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ABSTRACT
An issue that has been widely debated in the West is whether cyberwarfare gives militarily weaker actors asymmetric advantages. Is cyberwarfare a weapon of the weak? Or does it rather multiply the advantages enjoyed by militarily superior actors? These questions have major implications for China, which – as a rising power – must face stronger and weaker opponents at the same time. Based on an analysis of the Chinese journal Guofang Keji, this article investigates how China’s strategic community theorises advantage and disadvantage in the cyber domain and how this differs from Western perspectives on cyberwarfare.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For an early assessment of the new domain’s impact on international politics and International Relations theory, see Andreas Wenger (ed.), ‘The Internet and the Changing Face of International Relations and Security’, special issue, Information & Security 7 (2001). Over the past two decades, the implications of the cyber phenomenon for International Relations theory have been widely debated: to limit references to books, see for instance David J. Betz and Tim Stevens, Cyberspace and the State. Toward a Strategy for Cyber-Power (London: IISS 2011), 35–74; Nazli Choucri, Cyberpolitics in International Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2012), 25–48; Chris C. Demchak, Wars of Disruption and Resilience: Cybered Conflict, Power, and National Security (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press 2011), 22–47; Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello (eds.), International Relations and Security in the Digital Age (London: Routledge 2007); Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Müller (eds.), Cyberspace and International Relations. Theory, Prospects and Challenges (Berlin: Springer 2014); and Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs 2011), 113–51.
2 On China as a rising power and its implications for Sino–U.S. relations, see for instance the debate on the so-called ‘Thucydides trap’: Graham Allison, ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?’, The Atlantic, 24 September 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/; Graham Allison, Destined for War. Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2017); James R. Holmes, ‘Beware the “Thucydides Trap” Trap. Why the U.S. and China Aren’t Necessarily Athens and Sparta or Britain and Germany Before WWI’, The Diplomat, 13 June 2013, https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/beware-the-thucydides-trap-trap/; and Gregory J. Moore, ‘Avoiding a Thucydides Trap in Sino-American Relations (… and 7 Reasons Why that Might be Difficult)’, Asian Security 13/2 (2017), 98–115.
3 On China’s rise and the implications for Beijing’s relations with its neighbours, see the debate on balancing vs. bandwagoning in East Asia: Evelyn Goh, ‘Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies’, International Security 32/3 (2008), 113–57; David C. Kang, China Rising. Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York, NY: Columbia UP 2007), 50–75; Robert S. Ross, ‘Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East Asia’, Security Studies 15/3 (2006), 355–95. For more recent contributions to this debate, see G. John Ikenberry, ‘Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia’, Political Science Quarterly 131/1 (2016), 9–43; Adam P. Liff, ‘Whither the Balancers? The Case for a Methodological Reset’, Security Studies 25/3 (2016), 420–59; and Robert S. Ross and Øystein Tunsjø (eds.), Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China. Power and Politics in East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2017).
4 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi [Information Office of the PRC State Council], Zhongguo de Junshi Zhanlüe [China’s Military Strategy] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe 2015), 11–2.
5 On the PLASSF, see Kevin L. Pollpeter, Michael S. Chase and Eric Heginbotham, The Creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force and Its Implications for Chinese Military Space Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2017); Rachael Burton and Mark Stokes, The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force. Leadership and Structure (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute 2018); John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New Era (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press 2018); and Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations’, The Cyber Defense Review 3/2 (2018), 105–21.
6 Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu – Junshi Bianweihui [Editorial Committee of ‘Chinese Encyclopedia – Military’], Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu – Junshi [Chinese Encyclopedia – Military] (Beijing: Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu Chubanshe 2005), 923. In 2017, NUDT was reorganised to absorb several pre-existing academic institutions: the Chinese name was also changed from Guofang Kexue Jishu Daxue to Guofang Keji Daxue; see Ying Yu Lin, ‘One Step Forward, One Step Back for PLA Military Education’, China Brief 18/7 (2018), https://jamestown.org/program/one-step-forward-one-step-back-for-pla-military-education/.
