![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union implemented multiple arms control treaties that depended on National Technical Means (NTM) for verification. Since NTM included covert satellite reconnaissance systems that gathered a sizeable portion of American intelligence on the USSR, the US government kept the details about its NTM ambiguous. Consequently, US diplomats had to negotiate a verification framework dependant on NTM without compromising sensitive space-based intelligence capabilities. This article uses newly declassified documents to explore how Washington and Moscow navigated the boundaries of secrecy concerning space reconnaissance to create a robust arms control verification regime.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 For an excellent collection of essays on the INF Treaty, see The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal, eds. Philipp Gassert, Tim Geider, and Hermann Wentker (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2021).
2 ‘Trust but Verify’, New York Times, 10 December 1987, https://www.nytimes.com/1987/12/10/opinion/trust-but-verify.html.
3 John L. Gaddis,The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987), 195–215; John L. Gaddis, ‘Looking Back: The Long Peace’, The Wilson Quarterly 13/1 (1989).
4 Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman, ‘Why Arms Control is So Rare’, American Political Science Review (2020), 343.
5 For recent histories of Cold War arms control, see Aaron Bateman, ‘Mutually Assured Surveillance at Risk: Anti-Satellite Weapons and Cold War Arms Control’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/1 (2022); James Cameron, ‘Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation and the Limits of Co-operative Competition’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 33/1 (2022); James Cameron, The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017); Michael Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press 2022); John D. Maurer, ‘The Purposes of Arms Control’, Texas National Security Review, 2/1 (2018); John Maurer, Competitive Arms Control: Nixon, Kissinger, and SALT, 1969–1972 (New Haven: Yale University Press 2022).
6 A recent exception to this is an article by Dwayne Day on national technical means. See Dwayne Day, ‘Arms Control and Satellites: Early Issues Concerning National Technical Means’, The Space Review, 10 October, 2022, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4463/1.
7 ‘The National Reconnaissance Program’, 4 June 1969, NRO FOIA Electronic Reading Room, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111857.pdf.
8 ‘Reports to the USIB By the Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance’, May 1960, CREST, CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6.
9 Robert McDonald and Sharon Moreno, Raising the periscope … Grab and Poppy: America’s Early ELINT Satellites (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 2005).
10 James Outzen, ‘Historical Context of the D-21 Program’, undated paper, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/history/csnr/D-21/Historical%20Context%20of%20the%20D21%20Program.pdf.
11 ‘Draft Report on Satellite Reconnaissance Program’, undated, CREST, CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150005-2.
12 Bruce Berkowitz, The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 years, A Brief History (Chantilly: U.S. Government Printing Office 2018), 11–12.
13 Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, ‘Management of the National Reconnaissance Programme’, 6 September 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS hereafter), 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters.
14 Memorandum from the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Clifford) to President Johnson, ‘National Reconnaissance Programme’, 2 May 1964, FRUS, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations.
15 Ibid.
16 ‘Report on Political and Informational Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy’, undated, FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Memorandum for Director Central Intelligence, ‘Plans for the Handling of Satellite Photography (Corona)’, 24 August 1969, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc06.pdf.
20 For insights into ‘need to know’ and secrecy and national security, see Simone Turchetti, ‘A “Need-To-Know-More” Criterion? Science and Information Security at NATO during the Cold War’, in Cold War Science and the Transatlantic Circulation of Knowledge, ed. Jeroen van Dongen (Leiden: Brill 2015), 36; Alex Wellerstein, Restricted Data: The History of Nuclear Secrecy in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2021).
21 ‘Meeting of Alexis Johnson’s Committee to Consider Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance Information’, 15 January 1964, CREST, CIA-RDP79R01095A000800030011-9. Five Eye intelligence partners, the UK in particular, did receive more details than non-Five Eye NATO members about the NRP.
22 Memorandum from the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defence McNamara, ‘Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance’, 21 January 1964, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc24.pdf.
23 Department of Defence Directive, ‘Security and Public Information Policy for Military Space Programs’, 23 March 1962, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc14.pdf.
24 Memorandum from the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defence McNamara, ‘Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance’, 21 January 1964, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc24.pdf.
