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ABSTRACT
China’s expanding strength and ambition may foreshadow a violent conflict with the United States. I describe two scenarios about how such a conflict would unfold. The article begins by examining the prospects for nuclear escalation, drawing on theories about politics, psychology, and inadvertent escalation. It then examines the prospects for protracted conventional war, a scenario that has received far less attention. I present a new theory of protraction based on technology, geography, and domestic politics. After assessing the logic of both scenarios against a hypothetical US–China conflict, I discuss which is more likely. The conclusion points to a sobering trade-off: efforts to avoid nuclear catastrophe increase the chance of a long and grueling fight.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Mark Bell, Stephen Biddle, Owen Coté, Fiona Cunningham, Taylor Fravel, Eliza Gheorghe, Michael Glosny, Frank Gavin, Michael Horowitz, Nicholas Miller, Vipin Narang, Caitlin Talmadge, Christopher Twomey, Toshi Yoshihara, anonymous reviewers, and audiences at the American University School of International Service, the UC San Diego Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, the Indiana University Center for American and Global Security, Keio University, the MIT Security Studies Program, the Naval Postgraduate School, Peking University, and RMIT University.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For arguments about the possibility of war, see Christopher Coker, The Improbable War: China, The United States, and the Logic of Great Power Conflict (Oxford: Oxford UP 2015); Elbridge A. Colby and Abraham M. Denmark, Nuclear Weapons and U.S. China Relations: A Way Forward, A Report of the PONI Working Group on U.S.-China Nuclear Dynamics (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2013), 4; and James Dobbins, ‘War with China,’ Survival 54 (August/September 2012), 7–24.
2 Cristina L. Garafola, ‘The Evolution of PLAAF Mission, Roles, and Requirements,’ in Joe McReynolds (ed.) China’s Evolving Military Strategy (Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation 2016), 80. According to China specialists, the Science of Military Strategy is particularly important because it reflects the views of the Academy of Military Sciences, which reports directly to the Central Military Commission. See M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Changing Approach to Military Strategy: The Science of Military Strategy from 2001 and 2013,’ in McReynolds (ed.) China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 49–51.
3 Quoted in Garofola, ‘Evolution of PLAAF,’ 87.
4 Science of Military Strategy (2013), quoted in John Costello and Peter Mattis, ‘Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,’ in McReynolds (ed.) China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 165. The 2013 edition argues that this approach is appropriate whatever the balance of capabilities: “In the future, no matter whether we will face an enemy with superior equipment or an enemy with inferior equipment, we will always need to focus on paralyzing enemy warfighting systems and emphasize ‘striking at systems,’ ‘striking at vital sites,’ and striking at [key] nodes.” Quoted in Kevin Pollpeter and Jonathan Ray, ‘The Conceptual Evolution of China’s Military Space Operations and Strategy,’ in McReynolds, (ed.) China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 257–258.
5 Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations, August 2011, p. xx, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf>
6 Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, ‘Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (January 2015), 38–73.
7 Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy,’ International Security, 30/4 (Spring 2006), 7–44.
8 Walter Pincus, ‘It seems the Pentagon can never have enough deployed nuclear warheads,’ Washington Post, 29 June 2015.
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (ed) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1976), 117. On misperceptions and the power of expectations, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1976); and Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence 1999).
10 Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).
11 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,’ Econometrica 47 (1979) 263–291; Rose McDermott, Risk Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press 1998); and Jonathan Mercer, ‘Prospect Theory and Political Science,’ Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005), 1–21.
12 George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, ‘Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal Agent Problem Goes to War,’ American Journal of Political Science 38/2 (1994), 362–80; and H.E. Goemans and Mark Fey, ‘Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble,’ The Journal of Politics 71/1 (January 2009), 35–54.
13 The concept took hold in Russia during the 1990s, when there appeared few ways to deal with Russia’s glaring conventional weaknesses. Daniel Goure, ‘Moscow’s Vision of Future War: So Many Conflict Scenarios, So Little Time,’ in Roger N. McDermott (ed.) The Transformation of Russia’s Armed Forces: Twenty Lost Years (New York: Routledge 2015), 124–125.
14 Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1992).
15 Christopher P. Twomey, ‘What’s in a Name: Building Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities without Anti-Access Doctrine,’ in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Travis Tanner (ed.) Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press 2014).
16 Sam LaGrone, ‘Pentagon Drops Air Sea Battle Name, Concept Lives On,’ USNI News, 20 January 2015, <http://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/pentagon-drops-air-sea-battle-name-concept-lives>
17 DOD officials may have become more cognizant of the dangers of escalation. But the author’s conversations with military and defense officials suggest that they also fear fighting in contested environment without being able to target shore-based C2 and missile sites. In other words, at least some officials are willing to consider the risk. Conversations with officers involved with ASB suggest that the “official” version was somewhat less coherent than the CSBA version. For the CSBA version of ASB, see Jan Van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2010), <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept>. Although officials insist that ASB is not directed at any specific rival, only China seriously threatens to deny US access. For a useful comparison, see Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert and Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, ‘Air-Sea Battle,’ The American Interest (February 2012), <http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/02/20/air-sea-battle/>
18 Van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle, 63.
19 Van Tol, et al., AirSea Battle, 39.
20 The Air–Sea Battle Office emphasized the importance of maintaining escalation advantages throughout a hypothetical conflict with an enemy with anti-access capabilities. See Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges (2013); <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ASB-ConceptImplementation-Summary-May-2013.pdf>
21 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966), 74–75.
22 Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,’ International Security, 25/4 (Spring 2001), 5–40. For more on Chinese nationalism and regime insecurity, see Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford, UK: Oxford UP 2008). Xi Jinping may hope to restore ideological legitimacy, which might buffer the party in the event of economic collapse. Evan Osnos, ‘Born Red,’ The New Yorker, 6 April 2015.
23 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of China’s Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure,’ International Security 35/2 (Fall 2010), 48–87.
24 Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture, Adelphi Paper #446 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015); and John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, ‘Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68/5 (September/October 2012), 45–56. Some analysts believe China’s weapons handling and storage system is intentionally confusing. See Mark A. Stokes, ‘China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,’ Project 2049 Institute, 12 March 2010, 13n, <http://project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf> Others argue that China is moving away from a posture based on low numbers and ambiguity, though considerable ambiguity remains. See Fravel and Medeiros, ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation’; and Michael S. Chase, ‘China’s Transition to a More Credible Nuclear Deterrent: Implications and Challenges for the United States,’ Asia Policy 16 (July 2013), 69–101.
25 The short-range DF-15 might also have nuclear capabilities. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71/4 (2015), 79. One analyst offers a somewhat more sanguine assessment, noting that the CCP maintains tight command of nuclear warheads and treats them differently. Nonetheless, he concludes that as “a general trend, the distinction between brigades with nuclear and conventional missions is becoming blurred.” Stokes, ‘China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,’ 3.
26 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and US-China Strategic Stability,’ International Security, 40/2 (Fall 2015), 7–50, at 42–46.
27 Colby and Denmark, ‘Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations,’ 21; and Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation,’ 15–19.
28 There are also indications that China is moving away from an absolute commitment to no-first use. Chinese writers have argued that nuclear weapons may be required to deter certain kinds of conventional attacks, including strikes on China’s nuclear forces. See Christopher T. Yeaw, Andrew S. Erickson, and Michael S. Chase, ‘The Future of Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy,’ in Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes (ed.) Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon (Washington DC: Georgetown UP 2012), 53–80, at 60–63; and James M. Acton, ‘Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear Weapons?’ New York Times, 18 April 2013. For an alternative view, see M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China Has Not (Yet) Changed Its Position on Nuclear Weapons,’ The Diplomat (online), 22 April 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/china-has-not-yet-changed-its-position-on-nuclear-weapons/1/>
29 PLARF’s operational structure is complex and somewhat opaque. Each “missile base” is an administrative unit operating within a particular geographic area, which oversees brigades and battalions. The total number of brigades and corresponding battalions is unclear. Meanwhile, “launch companies” are set aside for conventional missiles alone. Stokes, ‘China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling Systems,’ 13n.
30 China’s new Type 094 submarine will carry the JL-2 SLBM, which is in the last stages of development. The JL-2’s reported range is over 7000 km, which would allow it to target Alaska from home waters but not the continental United States. Kristensen and Norris, ‘Chinese nuclear forces, 2015,’ 80.