7 For a preliminary analysis of a sample of Guofang Keji articles in the context of a study on U.S.–China relations in cyberspace, see Simone Dossi, ‘Confronting China’s Cyberwarfare Capabilities: A “Weapon of the Weak” or a Force Multiplier?’, in Marco Clementi, Matteo Dian and Barbara Pisciotta (eds.), US Foreign Policy in a Challenging World. Building Order on Shifting Foundations (Cham: Springer, 2018), 357–77.
8 Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’, Security Studies 22/3 (2013), 365–404, 368.
9 Stephen Blank, ‘Web War I: Is Europe’s First Information War a New Kind of War?’, Comparative Strategy 27/3 (2008), 227–47; Lucas Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution. Perils to Theory and Statecraft’, International Security 38/2 (2013), 7–40; Gregory D. Koblentz and Brian M. Mazanec, ‘Viral Warfare: The Security Implications of Cyber and Biological Weapons’, Comparative Strategy 32/5 (2013), 418–34; Kenneth Lieberthal and Peter W. Singer, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings 2012); Gary McGraw, ‘Cyber War Is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/1 (2013), 109–19; Joseph S. Nye, ‘Nuclear Lessons for Cyber Security?’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 5/4 (2011), 18–38; Nye, The Future of Power, 122–32; Dale Peterson, ‘Offensive Cyber Weapons: Construction, Development, and Employment’, Journal of Strategic Studies 36/1 (2013), 120–24; and Derek S. Reveron, ‘An Introduction to National Security and Cyberspace’, in Derek S. Reveron (ed.), Cyberspace and National Security. Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual World (Washington, DC: Georgetown UP 2012), 3–19.
10 John Arquilla, ‘Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us. But Can It Be Controlled?’, Foreign Policy, February 2012, 27, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/cyberwar-is-already-upon-us/#; David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘Waging Cyber War the American Way’, Survival 57/4 (2015), 7–28; McGraw, ‘Cyber War Is Inevitable’; and Greg Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2001), 34–64.
11 On the vulnerability of vital civilian infrastructures, see McGraw, ‘Cyber War Is Inevitable’; Peterson, ‘Offensive Cyber Weapons’. On the offence-dominant nature of cyberspace, see for instance Arquilla, ‘Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us’; Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution’; and Nye, ‘Nuclear Lessons’. On the attribution problem, see Richard B. Andres, ‘The Emerging Structure of Strategic Cyber Offense, Cyber Defense, and Cyber Deterrence’, in Reveron (ed.), Cyberspace and National Security, 89–104; Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution’; Koblentz and Mazanec, ‘Viral Warfare’; and Lieberthal and Singer, Cybersecurity and U.S.-China Relations.
12 Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution’; for a more articulated discussion of strategic cyberwarfare and its preconditions, see Rattray, Strategic Warfare, 101–51.
13 Nikolas K. Gvosdev, ‘The Bear Goes Digital. Russia and Its Cyber Capabilities’, in Reveron (ed.), Cyberspace and National Security, 173–89; Richard R. Kugler, ‘Deterrence of Cyber Attacks’, in Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr and Larry K. Wentz (eds.), Cyberpower and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense UP 2009), 309–40; Timothy L. Thomas, ‘Nation-State Cyber Strategies: Examples from China and Russia’, in Kramer, Starr and Wentz (eds.), Cyberpower, 465–88. On the cyber (or ‘informational’) component of Russia’s ‘cross-domain coercion strategy’, see Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘From Moscow with Coercion: Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 33–60. On a North Korean attempt at cyber coercion, see Travis Sharp, ‘Theorizing Cyber Coercion: The 2014 North Korean Operation Against Sony’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/7 (2017), 898–926; for an alternative assessment of the same operation, see Christopher Whyte, ‘Ending Cyber Coercion: Computer Network Attack, Exploitation and the Case of North Korea’, Comparative Strategy 35/2 (2016), 93–102.
14 Andres, ‘The Emerging Structure’; Blank, ‘Web War I’; Steven Bucci, ‘Joining Cybercrime and Cyberterrorism. A Likely Scenario’, in Reveron (ed.), Cyberspace and National Security, 57–68; Nye, ‘Nuclear Lessons’; Reveron, ‘An Introduction’; Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution’.
