addition to authoring a number of CSBA monographs, his work has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, and Foreign Affairs.
Eric S. Edelman
Eric S. Edelman is a Distinguished Fellow at CSBA, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner-in-Residence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and member of the Journal of Strategic Studies editorial board. He previously served as Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, in addition to holding senior positions at the White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense.