Speed kills? Reassessing the role of speed, precision, and situation awareness in the Fall of Saddam

Abstract

Many believe that US speed, precision, and situation awareness account for low Coalition casualties and limited damage to Iraqi infrastructure in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The details of the campaign's actual conduct, however, suggest otherwise. An analysis using evidence collected in a series of 176 interviews with a wide range of campaign participants from both sides of the conflict suggests that Iraqi weaknesses, and not just US strengths, may have been necessary preconditions for the initial campaign's low cost – a finding with very different implications for defense policy than the prevailing view.

Key words:

• Iraq
• transformation
• and revolution in military affairs

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Col. James Embrey, Col. Edward Filiberti, Col. Stephen Kidder, Dr Steven Metz, Dr Ivan Oelrich, and Lt. Col. Richard Shelton in collecting and assessing the evidence upon which this study is based. Thanks also to the many individuals whose comments on previous drafts have improved the analysis, and particularly Richard Betts, William Braun, John S. Brown, Daniel Byman, Mark Cancian, Jeffrey Clarke, Henry Crowder, Peter Feaver, Elizabeth Kier, Richard Kohn, Karl Lowe, Steven Mains, Timothy Muchmore, Michael O'Hanlon, Douglas Lovelace, Barry Posen, Thomas Reilly, Elizabeth Stanley-Mitchell, and Kevin Woods. Finally, the author would like to thank the American, British, and Iraqi soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines whose interviews form the basis of the evidence presented here, and without whose generous contributions of time and cooperation this analysis would not have been possible. Any errors of fact or interpretation are, of course, the author's.

Notes

¹The literature on defense transformation is enormous. For recent overviews of US official views, see the links available at <www.defenselink.mil/transformation/> and <www.oft.osd.mil/>. For Secretary Rumsfeld's views, see, e.g. Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, Foreign Affairs 81/3 (May/June 2002), 20–32; idem, FY 2007 Defense Budget Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee – Defense Subcommittee, 17 May 2006, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/sp20060517-13063.html>.

²See, e.g. Frederick W. Kagan, ‘Fighting the Wrong War: What Rumsfeld's Defenders Do Not Want to Admit’, Weekly Standard 10/17 (17 Jan. 2005), 19–21; Lawrence J. Korb, DoD's QDR and the 2007 Defense Budget: Heading in the Wrong Direction (Washington DC: Center for Defense Information 14 Feb. 2006); Fred Kaplan, ‘Is Rumsfeld Bored or Tired? His Latest, Sad Plan to Transform the Military’, Slate, 12 Jan. 2006; idem, ‘The Pentagon's Outdated Budget Priorities: Why the Military Would Rather Fund Stealth Fighters than Soldiers’, Slate, 22 Dec. 2005.

³See, e.g. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington DC: National Defense Univ. Center for Technology and National Security Policy 2003); Andrew Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2003), 28.

⁴In addition to the references in note 1 above, see, e.g. Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas E. Griffith Jr., ‘Winning With Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model’, International Security 30/3 (Winter 2005–6), 124–160; Michael G. Vickers and Robert C. Martinage, The Revolution in War (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2004); Brig. Gen. David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education Foundation 2001); Max Boot, ‘“The New American Way of War”’, Foreign Affairs 82/4 (July/Aug. 2003), 41–58; Jim Mannion, ‘Rumsfeld Rejects Case for Boosting Size of Army’, Washington Times, 6 Aug. 2003; Rowan Scarborough, ‘Decisive Force Now Measured by Speed’, Washington Times, 7 May 2003, 1.

⁵Paul D. Wolfowitz, Testimony on US Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture, House Armed Services Committee, 18 June 2003, 4–6. See also, e.g. Donald Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense FDCH Transcripts, 14 May 2003, 3; Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books 2004), e.g. 446, 557; Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2005); Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 2003), e.g. 13, 47, 50, 83, 94, 245; Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’; Scarborough, ‘Decisive Force Now Measured by Speed’; Usha Lee McFarling, ‘The Eyes and Ears of War’, Los Angeles Times, 24 April 2003, 1; Terry McCarthy, ‘What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?’, Time 161/19 (12 May 2003), 38; also Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 13–24, 28, 30–31 (which also emphasizes the importance of Iraqi shortcomings; see analysis below for a more extended discussion of this factor and its role in OIF).

⁶Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, Nov. 2002); idem, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 82/2 (March/April 2003), 31–46.

⁷By ‘skill’ I mean the ability to reduce exposure to hostile fire via a specific set of techniques that have been described elsewhere as the “modern system” of force employment: see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton UP 2004). Military Power presents a theory relating these specific techniques to combat outcomes as a function of technology and numerical preponderance. For brevity, and given its use in earlier analyses of Afghanistan and Operation ‘Desert Storm’, I use ‘skilled’ here as a summary indicator of the capacity to employ the modern system as presented in Military Power (plus other rudimentary features of competent military performance such as passable marksmanship or the ability to maintain essential equipment, which are implicit in the modern system as presented in Military Power but not enumerated there). But the discussion below specifies the particular techniques the combatants used, and the analysis turns on these observed specifics. Periodic reference to the summary assessment of ‘skill’ is needed to present the argument in a compact manner, but my findings thus rest on specific observational evidence, not aggregate subjective judgments.

⁸For a similar explanation of low Coalition casualties against Iraqi forces in Operation ‘Desert Storm’ of 1991, see Stephen Biddle, ‘Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (Fall 1996), 139–79. On the Iraqis' failure in 2003 to remedy their flaws of 1991, see the discussion in the conclusion below.

⁹For details, see Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, esp. 13–16, 19–21, 26–43.

¹⁰See, e.g. Steven Erlanger and Richard A. Oppel, ‘A Disciplined Hizballah Surprises Israel with its Training, Tactics, and Weapons’, New York Times, 7 Aug. 2006, 8; Andrew McGregor, ‘Hizballah's Tactics and Capabilities in Southern Lebanon’, Terrorism Focus 3/30 (1 Aug. 2006), 3–4.

¹¹See, e.g. Bradley Graham, ‘“Scorched Earth” Plans in Iraq Cited’, Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2002, A1ff.; Dave Moniz, John Diamond, and David J. Lynch, ‘A Virtual Certainty: Baghdad Falls. What's Uncertain: Cost of the Fight’, USA Today, 4 April 2003, 1Aff.; Brad Knickerbocker, ‘How US Might Counter “Scorched-Earth” Tactics’, Christian Science Monitor, 23 Dec. 2002, 3ff; Dana Priest, ‘Harsh Iraqi Reaction Expected; Invasion Would Spark Attacks on Israel, Kurds, US Sites’, Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2003, A18ff; Michael R. Gordon, ‘Iraq Strategy is Seen as Delay and Urban Battle’, New York Times, 16 Feb. 2003, 1ff; Moniz, ‘How the War Against Iraq Could Unfold’, USA Today, 21 Feb. 2003, 1Aff.; Mike Allen, ‘US Increases Estimated Cost of War in Iraq’, Washington Post, 26 Feb. 2003, A19ff.; Tom Bowman, ‘US Plan for Iraq’, Baltimore Sun, 24 Feb. 2003, 1Aff.; Gordon, ‘Hussein's Likely Plan: Make a Stand in Baghdad’, New York Times, 4 March 2003, A12ff.; John Daniszewski, ‘US Risks a Long War if It Invades, Iraqis Warn’, Los Angeles Times, 8 March 2003, 1ff.; Tom Squitieri, ‘What Could Go Wrong’, USA Today, 13 March 2003, 1Aff.; Paul Salopek, ‘Kurds Fear Saddam Has Already Wired Oil Field’, Chicago Tribune, 14 March 2003, 11ff.

¹²The post-Saddam insurgency has been much more destructive of Iraqi infrastructure than the major combat phase of the war: see below. US casualty figure is drawn from URL <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/casualty/OIF-Deaths-Before.pdf>, downloaded 10 Nov. 2003; UK casualties from CNN.com, ‘Forces: US & Coalition/Casualties’ at <www.cnn.com/specials/2003/iraq/forces/casualties/index.html>, downloaded 10 Nov. 2003; Coalition troop strength is from Victoria Clarke, Dept. of Defense News Briefing, Washington DC, 29 March 2003, 3.

¹³And of course this is a very different question than that of explaining losses or success prospects in the subsequent counterinsurgency effort. On the latter, see Stephen Biddle, ‘Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon’, Foreign Affairs 85/2 (March/April 2006), 2–14; “What to Do in Iraq: A Roundtable,”Foreign Affairs 85/4 (July/Aug. 2006), 165–69; and ‘Responses to “What to Do in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs online, 17 July 2006. The analysis here is restricted to the major combat phase of the war in Iraq.

¹⁴On process tracing and the related technique of subunit analysis (also employed below), see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton UP 1994), 85–87, 219–23, 225–28; Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005).

¹⁵Audiotapes of these interviews, together with other primary source documentary material collected for the study, have been deposited at the US Army's Military History Institute archive in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and constitute the MHI Strategic Studies Institute OIF Research Collection, henceforth MHI.

¹⁶For overviews of events, see, esp., Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin 2006); Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point; Nicholas E. Reynolds, Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond: The US Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2005).

¹⁷See references in note 5 above.

¹⁸Of course, this is a tactical-level phenomenon; the transformation debate is ultimately concerned with issues of strategic consequence. Yet tactical phenomena can have strategic consequences, and tactical level evidence can speak to central strategic questions. In fact, any claim for strategic-level causal relations must have observable referents that extend down to the tactical level: it is at the tactical level where fire is exchanged, casualties suffered, and ground taken, hence for strategic- or operational-level factors to affect the real war, they must ultimately be reflected somehow, somewhere, in tactical actions that destroy targets, take ground, or threaten to do so. For a strategic claim to hold, its logical implications for tactical events must also hold; for a strategic argument to imply tactical events that did not occur (or to preclude tactical events which did occur) is thus to invalidate the strategic argument, even if the observations used in the test were entirely tactical. Any part of the overall causal chain interconnecting strategic and tactical claims can thus be tested and the results can, in principle, speak to the validity of the chain overall as long as the deductive logic interrelating the claims at each level is sound. Strategic claims thus need not necessarily be tested at the strategic level. This is inherent in process tracing as a methodology, which is designed to enable theories to be tested by observing any part of the causal chain for which evidence is most available. In particular, for the analysis of speed, precision and situation awareness below, much of the evidence adduced is at the tactical level, but this does not therefore exclude operational or strategic level conclusions given sound deductive logic on the interrelationships involved.

¹⁹MHI Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. interview; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Walter int.; Tape 050203a1io and Tape 050203a2sb, Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int.

²⁰MHI Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int. Some British Challenger tanks took 7–9 RPG hits during their own ‘Thunder Runs’ in Basra: Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.

²¹See, e.g. MHI Tape 042903p2sb Lt. Col. Kerl et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int.; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Walter int.; Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.

²²MHI Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 042903p1sb Col. Brown et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int. In Baghdad, an estimated 1,000–2,000 paramilitaries were killed in 2nd Brigade's two “Thunder Runs” alone: Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Walter int.; Tape 050203a1io Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int.

²³Note, however, that Coalition speed was not necessarily responsible for this: most of the Iraqi Regular Army had little will to fight even before the war began, much less after they observed the US rate of advance. Many units, for example, had made elaborate plans for escape or surrender before the ground war even started: in the 18th Brigade, company commanders were instructed by their superiors as soon as the bombing began to release their units and leave the battlefield, whereupon their battalion commander fled (MHI Tape 042403a2sb Maj. al Tamimi int.). In the 11th Division, the commander of 3rd Battalion, 45th Brigade had presented surrender plans to his company commanders before even the air war had begun (Tape 042303a2sb St. Col. al Saadi int.). Desertion rates were high long before units had been contacted or bypassed by Coalition ground forces: of 520 prewar soldiers in 3rd Battalion, 45th Brigade, 11th Infantry Division, 90 deserted before the air war began, and all but 150 had left by the time the commander surrendered; more than half the initial troop strength of the 51st Division's 32nd Mechanized Brigade had deserted before 21 March; 30–40 percent of the 700–1,000 prewar soldiers in II Corps' 3rd Mechanized Brigade had deserted by 23 March, when the Brigade's commanding officer followed suit; 280 of 400 soldiers in a brigade defending near Najaf had deserted prior to contact; of the 94 troops initially manning the Al Hadr stores and equipment depot, only 17 were left by 6 April when its commander went home (Tape 042303a2sb St. Col. al Saadi int.; Tape 042503a1sb Lt. Col. al Hasnawi int.; Tape 042403p1sb Lt. Col. al Araghi int.; Tape 042503a1sb Col. al Sanabi int.; Tape 042503a1 Col. Delfi int.). Although Ba'athist paramilitaries often killed Regular Army soldiers found with non-military clothing, many nevertheless wore civilian clothes under their uniforms to facilitate desertion (Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Lt. Col. Rodgers, Lt. Col. Marcoz int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait). Captured Iraqi officers report widespread prewar defeatism, disaffection with the Ba'athist regime, and limited combat motivation across a wide range of Regular Army combat and support units (Tape 042303p0sb, Lt. Col. Kadhim int.; Tape 042403a1sb Lt. Col. Hamid int.; Tape 042403a2sb Maj. al Tamimi int.; Tape 042303a2sb St. Col. al Saadi int.; Tape 042403p1sb Lt. Col. al Araghi int.; 042503a1sb Col. al Sanabi int.; Tape 042503a1 Col. Delfi int.; Tape 042503a1sb Lt. Col. al Hasnawi int.). None of this required, or was caused by, the speed of a Coalition advance that came well after morale had already broken in such units.