15 Kello, ‘The Meaning of the Cyber Revolution’, 190. See also Nye, The Future of Power, 132–51.
16 Adam P. Liff, ‘Cyberwar: A New “Absolute Weapon”? The Proliferation of Cyberwarfare Capabilities and Interstate War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (2012), 401–28; Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet’; Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst & Company 2013), 44–5, 115, 169–70. See also David Betz, ‘Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (2012), 689–711; Max Smeets, ‘A Matter of Time: On the Transitory Nature of Cyberweapons’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 6–32. On Stuxnet see also James P. Farwell and Rafal Rohozinski, ‘Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War’, Survival 53/1 (2011), 23–40; and Rebecca Slayton, ‘What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?: Conceptions, Causes, and Assessment’, International Security 41/3 (2016/17), 72–109.
17 On offence-dominance as a myth see Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet’; Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 167–9. In fact, according to Rebecca Slayton, the offence–defence balance in cyberspace is not systemic but dyadic, i.e., ‘a characteristic not of cyberspace, but rather of the relationship between two adversaries’: Slayton, ‘What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance?’, 107. On attribution see Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (2015), 4–37.
18 Erik Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar. Bringing War in Cyberspace back down to Earth’, International Security 38/2 (2013), 41–73, 63. On ‘offline–online interaction’, see Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, ‘Conclusion. Digital-Age Security in Theory and Practice’, in Erkisson and Giacomello (eds.), International Relations and Security in the Digital Age, 173–84, 180. See also Betz and Stevens, Cyberspace and the State, 88–97; Betz, ‘Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs’. On ‘operational cyberwar’ as a more viable option than ‘strategic cyberwar’, see Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica: RAND 2009), 117–58; on the fact that ‘Information Warfare Only Looks Strategic’, see also Martin C. Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace. National Security and Information Warfare (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2007), 37–49. On the fact that cyberwarfare is not an efficient option for terrorists, see Giampiero Giacomello, ‘Bangs for the Buck: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Cyberterrorism’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27/5 (2004), 387–408.
19 Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar’.
20 See Joel Brenner in Joel Brenner and Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Debating the Chinese Cyber Threat’, International Security 40/1 (2015), 191–95; George P. Manson III, ‘Cyberwar: The United States and China Prepare for the Next Generation of Conflict’, Comparative Strategy 30/2 (2011), 121–33; Adam Segal, ‘Chinese Computer Games: Keeping Safe in Cyberspace’, Foreign Affairs 91/2 (2012), 14–20; Timothy L. Thomas, ‘Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares”’, Parameters 40/2 (2010), 101–13. On U.S. vulnerability to China’s ‘information warfare stratagems’, see Thomas, ‘Nation-State Cyber Strategies’.
21 Manson, ‘Cyberwar’, 124.
22 Alexander Klimburg, ‘Mobilizing Cyber Power’, Survival 53/1 (2011), 41–60.
23 For a recent discussion of China’s cyber doctrine based on the extensive analysis of Chinese sources, see Dean Cheng, Cyber Dragon. Inside China’s Information Warfare and Cyber Operations (Santa Barbara: Praeger 2017). According to Cheng, China’s approach to cyberwarfare is more correctly qualified as ‘orthogonal’, i.e., an approach that implies a completely different set of assumptions and goals: see Cheng, Cyber Dragon, 207–08. For other analyses based on Chinese sources, see also Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung and Derek S. Reveron (eds.), China and Cybersecurity. Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain (Oxford: Oxford UP 2015) and especially the following contributions: Kevin Pollpeter, ‘Chinese Writings on Cyberwarfare and Coercion’, 138–62; Robert Sheldon and Joe McReynolds, ‘Civil-Military Integration and Cybersecurity. A Study of Chinese Information Warfare Militias’, 188–222; Mark A. Stokes, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Computer Network Operations Infrastructure’, 163–87; and Ye Zheng, ‘From Cyberwarfare to Cybersecurity in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond’, 123–37.
24 Jon R. Lindsay, ‘The Impact of China on Cybersecurity. Fiction and Friction’, International Security 39/3 (2015), 7–47, 44; see also Cheng, Cyber Dragon, 215.
