China’s weapons transfer in the Western hemisphere

ABSTRACT

What characterises China’s weapons diplomacy and how does it unfold in the current security scenario in the Western Hemisphere? This article argues that Chinese arms deliveries have arrived in the region together with the expansion of commerce and trade routes as evidenced in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In Latin America and the Caribbean, states seek to buy weapons in light of contentious border hot spots and intrastate rampant violence. China is a wilful seller and, to accomplish this, it has developed a weapons transfer policy taking advantage of the post-hegemony of the United States. The article argues that Beijing’s successes could reverse due to the lack of interstate armed conflict, and the less belligerent military missions adopted by the armed forces. Yet, Chinese arms transfers in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the developing world reveal a complex security governance regime where the military, industry, and diplomatic policy communities interact.

KEYWORDS:

• Foreign policy
• international relations
• weapons industry
• arms transfers

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

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³ As the mass media put it recently, China seems to be taking advantage of a ‘growing great-power vacuum in Latin America’. See The Economist. ‘The Friendly Dragon’, 3 February 2018, available at: https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2018/02/03/china-moves-into-latin-america (accessed March 2019).

⁴ Monica Herrera and Ron Matthews, ‘Latin America in Step with Global Defence Offset Phenomenon’, The RUSI Journal 159/6, 50–57.

⁵ R. Evan Ellis, China on the Ground in Latin America (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2014); Georg Strüver, ‘Bereft of Friends? China’s Rise and Search for Political Partners in South America’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7/1 (2014), 117–151.

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⁹ The U.S. Disarmament and Arms Control Agency provides a definition of arms transfer worth introducing early on: Arms transfers (arms imports and exports) represent the international transfer (under terms of grant, credit, barter, or cash) of military equipment, usually referred to as ‘conventional,’ including weapons of war, parts thereof, ammunition, support equipment, and other commodities designed for military use.

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¹² Kinsella and Montgomery, ‘Arms Supply and Proliferation Networks’.

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¹⁴ By 2018, ninety-one states had ratified the ATT and 130 had signed it.

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¹⁹ Herrera and Matthews, ‘Latin America in Step with Global Defence Offset Phenomenon’.

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²³ Gary Klinsworth, ‘China and Arms Control: A Learning Process,’ The Journal of East Asian Affairs 14/1 (2000), 84–116.

²⁴ David Kinsella, ‘Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict’, Journal of Peace Research 35/1 (1998), 7–23.

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²⁸ World Economic Forum. ‘What You Need To Know About Global Arms Sales In 6 Charts’, 14 March 2018, available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/03/what-you-need-to-know-about-global-arms-sales-in-6-charts (accessed May 2019).

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³⁰ Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC). ‘List of Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Treaties That China Has Joined’, 2014, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/tyylb_665254/t141338.shtml (accessed May 2019).

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³² United Nations, ‘Global Reported Arms Trade Register: China’, 2013, available at: http://www.un-register.org/ (accessed March 2019).

³³ Human Rights Watch, ‘Global Progress on Banning Landmines’, 9 September 2003, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/09/09/global-progress-banning-landmines (accessed May 2019).

³⁴ CNN, ‘China Boosts Military Spending 8 per cent Amidst Ambitious Modernization Drive’, 4 March 2018, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/04/asia/chinese-military-budget-intl/index.html (accessed March 2019).

³⁵ Centre for Strategic and International Studies. ’What Does China Really Spend on its Military?’, China Power Team, 2018, available at: https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ (accessed March 2019).

³⁶ Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), ‘China’s Defence Expenditure,’ 7 April 2011, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/gjjk_665238/t410723.shtml (accessed March 2019). China’s ‘peaceful’ foreign policy under president Xi Jinping has been the object of study of Eastern scholars and thoroughly covered, among other papers and monographs, in Jian Zhang, ‘China’s New Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping: Towards ‘Peaceful Rise 2.0’? Global Change, Peace & Security 27/1 (2015), 5–19; and Weixing Hu, ‘Xi Jinping’s “Big Power Diplomacy” and China’s Central National Security Commission (CNSC)’, Journal of Contemporary China 25/98 (2016), 163–177.