²⁴MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb, Lt. Col. Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io Maj. Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a1sb Maj. Maciejewski int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb Capt. Ryan int. On the contrary, there is some evidence to suggest that Coalition speed may at times have inadvertently increased, not decreased, Iraqi will to fight. Other things being equal, higher operating tempo affords less time for detailed movement planning and rehearsals, and tends to strain resupply capacity, tiring drivers and convoy commanders. The rapid pace of the Coalition advance may thus have contributed to the navigational errors which resulted in the US 507th Maintenance Company's ambush by Iraqi forces in Nasiriyah on 23 March. There are indications that this American tactical setback may have encouraged members of the Iraqi Regular Army's 11th Division assigned to the defense of the city to reverse plans for desertion and instead stand fast and fight back: see, e.g. MHI Tape 042403p1sb Lt. Col. al Araghi int.; Tape 050203a2sb Lt. Col. Bayer int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int. Several of the Marine officers who subsequently fought in Nasiriyah now believe this was the case: see, e.g. Tape 042903p1sb Col. Brown et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int. If the 11th Division was in fact ready to quit the field when its resolve was instead stiffened by an apparent victory over the Americans in the 507th, then the speed that contributed to the ambush may have had the opposite of the hypothesized effects on Iraqi combat motivation at Nasiriyah. (Note that when the 507th was ambushed, the front had already moved well beyond Nasiriyah to the north and northeast.)

²⁵MHI Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb Capt. Ryan int. Note that British commanders had not planned to shoot their way into Basra; their intention was to invest the city, conduct limited precision strikes on key targets within, and allow a political uprising by residents to turn control over to the Coalition and allow an unopposed entrance by British forces. This uprising never occurred, however. Intentions to the contrary notwithstanding, Basra fell only when British armored columns entered the city center in force and destroyed the remaining opposition.

²⁶While the discussion above focuses on Iraqi paramilitaries and SRG infantry, it is interesting to note that the Iraqis also managed to redeploy elements of four Republican Guard divisions – the Hammurabi, Adnan, Nebuchadnezzar, and Medina – across the Coalition axis of advance after the conflict began (MHI Tape 050403p1io Lt. Col. Sterling int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Gen. Blount et al. int., 4 May 2003, 3rd Inf. Div. HQ, Baghdad International Airport, Iraq; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Lt. Col. Rodgers, Lt. Col. Marcoz int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 062503a1sb Lt. Col. B int.; 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.). Not all of Iraq's heavy forces were thus maldeployed. It is important to keep these movements in perspective. At its best, Iraq's response was incomplete and ill-coordinated. Yet the resulting mixture of error, accident, and insight nonetheless produced a significant movement of Iraqi combat power into positions from which it could, in principle, have inflicted serious losses on Coalition forces. How did the Iraqis do this?

The answer probably lies in a combination of several factors. First, even a purely random movement of tens of thousands of combatants will place some in advantageous combat positions. In fact, however, the Iraqis' movements were not purely random. Hence part of the answer presumably lies in their ability to extract some, albeit limited, knowledge from primitive sources. For example, geography reduced the number of possibilities. American television commentators did a fair job of anticipating the likely concept of operations from nothing more than map analysis and background knowledge of military affairs; it is not inconceivable that the Iraqis' own appreciation of the possibilities – even without Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data per se – would have gotten them into the right ballpark. Moreover, OIF involved a Coalition advance into hostile country. Coalition forces were thus moving through a natural sensor net in the form of many thousands of Iraqi observers who could see troop movements and report on their observations. Most of Iraq's paramilitaries and intelligence operatives wore civilian clothes and could not easily be distinguished from innocent noncombatants. This enabled Iraqi observers to conduct detailed reconnaissance simply by walking up to Coalition forces in plain sight, quietly counting vehicles and noting locations, then walking back to homes or other concealed locations with the information (MHI Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 043003a1io Col. Toolan et al. int.; Tape 050203a2sb Lt. Col. Bayer int.). There were simply too many pairs of eyes in a position to see what Coalition forces were doing for their movements to have been covert in any meaningful sense.