25 Guo Fuliang, Yang Xinde and Zhou Gang, ‘Wai Jun Wangluo Zhan Fazhan Xiankuang Yanjiu ji Qishi’ [Analysis of the Current Situation of Cyberwar Development in Foreign Armed Forces and Implications], Guofang Keji 34/3 (2013), 49–52, 51.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.; Sun Wei and Bao Chuang, ‘Guoji Wangluo Anquan Chanpin Shichang Fazhan Xianzhuang yu Qushi’ [State and Trends in the Development of the International Market for Cybersecurity Products’], Guofang Keji 37/2 (2016), 59–64; Zhang Jianchao, Shen Xueshi and Zhong Hua, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo Kongjian Zuozhan Lilun Fazhan ji Yingxiang Fenxi’ [The Development of the U.S. Military’s Cyberspace Operations Theory and Its Influence], Guofang Keji 37/3 (2016), 63–7; Zheng Hebin, ‘Wangluo Junbei dui Zhuquan de Yingxiang ji Woguo Duice’ [The Impact of Cyber Arms on Sovereignty and Countermeasures of China], Guofang Keji 34/2 (2013), 62–8; Wang Zengzhuo and Zhu Yajie, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo Silingbu yu Guojia Anquan Ju Chaifen de Kenengxing’ [On the Possibility of a Split between the U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency], Guofang Keji 39/5 (2018), 91–6.
28 Ibid., 64.
29 Du Yanyun and Liu Yangyue, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo Kongjian Boyi yu Jingzheng’ [Sino-U.S. Competition in Cyberspace], Guofang Keji 35/3 (2014), 70–82; Guo, Yang and Zhou, ‘Wai Jun Wangluo Zhan’; Ke Hongfa, Zhu Jilu and Zhao Rong, ‘Tuijin Wangluo Kongjian Hexin Zhiyuan Nengli Jianshe’ [Promoting the Building-Up of Core Supporting Capabilities in Cyberspace], Guofang Keji 38/2 (2017), 50–4; Liang Meng, Han Yue and Qiao Zheng, ‘Meiguo “Guofangbu Wangluo Kongjian Zuozhan Zhanlüe” Shuping’ [A Discussion of the U.S. “Department of Defence Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace”], Guofang Keji 33/1 (2012), 84–7; Sun Wei, ‘Quanli Zhengzhi Shijiao Xia Wangluo Zhuquan de Jichu’ [The Basis of Cyber Sovereignty from the Perspective of Power Politics], Guofang Keji 37/6 (2016), 81–7; Sun and Bao, ‘Guoji Wangluo Anquan Chanpin’; and Zhuang Lin and Si Huijing, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Anquan Zhanlüe de Shizhi’ [Essence of the U.S. Cybersecurity Strategy], Guofang Keji 34/4 (2013), 74–8.
30 Chen Tian, Xian Ming and Li Zili, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo Kongjian Zuozhan Guihua Yanjiu’ [Research on the U.S. Military's Cyberspace Operations Planning], Guofang Keji 37/3 (2016), 68–72, 68.
31 Fu Yanhong and Zhao Yang, ‘Wangluo Kongjian Junbei Kongzhi Yanjiu Xianzhuang ji Qishi Sikao [State of Research on Cyberspace Arms Control and Assessment], Guofang Keji 34/1 (2013), 34–7; Wu Zecheng, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan dui Zhongguo Guojia Anquan de Yingxiang ji Duice’ [The Influence of U.S. Cyber Hegemony on China’s National Security and Countermeasures], Guofang Keji 35/1 (2014), 55–60; and Zhan Xiaosu, ‘Jiaqiang Wangluo Guofang Jianshe Zhanlüe Yunchou Xuyao Qianghua de Liu Zhong Yishi’ [On the Six Elements of Awareness that Should Be Strengthened in Order to Reinforce the Strategic Planning for Cyber National Defence Construction], Guofang Keji 34/6 (2013), 69–72.
32 Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’; Fu and Zhao, ‘Wangluo Kongjian Junbei Kongzhi’; Guo, Yang and Zhou, ‘Wai Jun Wangluo Zhan’; Liang, Han and Qiao, ‘Meiguo’; Wu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan’; and Zheng, ‘Wangluo Junbei’.