25 ‘National Policy on Satellite Reconnaissance’, 10 April 1962, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc15.pdf.
26 Intelligence Note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball, ‘Khrushchev on Reconnaissance Satellites’, 1 June 1964, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc25.pdf.
27 ‘Possible Disclosure of Satellite Reconnaissance’, 21 January 1964, CREST, CIA-RDP67B00558R000100090003-8.
28 Ibid.
29 ‘Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water’, U.S. State Department, 5 August 1963, https://2009–2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/199116.htm.
30 Ibid.
31 Frederic Oder et al, The Gambit Story (Chantilly: Centre for the Study of National Reconnaissance, 1991), https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/history/csnr/gambhex/GAMBIT/The%20GAMBIT%20Story.pdf?ver=54DMJVk-ZGdCf0r0kl3UIg%3d%3d.
32 Critical to US Security: The Gambit and Hexagon Satellite Reconnaissance Systems, ed. James Outzen (Chantilly: Centre for the Study of National Reconnaissance, 2011), https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/history/csnr/gambhex/Docs/Critical%20to%20US%20Security.pdf.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Memorandum for Bundy, ‘Satellite Reconnaissance’, 31 July 1964, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc27.pdf.
36 Ibid.
37 Memorandum from Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), ‘Satellite Reconnaissance’, 31 July 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy.
38 Memorandum for the Record by Charles E. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff, ‘Satellite Reconnaissance’, 14 August 1964, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume X, National Security Policy.
39 ‘Recommendations 18(b)(9a) and 18(6)(b) of the 11 July 1966 Report of the NSAM 156 Committee’, 29 August 1966, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc31.pdf.
40 Ibid.
41 The oversight factor was explicitly raised in a memorandum for the NRO director, see Memorandum for Dr. McLucas, ‘“Fact of” Satellite Reconnaissance’, 23 June 1971, NRO Electronic Reading Room, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1971%20NARPs/SC-2021–00001_C05134204.pdf.
42 ‘Security and Space’, 9 May 1967, CREST, CIA-RDP70B00501R000100160009-9.
43 Everett Clark, ‘Satellite Spying Cited by Johnson’, New York Times, 17 March 1967, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1967/03/17/issue.html?auth=login-email (page 13).
44 Cameron, The Double Game, 71.
45 Ibid., 74.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 83.
48 Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2013), 75.
49 Ibid.
50 Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace, 103.
51 Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions with the Senate Armed Services Committee, Volume XIX, Ninetieth Congress, First Session 1967, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT31436/html/CPRT-110SPRT31436.htm.
52 ‘Disarmament Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy The Problem’, 9 September 1968 (draft), TCS-38686/A-68, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1968%20NARPs/SC-2018–00032_C05106067.pdf.
53 ‘Further Notes on NSAM 156 Arms Control Paper’, September 1968, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1968%20NARPs/SC-2018–00032_C05106064.pdf.
54 ‘Disarmament Aspects of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy The Problem’, 9 September 1968 (draft), TCS-38686/A-68, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1968%20NARPs/SC-2018–00032_C05106067.pdf.
55 Ibid.
56 ‘ACDA Proposed Guidance on the Handling of Satellite Reconnaissance Policy with Regard to the Strategic Missile Talks’, 27 September 1968, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1968%20NARPs/SC-2018–00032_C05106070.pdf.
57 Cameron, The Double Game, 107.
58 Ibid., 108.
59 Ibid.
60 ‘Memorandum for David Packard et al’, 23 September 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05114965.pdf.
61 ‘Memorandum from DCI Helms to President-Elect Nixon’, 6 January 1969, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972.
62 ‘Transmittal of 5–15 Years Papers Relating to Quick Reaction Systems and Security/Contracting Policies’, 7 June 1965, CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110005-1.
63 Melanie Brand, ‘Intelligence, Warning, and Policy: The Johnson Administration and the 1968 Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia’, Cold War History 21/2 (2021).
64 Dwayne Day, ‘Intersections in Real Time: The Decision to Build the KH-11 KENNEN Reconnaissance Satellite’, (part 1), 9 September 2019, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3791/1.