Finally, this contact information can be communicated by primitive means that are almost impossible to interdict. For example, couriers in civilian clothes can carry messages with little real danger of interception. High-performance military communications systems offer much faster throughput and much higher capacity; denying these to an enemy clearly reduces their message traffic. But traffic cannot be reduced to zero. An opponent who anticipates disruption and plans courier relays or mobile phone networks to get truly critical information through can ensure that a small volume of key messages reaches their destinations. The Iraqis made extensive use of just such expedients. The net result was some ability to collect direct contact intelligence on major American movements, and to report it to central authorities. Again, this is not to suggest that Iraq had perfect surveillance, or comprehensive real-time reporting on American whereabouts. But the Iraqi high command surely realized well before the war that it would need to operate covertly in order to survive, and that its communications means would be able to handle only small volumes of the most important information. It would not be implausible to suppose that they had prepared a system designed mainly to cue them on basic information about which of a restricted range of possible approach routes the Coalition was actually using, and to provide to key central decision-makers (if not to tactical commanders in the field, several of whom were captured when inadvertently stumbling upon Coalition units) gross estimates of how far along those routes Coalition forces had actually moved at any given time.

²⁷Note that little formal intelligence work was needed for this. It was surely obvious to all that Baghdad would be the Coalition's ultimate objective – forces predeployed there could be assured of a chance to kill Americans. And it was equally obvious that the cities controlling key Tigris and Euphrates bridges would be essential to any advance on Baghdad from the south; forces predeployed in these cities would likewise be sure to see important combat. The Iraqis apparently did manage to extract some ISR information on Coalition movements (see note 26), but even without wartime ISR, the fact that the Coalition's key objectives would inevitably be cities made it easy for Iraq to ensure that there would be enough forces in position to threaten the Coalition with serious losses in urban combat. In fact, this will almost always be the case: regardless of the theater or its geography, cities will necessarily be important politico-military objectives, making it nearly impossible to preclude urban close combat via speed or maneuver alone.

²⁸Maj. Jeffrey R. Voigt et al., V Corps Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Out Brief, US Army Acquisition Corps, 28 April 2003; Steven Komarow, ‘Tanks Take a Beating in Iraq’, USA Today, 30 March 2005, 1.

²⁹In a series of experiments at George Air Force Base, California, for example, Marine infantry units suffered some 100 casualties to defeat a force of 160 defenders in mock urban combat: Greg Jaffe, ‘Urban Warfare’, Desert Morning News, 1 Sept. 2002, AA02ff.; Scott Peterson, ‘Iraq Prepares for Urban Warfare’, Christian Science Monitor, 4 Oct. 2002, 1ff. Of course, much depends on the defenders' skills; on variance in urban warfare casualty levels as a function of defender skill levels, see, e.g. Daryl G. Press, ‘How to Take Baghdad’, New York Times, 26 March 2003, A17.

³⁰See, e.g. Rumsfeld, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, 14 May 2003, 3; Wolfowitz, Testimony on Iraq Reconstruction, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 22 May 2003, 2,7; idem, Testimony on US Military Presence in Iraq: Implications for Global Defense Posture, House Armed Services Committee, 18 June 2003, 4–6; Tom Bowman, ‘Rumsfeld Taunting but Naysayers Persist’, Baltimore Sun, 18 May 2003, 1C; Sonni Efron, ‘Pentagon Officials Defend Iraq Battle Strategy’, Los Angeles Times, 23 May 2003, 19; Esther Schrader, ‘Official Ties Iraq's Troubles to US Success’, Los Angeles Times, 9 July 2003, 8; Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’, 41–58; Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

³¹MHI Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Lt. Col. Rodgers, Lt. Col. Marcoz int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.

³²Note that bridge destruction and inundation could in principle be partial exceptions to this latter implication, in that defenders often wish to use bridges and low-lying terrain for their own movements, and hence sometimes delay their destruction until the last possible minute. Hence a bridge, for example, could survive a long time into an offensive even if the defender has the ability and intention to destroy it. In fact, there is little reason to conclude that the Iraqis had either the ability or the intention to carry out wholesale bridge destruction or inundation: see below.