33 Huo Jiajia, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Fangwu Chengbao de Xianzhuang’ [State of Cyber Defence Contracting in the United States], Guofang Keji 37/6 (2016), 100–3; Cai Jun and Yu Xiaohong, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Kongjian Zuozhan Nengli Jianshe’ [On the Construction of U.S. Cyberspace Operations Capabilities], Guofang Keji 39/3 (2018), 105–9. On cooperation between the U.S. military, civilian agencies and private companies, see also Liu Yangyue, ‘Jun Min Ronghe Shijiao Xia de Meiguo Wangluo Anquan Rencai Zhanlüe’ [U.S. Cybersecurity Personnel Strategy from the Point of View of Civil-Military Fusion], Guofang Keji 39/1 (2018), 71–5.
34 Wu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan’, 58–59; see also Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’.
35 Ibid., 72; see also Zhan, ‘Jiaqiang Wangluo Guofang Jianshe’.
36 Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’.
37 Wu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan’.
38 Chen, Xian and Li, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo’; Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’; Huo, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Fangwu’; Wu Tong, ‘Jingwai Xinxi Wangluo Jiankong Xingshi yu Tiaozhan’ [Situation and Challenges of Information Network Monitoring Abroad], Guofang Keji 37/3 (2016), 40–3; Wu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan’; Zhan, ‘Jiaqiang Wangluo Guofang Jianshe’; and Zhuang and Si, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Anquan’.
39 Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’, 71.
40 Hu Yanjing and Zhan Zhongkun, ‘Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxi Gongfang Xinxing Zuozhan Liliang Jianshe’ [On Speeding Up the Construction of Information Attack and Defence Forces of a New Type], Guofang Keji 38/2 (2017), 64–7, 66.
41 Zhang, Shen and Zhong, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo’.
42 Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’; Guo, Yang and Zhou, ‘Wai Jun Wangluo Zhan’; Sun, ‘Quanli Zhengzhi Shijiao Xia’; Sun and Bao, ‘Guoji Wangluo Anquan Chanpin’; Wu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Baquan’; and Zheng, ‘Wangluo Junbei’.
43 Tian Chengxin, Zhang Feng and Jiang Fei, ‘Wangluo Zhan dui Zuozhan de Yingxiang ji Duice’ [Influence of Cyberwarfare on Operations and Countermeasures], Guofang Keji 35/5 (2014), 103–5, 104.
44 Zhuang and Si, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Anquan’.
45 Cheng Shaojie, Zhang Tao and Chang Zhenyu, ‘Wangluo Kongjian yu 21 Shiji de “Shouzhan”’ [Cyberspace and “First Strike” in the Twenty-First Century], Guofang Keji 30/6 (2009), 81–4, 82.
46 Shang Liang, Yang Guoxin, Shi Jinlai and Sui Shilong, ‘Wangluo Zhan Budui. Ge Guo Jun Zhong Xin Chong’ [Cyberwar Forces: The New Favourite of Every Country’s Military], Guofang Keji 30/4 (2009), 89–92.
47 Wu Chenggang, ‘Jiakuai Zhongguo “Wangluo Guofang” Jianshe de Zhanlüe Sikao’ [Strategic Reflection on Accelerating the Construction of China’s “Cyber National Defence”], Guofang Keji 33/3 (2012), 1–4.
48 Hu and Zhan, ‘Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxi Gongfang’, 64.
49 Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’.
50 Hu and Zhan, ‘Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxi Gongfang’, 64.
51 Tang Lu, ‘Qianxi Yi Falü Xingshi Kongzhi Wangluo Junbei Jingsai de Biyaoxing’ [An Analysis on the Necessity of Controlling Cyber Arms Race through Law], Guofang Keji 31/3 (2010), 33–6, 35. See also Ke, Zhu and Zhao, ‘Tuijin Wangluo Kongjian’. On the impact of new technological developments on the offence–defence balance in cyberspace, see Shen Xueshi, ‘Wangluo Kongjian Gong Fang Jishu Fazhan Dongxiang Fenxi’ [An Analysis of the Development Trends in Cyberspace Offence and Defence Technology], Guofang Keji 38/4 (2017), 42–6.