31 For variations on this theme, see Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and US-China Security Relations,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 35/4 (2012), 447–487; Avery Goldstein, ‘First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,’ International Security 37/4 (Spring 2013), 49–89; Joshua Rovner, ‘AirSea Battle and Escalation Risks,’ Policy Brief, No. 12 (La Jolla: UC San Diego Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, January 2012); Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Future Scenarios of Limited Nuclear Conflict,’ in Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (ed.) On Limited War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2014), 138–140; Paul I. Bernstein, ‘The Emerging Nuclear Landscape,’ in Larsen and Kartchner (ed.) On Limited War in the 21st Century, 111–117; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Assessing The Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,’ International Security (forthcoming); and William J. Norris, ‘Inadvertent Escalation in East Asia: The Strategic Nuclear Implications of Air-Sea Battle,’ unpublished ms.
32 Kerry M. Kartchner and Michael S. Gerson, ‘Escalation to Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century,’ in Larsen and Kartchner (ed.) On Limited War in the 21st Century, 158–162; and Colby and Denmark, ‘Nuclear Weapons and U.S.-China Relations,’ 13 and 39–40.
33 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (April 2010), x–xi, <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf> Such efforts are moving slowly. Issues of nuclear stability were treated in passing in the recent U.S.-China Security and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue produced over 100 “outcomes” in the joint declaration at the end of the talks, but only one suggested any attention to the problem, and the language was vague and anodyne. The parties “affirmed a mutual commitment to the management of crises.” Department of State, ‘U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Outcomes of the Strategic Track,’ 14 July 2015; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/07/229239.htm
34 For a recent discussion of the consequences of a prolonged conflict, see David C. Gompert, Astrid Cevallos, and Cristina L. Garafola, War With China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2016).
35 Karl Magyar distinguishes prolonged wars from protracted wars, in which at least one side deliberately extends the duration of fighting. Here my focus is on wars that go on longer than either side expects. See Karl P. Magyar, ‘Introduction: The Protraction and Prolongation of Wars,’ in Magyar and Constantine P. Danopolous (ed.) Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge (Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 1994). For studies that consider the effects of choosing strategies of attrition or protraction, see D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, III, ‘The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816–1985,’ American Political Science Review 90/2 (June 1996), 234–257; and Catherine C. Longlois and Jean-Pierre B. Longlois, ‘Does Attrition Behavior Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars?’ International Studies Quarterly 53/4 (December 2009), 1051–1073.
36 Examples include Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1983); Robert F. Powell, ‘Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,’ Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002); Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, ‘A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War,’ American Journal of Political Science 46/4 (October 2002), 819–838; and Branislav Slantchev, ‘How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,’ American Journal of Political Science 48/4 (October 2004), 813–829.
37 Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2009).
38 Phil Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2015).
39 Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2009).
40 Hein Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2000). See also Sarah E. Croco, Peace at What Price? Leader Culpability and the Domestic Politics of War Termination (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2015).
41 Colin F. Jackson, ‘Lost Chance or Lost Horizon? Strategic Opportunity and Escalation Risk in the Korean War, April-July 1951,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 33/2 (April 2010), 255–289.
42 Religion is a core value, but for some analysts the line between divine and national interests is fuzzy. See, for example, Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: McMillan 1960). On nationalism and prolonged war, see Barry R. Posen, ‘Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,’ International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993), 80–124. On religion and long wars, see Michael C. Horowitz, ‘Long Time Going: Religion and the Duration of Crusading,’ International Security 34/2 (Fall 2009), 162–193.
43 Ron E. Hassner, ‘The Path to Intractability: Time and the Entrenchment of Territorial Disputes,’ International Security 31/3 (Fall-Winter 2006/2007), 107–138; and Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller, ‘Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 57/2 (April 2013), 258–284. On propaganda, see Samuel Vichinich and Jay Teachman, ‘Influences on the Duration of Wars, Strikes, Riots, and Family Arguments,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 37/3 (September 1993), 544–568.
44 Robert S. Ross, ‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,’ International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999), 81–118.
45 Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989).
46 For overviews, see Kamphausen, Lai, and Tanner, eds., Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era; Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, and Samuel K. Berkowitz, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2015); and Eric Heginbotham, et al., The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2007 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2015).
47 Ross, ‘Geography of the Peace.’
48 Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity,’ paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, Toronto, March 25–29, 2014.
49 See the transcript of President Obama and President Xi Jinping’s press conference in November 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/12/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-jinping-joint-press-conference>
50 Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War.
51 For an overview, see Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, ‘Explaining the U.S. ‘Pivot’ to Asia,’ Chatham House, August 2013, <www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf>
52 Michael A. Glosny, ‘Heading toward a Win–Win Future? Recent Developments in China’s Policy toward Southeast Asia,’ Asia Security 2/1 (2006), 24–57.