³³In effect, the evidence thus establishes that Coalition speed was not necessary for the infrastructure's survival – the Iraqis' own choices appear to have been far more important than the speed of the Coalition's advance. But speed was probably not sufficient, either. If the Iraqis had chosen to destroy their infrastructure (and had gone about it in a competent manner), then there is very little that even a very fast-moving attacker could have done to prevent it. Properly wired bridges, oil wells, pipelines, cranes, or levees can be blown in seconds from safe locations with the pressing of a single button. Secure landline cables connecting switchboxes with explosives would make such commands very difficult to interdict. Predelegated detonation authority could have afforded local commanders the ability to beat invaders to the punch even if unable to communicate with Baghdad. Had the Iraqis taken such precautions, massive damage could have been done in seconds, outpacing even the fastest conceivable offensive.

³⁴MHI Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, CW4 Crowder (Oil Fusion Team Head, CFLCC JACE) int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Earnshaw int., 8 May 2003, 1st UK Armoured Division HQ, Basra Iraq.

³⁵MHI Tape 062403p1sb Lt. Col. K int.; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, CW4 Crowder (Oil Fusion Team Head, CFLCC JACE) int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.

³⁶In 1991, Iraqi engineers wired Kuwaiti oil fields for destruction in about a month of work performed during the fighting itself: Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, CW4 Crowder (Oil Fusion Team Head, CFLCC JACE) int., 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.

³⁷For example, by targeting them for artillery or mortar fire after losing them to American control, let alone by effective pre-capture demolition. MHI: Tape 042903p2sb Lt. Col. Kerl et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int.

³⁸MHI Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.

³⁹One span was dropped, but the bridge remained trafficable. MHI Tape 050203a1io Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int.; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int. On the survival of most Iraqi bridges, see Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Stephenson int., 30 April 2003, I MEF HQ, Hillah, Iraq.

⁴⁰The author inspected the port facilities on 25 April 2003 and found no evidence of damage. Captured Iraqi officers maintain that orders to destroy the port would not have been followed – the commanders at the scene viewed the facilities as the patrimony of the Iraqi people and not as tools for defending Saddam: MHI Tape 042403a1sb Lt. Col. Hamid int.

⁴¹MHI Tape 042803p1sb Maj. Gen. Marks, Col. Rotkoff int.

⁴²On Iraqi motives underlying their decision not to implement a scorched earth campaign, see Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: Joint Center for Operational Analysis, US Joint Forces Command 2006), 146; Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 122–3, 166–7, 505.

⁴³Lethality is also improved by access to high firepower weaponry, but even light weapons can kill if wielded effectively (see above), whereas even heavy weapons are useless if their crews cannot hit targets. I thus focus here on marksmanship per se as a quality needed for any weapon to inflict losses.

⁴⁴In principle, this hypothesis also implies that Iraqi forces using superior cover and concealment should have inflicted heavier losses on Coalition forces. This is difficult to test, however, in that I have been unable to identify any such Iraqi behavior in 2003. Iraqi combatants varied in training and preparation, but none proved able to use terrain as effectively as, for example, al Qaeda did in 2001–2, or as Hizballah appears to have done in southern Lebanon in 2006: on the former, see refs. in note 9 above; on the latter, see refs. in note 10 above.

⁴⁵MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb Lt. Col. Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io Maj. Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a1sb Maj. Maciejewski int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int. Moreover, these assaults were usually directed at Coalition heavy armored units; Iraqi paramilitaries appear to have systematically avoided softer-skinned command or logistical elements in order to seek out Coalition tanks and infantry fighting vehicles: Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 Apr. 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050203a1io Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int. The combination of exposure and targets with much heavier armor protection proved especially lethal to Iraqi counterattackers.

⁴⁶See, e.g. MHI Tape 042403a2sb Maj. Al Tamimi int.; Tape 042403a2sb Staff Col. Alzadi int.; Tape 042403p1sb Staff Lt. Col. Alaragi int.

⁴⁷In places, as much as whole brigades of unoccupied but undamaged Iraqi armored vehicles were counted as V Corps and I MEF passed through their positions: see, e.g. MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 043003a1io Col. Toolan et al. int.; Tape 062503a1sb Lt. Col. B int.; Tape 062503p1sb Maj. P. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Lt. Col. Rodgers, Lt. Col. Marcoz int., 22 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p1sb Lt. Col. Gillette int.; Tape 050203a1io Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.