52 Zhang, Shen and Zhong, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo’, 66. See also Du and Liu, ‘Zhong Mei Wangluo’; Ma Zengjun and Li Jian, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo Zuozhan Zhihui yu Kongzhi de Guoqu, Xianzai yu Jianglai’ [Past, Present and Future of the U.S. Military’s Cyberwarfare Command and Control], Guofang Keji 35/5 (2014), 73–85; Sun and Bao, ‘Guoji Wangluo Anquan Chanpin’. Nevertheless, a 2018 article notes that defence is recognised a greater role in recent U.S. documents: Wang and Zhu, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo Silingbu’.
53 Hu and Zhan, ‘Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxi Gongfang’, 66.
54 Ibid., 65.
55 Sun Zi’s principle of ‘not fighting and subduing the enemy’ is mentioned in other Guofang Keji articles. See also Tang, ‘Qianxi Yi Falü Xingshi’; Xiao Xunlong and Li Shouqi, ‘Wangluo Yulun Zhan de Lilun Tanxi’ [Theoretical Analysis of Cyber Public Opinion Warfare], Guofang Keji 35/2 (2014), 5–8; Yang Tengfei, Zhu Yaohua and Zhang Weichao, ‘Heping Shiqi Wangluo Yulun Zhan de Tedian ji Duice Chuyi’ [Characteristics of Cyber Public Opinion Warfare in Peacetime and Opinions on Countermeasures], Guofang Keji 35/2 (2014), 33–6; and Cai and Yu, ‘Meiguo Wangluo Kongjian’. For a critical discussion of the principle of ‘not fighting and subduing the enemy’ in Chinese ancient military thought, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism. Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1995), 99–105.
56 Cheng, Zhang and Chang, ‘Wangluo Kongjian’, 84.
57 Zhang, Shen and Zhong, ‘Mei Jun Wangluo’, 66.
58 Wu, ‘Jiakuai Zhongguo’, 2.
59 Deng Feng, ‘Bianzheng Renshi Gao Jishu Zhanzheng Zhong Yi Lie Sheng You de Wenti’ [Dialectical Understanding of the Issue of Defeating the Superior from a Position of Inferiority in High-Tech Wars], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 17/3 (2004), 107–11; Jiang Lei, Xiandai Yi Lie Sheng You Zhanlüe [Contemporary Strategy for Defeating the Superior from a Position of Inferiority] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe 1997); Ning Jun and Dan Xiufa, ‘Mao Zedong Yi Ruo Sheng Qiang Lilun Zai Yanjiu’ [New Research on Mao Zedong’s Theory of the Defeating the Strong from a Position of Weakness], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 23/3 (2010), 60–70; Sun Qiangyin, ‘Zhunque Tangxun Xinxihua Zhanzheng Yi Lie Sheng You Zhisheng Jili’ [Exploring the Mechanism of Defeating the Superior from a Position of Inferiority in Informationized War], Guofang Keji 36/1 (2015), 75–8. For an authoritative statement of the relative nature of ‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’, see Junshi Kexueyuan Zhanlüe Yanjiubu [Academy of Military Sciences Strategy Research Institute], Zhanlüe Xue [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe 2001), 459.
60 Hu and Zhan, ‘Jiakuai Tuijin Xinxi Gongfang’, 66.
61 Zhan, ‘Jiaqiang Wangluo Guofang Jianshe’, 71, emphasis added.
62 Wu, ‘Jiakuai Zhongguo’.
63 Huang Renquan and Li Weimin, ‘Kongfang Duikang Zhanchang Tuozhan Dao Wang Dian Kongjian dui Weilai Guojia Fangkong de Yingxiang’ [The Extension of the Air Defence Battlefield to the Network Electronic Space: Impact on the Future of National Antiaircraft Defence], Guofang Keji 33/3 (2012), 46–50, 48.