³⁷ The fundamentals of the Chinese defence policy go on to say: ‘China pursues a road of peaceful development, and firmly pursues a national defense policy which is defensive in nature. China is a developing country with vast territory and large population. China’s peace, security and development needs effective national defence. China’s national defence is subject to and serves its development and security strategy. It is not directed against nor does it threaten any country, and its fundamental purpose is to safeguard national security and unity and ensure smooth progress of the cause of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (…)’. See Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC). ‘China’s Defence Policy’, 27 May 2010, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/kjlc_665236/gjjk_665238/t410720.shtml (accessed March 2019).

³⁸ China’s 2015 military policy addresses the international security regime with the following assessment: ‘In today’s world, the global trends towards multi-polarity and economic globalisation are intensifying, and an information society is rapidly coming into being. Countries are increasingly bound together in a community of shared destiny. Peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit have become an irresistible tide of the times”. Nevertheless, China sees the world with critical eyes especially the affairs of national unification, territorial integrity and development interests. See FMPRC, ‘China’s Defence Policy’.

³⁹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘Global Defence-Industry League: Where is China?’ 2018, available at: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/08/china-global-defence-industry-league (accessed January 2019).

⁴⁰ Reuters. ‘Insight: China builds its own Military-Industrial Complex,’ 16 September 2012, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/insight-china-builds-its-own-military-industrial-complex-idUSBRE88F0GM20120916 (accessed May 2019).

⁴¹ See Luo, ‘Intrastate Dynamics in The Context of Hegemonic Decline’.

⁴² Kenneth Boutin, ‘Defence Technologies and Industrial Base’, in Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu (eds.), Defence Industries in Russia and China: Players and Strategies available at: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_38_Defence-industries-in-Russia-and-China.pdf (accessed May 2019).

⁴³ James C. Mulvenon et al. Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Transformation and Implications for the Department of Defence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).

⁴⁴ You Ji, China’s Military Transformation (Cambridge: Polity, 2015).

⁴⁵ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, ‘How Dominant is China in the Global Arms Trade?’ China Power Team, 2018, available at: https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/ (accessed May 2019).

⁴⁶ Tamar Gabelnick and Anna Ric, ‘Globalized Weaponry’, Social Justice 27/4, 37–44, 37.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Caverley and Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘How Washington Squandered its Monopoly on Weapons Sales’, Foreign Affairs 91/5 (2012), 125–132.

⁴⁸ See Caverley and Kapstein, ‘How Washington Squandered its Monopoly on Weapons Sales’.

⁴⁹ Christopher Parker, ‘New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States’, International Security 23/4 (1999), 119–147.

⁵⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘Trends in International Arms Tranfers, 2017ʹ, 2018, available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-03/fssipri_at2017_0.pdf (accessed May 2019).

⁵¹ See Sipri, ‘World Military Spending’.

⁵² Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu, ‘Introduction’, in Richard A. Bitzinger and Nicu Popescu (eds.), Defence Industries in Russia and China: Players and Strategies, available at https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Report_38_Defence-industries-in-Russia-and-China.pdf (accessed May 2019).

⁵³ William D. Hartung, ‘Retrospective: An Unstoppable Arms Trade?’ World Policy Journal 25/3 (2008), 61.

⁵⁴ See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1997).

⁵⁵ See SIPRI, ‘Trends in International Arms Tranfers, 2017ʹ.

⁵⁶ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures Arms Transfers, 1998, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2000), 5–9.

⁵⁷ David Mares, Latin America and the Illusion of Peace (Basingstoke: Routledge, 2012).

⁵⁸ Carlos Solar, ‘Civil-military Relations and Human Security in a Post-dictatorship’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/3–4 (2019), 507–531.

⁵⁹ see note 55 above.

⁶⁰ Carla Solmirano and Sam Perlo Freeman, ‘Is South America on the Brink of an Arms Race?’, 2009, available at: https://www.sipri.org/commentary/2009/jan-10-south-america-brink-arms-race (accessed May 2009).