⁴⁸See, e.g. Jesse Orlansky and Col. Jack Thorpe (eds.), 73 Easting: Lessons Learned from Desert Storm via Advanced Distributed Simulation Technology (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 1992), IDA D-1110, I-54; Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office 1991), S. Hrg. 102–326, 115.

⁴⁹MHI Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Sajid int.; Tape 050403p1io Lt. Col. Sterling int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int. Why did the Iraqis systematically deny their most favorable defensive terrain to their most capable units? Available evidence points to Iraqi civil-military relations: see the discussion in Conclusions, and associated references below.

⁵⁰MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb, Lt. Col. Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io Maj. Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb, Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a1sb Maj. Maciejewski int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.

⁵¹MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb, Lt. Col. Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io Maj. Walter et al. int.; Tape 050303p2sb, Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Tape 042903p2sb Lt. Col. Kerl et al. int.; Tape 043003a1io Col. Toolan et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050103p2sb Maj. Robert Walter int.; Tape 050203a2sb Lt. Col. Bayer int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.

⁵²MHI Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Sajid (Commandant, Iraqi Armor School) int.

⁵³MHI Tape 042403a2sb St. Col. al Saadi int.

⁵⁴MHI Tape 042403a1sb Lt. Col. Hamid int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.

⁵⁵MHI Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.

⁵⁶MHI Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the Record, Objective ‘Montgomery’ Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003.

⁵⁷See, e.g. MHI Tape 050203p1sb Lt. Col. Schwartz et al. int.; Tape 050303p1sb, Lt. Col. Pease int.; Tape 050303p1io Maj. Walter et al. int.; Tape 043003a1io Col. Toolan et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Johnson int.; Tape 062503p1sb Maj. P. int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.; 042903p1sb Col. Brown et al.

⁵⁸MHI Col. Mohammed Al Jboori, infantry battalion commander, 2nd Division, attached to 45th Division, 4/24 PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti.

⁵⁹MHI Lt. Col. Ayad Hasam Aldemi, Brigade XO/D Co, 3rd ID, 4/23 PM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti.

⁶⁰MHI Tape 042403a2sb Staff Col. Alzadi int.

⁶¹MHI Staff Sgt Ahmed Al Samarl, company clerk, Baghdad Division of Republican Guard, 4/25 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti. For similar examples from other units, see MHI Tape 042403a2sb Maj. Al Tamimi int.; Tape 042303p2sb Staff Brigadier Raid Sajid int.; Tape 042403a1sb Lt. Col. Hamid int.; Tape 042403p1sb Staff Lt. Col. Alaragi int.; Tape 042503a1sb Col. Alzanabi int.; Maj. Mohammed Abad, company commander, mechanized infantry, interviewed 4/24 by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti; Capt. Amer Taleb Alseltane, platoon leader, artillery, 4/23 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti; Lt. Col. Kassim Alajeel, regimental commander of local security unit, 4/25 AM, interviewed by Metz, Kidder, and Filiberti.

⁶²US Dept. of the Army, Pamphlet 350-38 1 (STRAC) Standards in Weapons Training (Oct. 2002), Ch. 5.

⁶³On counterfactual analysis (sometimes called ‘thought experiments’, or gedankenexperiments) see, e.g. Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.), Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton UP 1996); James D. Fearon, ‘Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science’, World Politics 43/2 (Jan. 1991), 169–95; King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, 76–91. The counterfactuals examined here are the most policy-relevant of several theoretically important counterfactual implications for military cause and effect in OIF. In addition to the ‘skilled Iraqis’ and ‘lines of communication interdiction’ counterfactuals presented below, the causal claim presented here also implies, for example, that reducing Coalition skills to Iraqi levels would produce a dramatic difference in outcome (even with the same technology imbalance); that reducing technological sophistication to, say, 1970s levels should increase Coalition losses to levels comparable to those of pre-1991 Mideast wars with major skill imbalances; and that raising Iraqi technological sophistication to parity with the US would make less difference for outcomes than stipulating equal skill levels on the two sides (since the Iraqis would be unable to use this technology to anything like its theoretical potential, whereas Coalition skill enables their forces to exploit much more of their technology's capacity). Some of these additional counterfactuals have been addressed: the US Army's Center for Army Analysis, for example, is addressing the effects of putative skill and technology variations in Iraq via simulation analysis (forthcoming). The effects of reduced Coalition skill and technology (as well as the increased-Iraqi-skill case considered below) were assessed systematically via a series of Janus analyses on the 73 Easting database from the 1991 Gulf War in Biddle, ‘Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict’, International Security 21/2 (Autumn 1996), 139–79 at 165–73. The latter yielded results consistent with the causal claim presented above. But only the ‘increased Iraqi skill’ and ‘LOC interdiction’ cases are considered in detail here.