64 Cheng, Zhang and Chang, ‘Wangluo Kongjian’, 83.
65 For a detailed discussion of the concept of shashoujian, see Jason Bruzdzinski, ‘Demystifying Shashoujian: China’s “Assassin’s Mace” Concept’, in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel (eds.), Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2004), 309–64. See also Dennis J. Blasko, ‘“Technology Determines Tactics”: The Relationship Between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese Military Thinking’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/3 (2011), 355–81; and Jacqueline Newmyer, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/4 (2010), 483–504.
66 Junshi Kexueyuan Zhanlüe Yanjiubu, Zhanlüe Xue, 459.
67 For instance see Manson, ‘Cyberwar’; Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (London: Adelphi Series 2015), 95–6; Lindsay, ‘The Impact of China’; and Pollpeter, ‘Chinese Writings’.
68 Tian, Zhang and Jiang, ‘Wangluo Zhan’, 104.
69 Ning and Dan, ‘Mao Zedong’, 67–8.
70 Peng Hongqi, ‘Qiantan Xinxihua Tiaojian Xia de Yi Lie Sheng You’ [On Defeating the Superior from a Position of Inferiority under Information Conditions], Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 21/1 (2008), 142–8, 147.
71 Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiubu [Academy of Military Sciences Military Strategy Research Institute], Zhanlüe Xue [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe 2013), 130–1, 196.
72 Ibid., 131. This emphasis on ‘peace–war combination’ is coherent with the orthodox Marxist–Leninist view of war as the continuation of peacetime political struggle. In Mao’s words, ‘politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed’, or even more explicitly: ‘war is the continuation of politics, i.e., the continuation of peace’. See Zhang Yining et al., Zhongguo Xiandai Junshi Sixiang [China’s Contemporary Military Thought] (Beijing: Guofang Daxue Chubanshe 2006), 75–9, 109–12. Of course, this view is in turn coherent with Clausewitz’s: on the affinity between the Marxist–Leninist tradition and Clausewitz’s teachings, see Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism, 1914–1921’, Military Affairs 49/4 (1985), 184–91; and Azar Gat, ‘Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look’, Journal of Contemporary History 27/2 (1992), 363–82.
73 Stokes, ‘The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Computer Network Operations Infrastructure’; Costello and McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force, 8; and Kania and Costello, ‘The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations’.
74 Burton and Stokes, The People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, 9; Costello and McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support Force, 25.
75 Xi Jinping, ‘Zai Wangluo Anquan he Xinxihua Gongzuo Zuotanhui shang de Jianghua’ [Speech at the Cybersecurity and Informatization Work Conference], Renmin Ribao, 26 April 2016, 1.
76 On the apparent contradiction between cooperation and self-reliance in China’s industrial policies, see Greg Austin, Cybersecurity in China. The Next Wave (Cham: Springer 2018), 41–64. On autonomous innovation in China’s cybersecurity sector, see Tai Ming Cheung, ‘The Rise of China as a Cybersecurity Industrial Power. Balancing National Security, Geopolitical, and Development Priorities’, Journal of Cyber Policy 3/3 (2018), 306–26. On autonomous innovation in the broader context of China’s defence technology, see Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Innovation in China’s Defense Technology Base: Foreign Technology and Military Capabilities’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016), 728–61.
77 On ‘civil–military fusion’, see Daniel Alderman et al., ‘The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration’, in Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might. A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2014), 109–35. On the role of the PLASSF in civil–military fusion, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press 2017), 35–7; Lorand Laskai, ‘Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies’, China Brief 18/6 (2018), 12–6.
78 Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Liberation of China 2018 (Washington, DC 2018), 39–41, 60–1, 74–5; Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power. Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC 2019), 45–6, 97.
79 Junshi Kexueyuan Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiubu, Zhanlüe Xue, 267–72.
80 Lindsay, ‘The Impact of China’, 35; see also Inkster, China’s Cyber Power, 97, 148.
81 Cheng, Zhang and Chang, ‘Wangluo Kongjian’, 82; see also Wu, ‘Jiakuai Zhongguo’.
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Simone Dossi
Simone Dossi is Adjunct Professor of History and Politics of the Far East at the University of Milan and Research Fellow at the Torino World Affairs Institute (T.wai). He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Italian Institute of Human Sciences (Florence). His research interests include the military doctrine and force structure of the People’s Liberation Army and civil–military relations in contemporary China.