⁶¹ Charles Glaser, ‘When are Arms Races Dangerous: Rational Versus Suboptimal Arming’, International Security 28/4 (2004), 44–84.

⁶² Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), ‘Global Conflict Tracker’, 2019, available at: https://www.cfr.org/ (accessed May 2019).

⁶³ see note 55 above.

⁶⁴ Laura Jaitman and Nicolas Ajzenman. ‘Crime Concentration and Hot Spot Dynamics in Latin America’, Inter-American Development Bank, 2016, available at https://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/7702/Crime-Concentration-and-Hot-Spot-Dynamics-in-Latin-America.pdf?sequence = 1 isAllowed = y (accessed May 2019).

⁶⁵ Shannon O’Neill, ‘Mexico’s Next Crisis will Arrive from the South’, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2018, available at https://www.cfr.org/blog/mexicos-next-crisis-will-arrive-south?sp_mid=56960709 sp_rid=Y2Flc29sYXJAZ21haWwuY29tS0 (accessed May 2019).

⁶⁶ U.S. State Department, ‘U.S. Strategy for Central America’, 2019, available at https://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/strat/index.htm (accessed May 2019).

⁶⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment’, 2012, available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf (accessed May 2019).

⁶⁸ Binay Prasada, ‘A Latin American battle: China vs. Taiwan’, The Diplomat, 19 August 2017, available at https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/a-latin-american-battle-china-vs-taiwan/ (accessed May 2019).

⁶⁹ Erwan De Cherisey, ‘Taiwan Donates Military Equipment to Dominican Republic’, Jane’s, 31 October 2017, available at: http://www.janes.com/article/75347/taiwan-donates-military-equipment-to-dominican-republic (accessed May 2019).

⁷⁰ Frank Chen, ‘Arms Donation used by Taipei to Help Allies Stay Loyal’, Asian Times, 6 November 2017, available at http://www.atimes.com/article/arms-donations-used-taipei-help-allies-stay-loyal/ (accessed May 2019).

⁷¹ See Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (PMPRC). ‘Statement by Mr. Sun Lei, counsellor of the Permanent Mission of China to the UN, at the general debate of the United Nations Disarmament Commission 2017 Substantive Session’, 3 April 2017, available at: http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/disarmament_armscontrol/t1451169.htm (accessed May 2019).

⁷² Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), ‘Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference’, 1 March 2015, available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1246058.shtml (accessed May 2019).

⁷³ To recapitulate these pillars are: ‘The exports should be conducive to the legitimate self-defence capability of the recipient country; the exports should not undermine the peace, security and stability of the region concerned and the world as a whole; and the exports should not be used as a means of interfering in the internal affairs of the recipient country.’ See FMPRC, ‘China’s Defence Policy’.

⁷⁴ This information is available at Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China (FMPRC), ‘The 8th China-US Consultation on Strategic Security and Multilateral Arms Control held in Washington D.C.’, 13 May 2016, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zygy_663314/gyhd_663338/t1364019.shtml (accessed May 2019). A month later to the U.S.-China consultation in Washington, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin signed at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing a joint statement vowing to strengthen ‘global strategic stability’, which argued that ‘arms control is an important means to strengthen global security and stability, and that disarmament and arms control should be fair and balanced, and be conducive for every country’s security.’ See Xinhua, ‘China, Russia Sign Joint Statement on Strengthening Global Strategic Stability,’ 26 June 2016, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-06/26/c_135466187.htm (accessed May 2019).

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Carlos Solar

Carlos Solar is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow at the Latin American Centre in the University of Oxford where he is currently researching on cybersecurity governance. Carlos is the author of Government and Governance of Security: The Politics of Organised Crime in Chile (New York: Routledge, 2018). His research on policing, organised crime, armed forces, and international security has been published in International Politics, Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Politics, Latin American Policy, Peace Review, and Global Crime, among other journals. He can be contacted through his website: www.carlossolar.com