65 Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance Volume IIIB – Hexagon, November 1973, report produced by Headquarters Air Force, 74, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/docs/HOSR/SC-2017–00006e.pdf.
66 Day, ‘Intersections in Real Time’.
67 ‘ExCom and the Arms Control Satellite’, 14 July 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111981.pdf.
68 ‘State Department Proposal for Handling the Subject of Satellite Reconnaissance in Future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’, 7 May 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05115061.pdf.
69 Ibid.
70 ‘ExCom and the Arms Control Satellite’, 14 July 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111981.pdf.
71 ‘Possible Consequences for Intelligence Capabilities of Revealing Detection of a Violation’, undated, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111669.pdf.
72 ‘Revision of ExCom-M-17’, 12 September 1969, CREST, CIA-RDP74B00283R000100150001-7.
73 Cameron, The Double Game, 128.
74 Paper prepared by the interagency SALT steering committee, ‘Summary of NSSM-28 Report’, undated, FRUS, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXIII, SALT I, 1969–1972.
75 John Maurer, ‘Divided Counsels: Competing Approaches to SALT, 1969–1970’, Diplomatic History 43/2 (2019), 375–376.
76 ‘Impact of Collateral MIRV Test Bans on Satellite Intelligence Collection Systems’, 6 October 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111663.pdf.
77 ‘Comments on Verification Team Reports’, 21 August 1969, https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/foia/declass/Archive/NARP/1969%20NARPs/SC-2018–00033_C05111668.pdf.
78 Cameron, The Double Game, 129.
79 National Intelligence Estimate 11-1-69, ‘The Soviet Space Program’, 19 June 1969, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB501/docs/EBB-16a.pdf.
80 Editorial Note, undated, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v34/d197.
81 Cameron, The Double Game, 158–159.
82 Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace, 286.
83 ‘Views on Public Release of Information on US Satellite Reconnaissance’, 13 April 1970, CREST, CIA-RDP79B01709A000200010007-3.
84 Ibid.
85 Asif Siddiqi explains that the Soviets ceased testing due to promote a more favourable climate for the SALT talks, see Asif Siddiqi, ‘The Soviet Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite System: A Synopsis’, British Interplanetary Society (1997).
86 Bateman, ‘Mutually Assured Surveillance’, 7.
87 ‘U.S. Responses to Soviet Anti-Satellite Activities’, 18 June 1973, FRUS, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976.
88 Philip J. Klass, ‘Keeping the Nuclear Peace’, New York Times, 3 September 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/03/archives/spies-in-the-sky-sky-spies-good-catch.html.
89 ‘SALT Submissions’, 7 June 1972, FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972.
90 ‘Security Guidance Concerning National Technical Means of Verification of SALT Agreements’, 16 June 1972, CREST, CIA-RDP79B01709A000200020019-9.
91 ‘NASA Request for Guidance on Cooperation with the Soviet Union in Remote Sensing of the Environment’, 14 September 1973, FRUS, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976; John Noble Wilford, ‘Accord with Soviet in Sight on a Joint Space Mission’, New York Times, 2 April 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/02/archives/accord-with-soviet-in-sight-on-a-joint-space-mission-ussoviet.html; For details concerning American-Soviet LANDSAT cooperation, see Soviet Space Programs: 1976–80, Supporting Vehicles and Launch Vehicles, Political Goals and Purposes, International Cooperation in Space, Administration, Resource Burden, Future Outlook, Prepared at the request of the Honourable Bob Packwood (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 1982), 235.
92 ‘Modification of the Security Controls for the Products of Photographic Reconnaissance Satellites’, 23 November 1973, CREST, LOC-HAK-453-2-15-0.
93 James Cameron, ‘Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation and the Limits of Co-operative Competition’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 33/1 (2022), 119.
94 Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace, 153.
95 ‘Minutes of National Security Council Meeting’, 2 December 1974, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0312/741202.pdf.
96 Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace, 156.
97 ‘Modification of the Classification and Dissemination Controls for the Products of Reconnaissance Satellites’, 25 June 1976, CREST, CIA-RDP79M00467A002400080006-2.
