Making Plans for Liberia—a Trusteeship Approach to Good Governance?

Abstract

Since the end of the Liberian civil war in August 2003 the international community has been ‘making plans’ for Liberia. However, it rarely questioned whether these plans were in accordance with the political and economic logic of the peace agreement and the subsequent transitional government. The consequence was that corruption continued and a much more intrusive economic management plan was established. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (gemap) is supposed to combat corruption and facilitate good governance, but it also limits the range of policy options for the new democratically elected government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. The irony is that the best and most legitimate government that Liberia has ever had is subject to stronger external control than any of its predecessors. The probability that this scheme will remain sustainable when donor interest shifts elsewhere is low, and what is needed is a more pragmatic approach that draws a wider segment of Liberian society into anti-corruption management and creates checks and balances between them.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank the United States Institute of Peace (grant SG-157-04F), the Norwegian Research Council (grant 174582/S30) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (grant QME1064107). These grants have made it possible to follow the process in Liberia at close range. The author also expresses his gratitude to the many Liberians and expatriates who have shared their views about the transition period and the first part of the Johnson-Sirleaf tenure.

Notes

1 See S Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War, London: Hurst, 1999; M Utas, Sweet Battlefields—Youth and the Liberian Civil War, Dissertations in Cultural Anthropology, Uppsala: University of Uppsala, 2003; M B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war: new war/old war?’, Global Society, 19 (1), 2005, pp 73–88; P Richards et al, Community Cohesion in Liberia—A Post-war Rapid Social Assessment, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005; and MH Moran, Liberia—The Violence of Democracy, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.

2 S Ellis, ‘How to rebuild Africa’, in PN Lyman & P Dorff (eds), Beyond Humanitarianism, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.

3 International partners involved in the establishment of gemap include the USA, the European Union, the imf, the World Bank and the United Nations. See GEMAP frequently asked questions: What is GEMAP?, 2007, at http://www.gemapliberia.org.

4 In addition to the Bank of Liberia, these include, the National Port Authority, Roberts International Airport, the Cash Management Committee (Ministry of Finance), Bureau of the Budget, General Services Agency, the Liberian Petroleum Refining Company, Public Procurement and Concessions Commission, Forestry Development Agency, the Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy, General Auditors Commission, and the Bureau of Customs and Excise. In short, all the traditional cash cows of the Liberian state.

5 See also M B⊘ås & KM Jennings, ‘Failed states and state failure: threats or opportunities’, Globalizations, 4 (1), 2007, pp 475–485.

6 egsc, Governance and Economic Management Programme (gemap): Status Report—Year 1, Monrovia: Liberia, 2006.

7 gemap, Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme, Monrovia: gemap, 2005, p 6.

8 See oecd, dac Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, Paris: oecd, 2007.

9 For arguments in favour of the strong intrusiveness of the ‘trusteeship’ approach, see S Ellis, ‘How to rebuild Africa’; and P Atkinson, ‘Liberal interventionism in Liberia: towards a tentatively just approach?’, Conflict, Security & Development, 8 (1), 2008, pp 15–45.

10 T Mkandawire, ‘Crisis management and the making of choiceless democracy’, in R Joseph (ed), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp 119–136.

11 W Reno, ‘Anti-corruption efforts in Liberia: are they aimed at the right targets?’, International Peacekeeping, 15 (3), 2008, pp 387–404.

12 B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’.

13 These are the Bassa, Belle, Dey, Gbandi, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende and Vai.

14 M B⊘ås, ‘Liberia—the hellbound heat? Regime breakdown and the deconstruction of society’, Alternatives, 22, 1997, pp 353–380; and B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’.

15 R Kappel, ‘Resistance fo the Liberian people: problems of the ignored facts’, in E Hinzen & R Kappel (eds), Dependency, Underdevelopment and Persistent Conflict: On the Political Economy of Liberia, Bremen: Übersee-Museum, 1980, pp 169–196; and Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy.

16 G Schröder & D Seibel, Ethnographic Survey of Southwestern Liberia: The Krahn and the Sapo, Newark, NJ: Liberian Studies Association in America Monograph Series No 3, 1974; and Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy.

17 P Gifford, Christianity and Politics in Doe's Liberia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

18 W Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.

19 B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’.

20 M Huband, The Liberian Civil War, London: Frank Cass, 1998. During the 1980s Doe's regime received more financial support from the USA than did any other government in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the brutality and extreme level of corruption of Doe and his associates, the USA continued to support him, almost to the very end. See GK Kieh, ‘Merchants of repression: an assessment of United States military assistance to Liberia’, Liberia Forum, V (9), 1989, pp 50–61.

21 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, 1999.

22 Huband, The Liberian Civil War; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy; Utas, Sweet Battlefields; B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’; and M B⊘ås & A Hatl⊘y, ‘Getting in, getting out: militia membership and prospects for re-integration in post-war Liberia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 46 (1), 2008, pp 33–55.

23 P Takirambudde, ‘Liberia: where the arms come from on’, International Herald Tribune, 2003, at http://www.iht.com/articles/110148.html.

24 See B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’; and W Reno, ‘Liberia: the lurds of the New Church’, in M B⊘ås & KC Dunn (eds), African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007, pp 69–80.

25 Charles Taylor's exile in Nigeria came to an end on 29 March 2006. He was extradited first to Liberia before being transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where he is currently facing 17 charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his alleged role in Sierra Leone's brutal civil war. In June 2006 his trial was moved to The Hague because of fear that a trial in Sierra Leone could provoke regional instability.

26 B⊘ås & Hatl⊘y, ‘Getting in, getting out’.

27 Gyude Bryant, of Grebo origin, was chosen as ntgl Chairman as he was perceived to be relatively unattached both to the rebel movements and to Taylor's forces, whereas Wesley Johnson got his position as a result of having been one of the leading members of the political opposition to Taylor.

28 It should also be noted that some the wartime leaders did manage to survive the democratic transition. Most of these were people like Jewel Howard-Taylor (Charles Taylor's former ‘first lady’) and Prince Johnson (a former Taylor ally and later enemy, who is considered responsible for President Doe's murder), who were elected to the Senate in the 2005 elections. Both supported Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf during the presidential campaign. See also Reno, ‘Anti-corruption efforts in Liberia’.

29 The relationship between lurd and the Guinean leadership is complex. Ethnicity is certainly an important factor, as the Mandingo people also live in Guinea, and Conte belongs to an ethnic group that has historically been a close ally of the Mandingos. Personal relations also played an important role, as Sekou Conneh was chosen as leader of lurd not so much for his political or military capabilities, but because his wife is Conte's soothsayer. See B⊘ås, ‘The Liberian civil war’; and Reno ‘Liberia’.

30 Huband, The Liberian Civil War; and Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy.

31 Conneh not only angered rank and file imf members with his trade in ntgl positions, but also his wife, Aisha, who became furious when she realised that her husband had sold the position of Minister of Finance to the brother in-law from his first marriage, Lusinee Kamara.

32 In August 2007 the Liberian government suddenly announced that it had found more than 7000 ‘ghost’ workers on its payroll—employees who did not exist. The ‘ghost’ workers got on the payroll through corruption, and supposedly cost the Liberian state some $2.6 million per year. All fake names are to be removed and a new system will be put in place. The bbc story reporting this affair did not mention whether international experts were to supervise this process as well.

33 oecd, dac Guidelines on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, p 12.

34 See A Sawyer, Beyond Plunder: Toward Democratic Governance in Liberia, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.