⁶⁴MHI Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 042903p1sb Col. Brown et al. int.; Tape 043003p2io Col. Brown int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the record, Maj. Colligan et al. int., 26 April 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait; Tape 050203a1io Lt. Col. Bayer et al. int.; Tape 050903p1sb Maj. Gen. Kratzer int. Iraqi insurgents have subsequently discovered the vulnerability of long LOCs, but little was done to strike them before 9 April 2003.

⁶⁵MHI Tape 050903p3sb Maj. Gen. Stratman int.

⁶⁶For detailed accounts, see Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, 15–16, 26–43. Note that the indigenous Afghan Taliban (by contrast with the better-trained Al Qaeda foreigners) were much less adept at exploiting cover and concealment, and suffered much more heavily under Western air attack: ibid.

⁶⁷See, e.g. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington DC: Brookings 2000), 120–4; Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001), 77–90; Gen. Wesley K. Clark and Brig. Gen. John D.W. Corley, ‘Press Conference on the Kosovo Strike Assessment’, NATO Headquarters Brussels, 16 Sept. 1999; Barry R. Posen, ‘The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy’, International Security 24/4 (Spring 2000), 39–84; idem, ‘Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony’, International Security 28/1 (Summer 2003), 5–46.

⁶⁸See references in note 10 above.

⁶⁹And where they were able to conceal themselves from Coalition surveillance, they were typically unable to provide cover from fire or meaningful fields of fire for their own weapons (see above) – unlike Al Qaeda in Afghanistan or Hizballah in Lebanon.

⁷⁰MHI Tape 050203a2sb Lt. Col. Bayer int.

⁷¹MHI Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.

⁷²The account below is drawn from MHI Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the Record, Objective ‘Montgomery’ Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003, with attached maps and photographs.

⁷³See, e.g. Robert Scales et al., Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books 1998), 267–70.

⁷⁴Apache Troop at Objective ‘Montgomery’ fielded 7 M1 tanks and 6 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles. By contrast, the Iraqi 17th Battalion of the 17th Brigade of the Hammurabi Division fielded at ‘Montgomery’ a force of 20 T-72 tanks, 2 M113 armored personnel carriers, 17 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers, 15 23 mm and 37 mm antiaircraft guns, and about 100 dismounted infantry. Iraqi prisoners report that the 17th Battalion had arrived in the pre-prepared position a day prior to the attack, and was at full strength at the time of the battle. MHI Tape 050303p2sb Lt. Col. Ferrell et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the Record, Objective ‘Montgomery’ Battlefield Inspection, 4 May 2003, with attached maps and photographs.

⁷⁵Jaffe, ‘Urban Warfare’, AA02ff.; Peterson, ‘Iraq Prepares for Urban Warfare’, 1ff.

⁷⁶MHI Tape 050803a1sb Maj. Maciejewski int.; Tape 050803a2sb Capt. Ryan int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.

⁷⁷MHI Tape 050303a1sb Col. Allyn et al. int.; Tape 050203p1sb Col. Perkins et al. int.; Tape 050803a2sb Maj. Longman et al. int.; Stephen Biddle, Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. C. interview, 12 May 2003, CFLCC HQ, Camp Doha Kuwait.

⁷⁸For detailed treatments, see the references cited in note 10 above.

⁷⁹See, e.g. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP 1957), 82; Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Plave Bennett (eds.), The Political Influence of the Military (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1980), 205–8; Eliot A. Cohen, ‘Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World’, International Security 10/4 (Spring 1986), 143–71 at 168.

⁸⁰For more detailed discussions, see Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World’, Journal of Strategic Studies 19/2 (June 1996), 171–212; Risa Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper No. 324 (London: OUP for IISS 1999). Cf. Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness’ (PhD dissertation, Cambridge, MA: MIT 1996); idem, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991 (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 2002). On the role of civil-military relations in OIF in particular, see, esp., Woods et al., Iraqi Perspectives Project, and the excerpts summarized in Kevin Woods, James Lacey and Williamson Murray, ‘Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside’, Foreign Affairs 85/3 (May/June 2006), 2–26; also Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, e.g. 55, 120, 504.

⁸¹For a similar argument, see Biddle, Military Power, 206–8.