98 Bateman, ‘Mutually Assured Surveillance’.
99 ‘Final Report of the Ad Hoc NSC Space Panel – Part II: U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities’, 3 November 1976, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
100 Ibid; National Security Decision Memorandum 345, ‘U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities’, 18 January 1977, https://aerospace.org/sites/default/files/policy_archives/NSDM-345%20ASAT%20Jan77.pdf.
101 ’Final Report of the Ad Hoc NSC Space Panel – Part II: U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities,’ 3 November 1976, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
102 ‘Modification of the Classification and Dissemination Controls for the Products of Reconnaissance Satellites’, 8 June 1976, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB225/doc37.pdf.
103 ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, President Ford et al, 13 April 1976, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553429.pdf.
104 ‘Final Report of the Ad Hoc NSC Space Panel – Part II: U.S. Anti-Satellite Capabilities’, 3 November 1976, Gerald Ford Presidential Library.
105 Memorandum of conversation, ‘Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters’, 30 March 1977, FRUS, 1977–1980, Volume XXVI, Arms Control and Non-proliferation.
106 For an overview of the ASAT arms control negotiations, see Bateman, ‘Mutually Assured Surveillance’.
107 ‘Tactical Use of Reconnaissance Satellite Assets’, 27 June 1977, CREST, CIA-RDP83M00171R001000190001-6.
108 ‘Intelligence as a Force Multiplier – Meeting with [Redacted] TENCAP Coordination Officer’, 24 April 1986, April 25, 1986, CREST, CIA-RDP89B01330R000400750014-7.
109 ‘Tactical Use of Reconnaissance Satellite Assets’, 27 June 1977, CREST, CIA-RDP83M00171R001000190001-6.
110 ‘Memorandum for Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management’, 15 September 1978, CREST, CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110001-3.
111 ‘Memorandum on Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives’, 5 September 1978, CREST, CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110002-2.
112 ‘Public Acknowledgment of the “Fact Of” Satellite Reconnaissance’, 27 September 1978, CREST, CIA-RDP83M00171R000500070003-3.
113 ‘Memorandum on Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy Alternatives’, 5 September 1978, CREST, CIA-RDP85-00821R000100110002-2.
114 ‘Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents’, 9 October 1978, National Security Archives, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB231/doc32.pdf.
115 Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Reactions to the President’s Acknowledgement of the Fact of Satellite Reconnaissance’, 14 November 1978, CREST, CIA-RDP81M00980R001300030019-5.
116 ‘International Political Implication of Public Release of Selected Satellite Imagery or Information’, 5 January 1979, CREST, CIA-RDP87B01034R000700060008-5.
117 Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons that Nearly Destroyed NATO (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2022), 136.
118 See Krepon, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace and The INF Treaty of 1987: A Reappraisal, eds. Philipp Gassert et al.
119 ‘Preliminary Conversation on Arms Control’, 21 August 1981, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
120 ‘Letter from the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan’, 5 February 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
121 Memorandum from Carlucci to Powell, ‘The PFIAB Letter on START’, 2 March 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
122 Ibid.
123 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘START’, 29 May 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
124 Minutes of NSPG Meeting, ‘Review of U.S. Arms Control Positions’, 9 May 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
125 ‘Letter from the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Armstrong) to President Reagan’, February 5, 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988 Volume XI, START I.
126 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘NST Instructions’, 5 December 1987, FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I.
127 Admiral William Crowe specifically referred to the Boost Surveillance and Track Systems (BSTS) that was intended to succeed DSP and serve as the ‘next generation early warning system’ developed under the umbrella of the Strategic Defence Initiative. For details, see Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Memorandum of Conversation, ‘Defence and Space, START’, 30 May 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I. The Pentagon wanted to block any limit on sensors because of its potential impact on deploying satellites that could be used for nuclear early warning and intelligence gathering functions, see Minutes of NSPG, ‘Review of U.S. Arms Control Positions’, 9 May 1988, FRUS, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Aaron Bateman
Aaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. He received his PhD in the history of science and technology from Johns Hopkins University. Prior to academia, he served as a US Air Force intelligence officer.