53 Jane Cai and Laura Zhou, ‘China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Reflects Mainland’s Rising Power,’ South China Morning Post, 25 March 2015.
54 Chase, et al, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, 84.
55 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,’ International Security 41/1 (Summer 2016), 7–48.
56 Biddle and Oelrich, ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.’
57 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1999), 14–34.
58 Joshua Rovner, ‘Cross-Domain Deterrence in the Peloponnesian War,’ unpublished ms.
59 Quoted in Blasko, ‘Technology Determines Tactics,’ 68.
60 Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge 2012), 126–127.
61 OSD, Annual Report, 33.
62 OSD, Annual Report, 26–27
63 OSD, Annual Report, 30.
64 Blasko, Chinese Army Today, 128.
65 Blasko, Chinese Army Today, 129–130.
66 Chase, et al, China’s Incomplete Military Transformation, 102–113, at 113.
67 On supply chains, see Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 2007). On China’s internal economic difficulties, see George J. Gilboy, ‘The Myth Behind China’s Miracle,’ Foreign Affairs (July-August 2004), 33–48.
68 Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to Innovation,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (June 2011), 325–354.
69 OSD, Annual Report, 25; and Heginbotham, et al., Scorecard, 47.
70 Blasko, Chinese Military Today, 130.
71 OSD, Annual Report, 79–80.
72 OSD, Annual Report, 80.
73 OSD, Annual Report, 80–81.
74 Cheung, ‘Chinese Economy’s Long March,’ 338–343.
75 Quoted in Blasko, ‘Technology Determines Tactics,’ 368. U.S. officials share the same basic view. In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, the Pentagon speculates that China’s first option will be to deter US entry. If that fails, it will seek ‘victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; or fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.’ OSD, Annual Report, 88.
76 Michael S. Chase, ‘Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era,’ in Kamphausen (ed.) Assessing the People’s Liberation Army, 312–313. The Second Artillery was recently renamed the PLA Rocket Force.
77 According to The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (2006), ‘when command is disrupted or when the situation is urgent, Second Artillery campaign commanders and their command offices should, within their limited scope of authority, act on their own judgment, in light of the strategic intentions of headquarters.’ China’s long-standing emphasis on centralization, and on robust and redundant command and control, means this statement comes with important caveats. This guidance may only apply to conventional missile units, which are also covered in SSAC. In addition, it may not have anything to do with launch authority but only refer to more general command and control issues like moving warheads to different hide sites. Chase, ‘Second Artillery in the Hu Jintao Era,’ 314.
78 Osnos, ‘Born Red’; and Shirk, China.
79 T.X. Hammes, ‘Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict,’ INSS Strategic Forum (2012), <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a577602.pdf>
80 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69–86.
81 Hammes, ‘Offshore Control.’ One analyst argues that a blockade might make sense when US interests are sufficient to pay the price of a protracted war, but not so high that it would risk escalation. Sean Mirski, ‘Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,’ Journal of Strategic Studies 36/3 (June 2013) 385–421.
82 T.X. Hammes argues that a restrained US approach could provide China the opportunity to back down while claiming that it “taught the enemy a lesson.” Sean Mirski argues that China’s “nationalist ardor” may decrease as economic costs rise, and Chinese leaders may fear that diverting resources to external security might leave them vulnerable to internal threats. Under these conditions, the CCP might be amenable to a settlement. While these scenarios are plausible, all of them will take time, and Hammes and Mirski both acknowledge that any strategy of exhaustion will require patience. Hammes, ‘Offshore Control,’ p. 6; and Mirski, ‘Stranglehold,’390–392. Efforts to coerce China by cutting off its oil supply may be useful if they threaten the PLA’s ability to continue fighting. But China’s vulnerability is in dispute, and it may be able to fight on for an extended period, especially if it continues to develop reliable overland alternatives. On oil and coercion, see Rosemary A. Kelanic, ‘The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior,’ Security Studies 25/2 (June 2016), 181–213. For different views on China’s vulnerability, see Charles L. Glaser, ‘How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,’ International Security 38/2 (Fall 2013), 112–146, at 131–133; and Gabriel S. Collins and William Murray, ‘No Oil for the Lamps of China?’ Naval War College Review 61/2 (Spring 2008), 79–95.
83 Joshua Rovner, ‘Delusion of Defeat: The United States and Iraq, 1990–1998,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 37/4 (August 2014), 482–507.
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Joshua Rovner
Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Distinguished Chair in International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of the Security and Strategy Program (SAS@SMU).