State building and the non-state: debating key dilemmas

Abstract

This article unpacks the relationship between state building and the non-state. While accepting both the positive and corrosive characteristics of non-state actors and informal practices of governance, it attempts to (1) advance an argument in favour of mainstreaming ‘non-state’ forms that are positive and useful for state building; and (2) highlight the tensions between the practice of state building and the reality of the non-state. In thinking beyond the state and non-state dichotomy, the article seeks to identify factors that are necessary if state-building programmes are to work in complex environments. Drawing on received wisdom from recent experiences, this conceptual study focuses on important contextual, local, political and legitimacy issues to highlight prominent dilemmas. The conclusion suggests four policy-relevant lessons that reinforce the argument in favour of mainstreaming the non-state agenda into the critical thinking about security and development.

Keywords:

• state building
• non-state armed groups
• tradition
• legitimacy
• justice
• security

Acknowledgements

This article draws on field research in Liberia, South Sudan and Ethiopia. The author is grateful to respondents and research partners for their time, patience and willingness to participate in the research process. Thanks are due to Ann Fitz-Gerald and Erwin van Veen for flagging up non-state-related policy concerns that encouraged this conceptual piece.

Notes

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2. oecd, State Building in Situations of Fragility.

3. Lemay-Hébert, “Statebuilding without Nation-building?,” 21–45.

4. Mac Ginty, “Warlords and the Liberal Peace,” 577–598.

5. See Ghani et al., Closing the Sovereignty Gap; Wolff, “Post-conflict State Building,” 1777–1802; and Rocha Menocal, “State Building for Peace,” 1715–1736.

6. Alonso, “The Politics of Space, Time and Substance,” 379–405.

7. Trotha, cited in Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders, 9.

8. De Waal, “Mission without End?,” 99.

9. Reno, Warlord Politics and African States.

10. Herzfeld, Cultural Intimacy.

11. Sending, Learning to Build a Sustainable Peace.

12. Albrecht et al., Perspectives on Involving Non-state and Customary Actors, 13.

13. Ibid.

14. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 89.

15. Newman, “The Violence of Statebuilding,” 141–157.

16. Bauman, Globalization.

17. oecd, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility.

18. Richmond, “De-romanticising the Local”; and Nathan, “No Ownership, No Commitment,” 5.

19. Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?,” 1084–1088.

20. oecd, Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile Situations; oecd, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility; oecd, International Engagement in Fragile States; and oecd/dac, Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Priorities and Challenges.

21. World Bank, World Bank Development Report 2011.

22. Albrecht et al., Perspectives on Involving Non-state and Customary Actors.

23. Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-conflict Countries, 18.

24. Tran, “London Conference.”

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26. Putzel, Do no Harm, 10–11.

27. Naseemidullah and Staniland, “Varieties of Indirect Rule.”

28. Menkhaus, “Governance without Government,” 74–106.

29. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers.

30. Naseemidullah and Staniland, “Varieties of Indirect Rule.”

31. Menkhaus, “The Rise of a Mediated State in Northern Kenya,” 26–27.

32. Heald, “Reforming Community, Reclaiming the State: The Development of Sungusungu in Northern Tanzania,” 57–79.

33. Vellema and Lara, “The Agrarian Roots of Contemporary Violent Conflict in Mindanao,” 304.

34. 34Author interview with Member of State Assembly for Central Equatoria (MLA 1), Juba, January 28, 2013.

35. Tull, The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa, 127.

36. Podder, “Mainstreaming the Non-state.”

37. I borrow this from Shneckener, “Spoilers or Governance Actors?,” 31.

38. Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups and Stability.”

39. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.

40. Huang, “The Wartime Origins of Post-war Democratization.”

41. Bakonyi and Stuvøy, “Violence and Social Order,” 359–382.

42. Podder, “Non-state Armed Groups and Stability,” 23–24, 26–28.

43. Sacks and Larizza, Why Quality Matters.

44. Wennmann, “The Political Economy of Conflict Financing,” 427–444.

45. Krause and Milliken, “Introduction,” 212–213.

46. Justino, Shared Societies and Armed Conflict.

47. Lawrence, Towards a Non-state Security Sector Reform Strategy.

48. Le Riche, “Not just another War in Africa.”

49. Lischer, “Collateral Damage,” 79–109; and Mampilly, Rebel Rulers.

50. Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision,” 504–508.

51. Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbollah, 134.

52. Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 87–89.

53. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders, 7; and Menkhaus, “Governance without Government,” 74–106.

54. Chopra and Isser, “Women’s Access to Justice,” 23–38.

55. undp, “Strengthening the Rule of Law.”

56. Hoehne, Traditional Authorities.

57. Hall, Beyond Culture.

58. West and Kloeck-Jenson, “Betwixt and Between,” 457.

59. Lutz and Linder, Traditional Structures, 27.

60. Hoehne, Traditional Authorities.

61. Author interview with Wafula Okumu, Head, African Union Border Security Office, Addis Ababa, January 2012.

62. Podder, “Bridging the Conceptual–Contextual Divide,” 365–366.

63. Vinck et al., “Talking Peace,” 4.

64. Isser et al., “Looking for Justice,” 4.

65. Anten, “Strengthening Governance,” 16–18.

66. Boege and Garasu, “Papua New Guinea,” 103–128; and Menkhaus, “Governance without Government,” 91–93.

67. Pham, “The Somaliland Exception,” 23–25.

68. Boege and Garasu, “Papua New Guinea,” 103–128.

69. Brinkerhoff, “Capacity Development in Fragile States,” 233.

70. World Bank, World Bank Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Swedish Development Cooperation in the Legal Sector; Department for International Development, Justice and Poverty Reduction; and Office of Democracy and Governance, usaid Achievements.

71. Putzel, Do no Harm, 10.

72. Menkhaus, “Governance without Government.”

73. de Zeeuw, From Soldiers to Politicians.

74. Oomen, Chiefs in South Africa, 92.

75. For example, in Kunduz province of Afghanistan, official positions served as the source of legitimacy for warlords and state resources were seen as important for maintaining their influence. Externally sponsored top-down institution building was supported to the extent that the importance of local strong men was sustained by it. See Debiel and Lambach, “How State‐building Strategies miss Local Realities,” 22–28.

76. Raeymaekers, “Protection for Sale,” 576.

77. Kabamba, “Heart of Darkness,” 272.

78. Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?,” 1084–1088.

79. Ibid.

80. Chopra and Isser, “Women’s Access to Justice.”

81. Denney, “Liberal Chiefs or Illiberal Development?,” 5.

82. Ibid., 14.

83. Chopra and Isser, “Women’s Access to Justice,” 5–6.

84. Peter et al., “Experiences of Informal Justice and Security,” 153.

85. Field interviews in rural communities in Liberia, 2009.

86. The prevailing land tenure systems in Southern Sudan are basically twofold: (1) statutory tenure in urban areas; and (2) communal tenure in rural areas. In the constitution and under the Land Act (2009), land belongs to the community and its uses are to be managed by the government. See usaid, “South Sudan Country Profile on Land Tenure.”

87. Focus group discussion, Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, January 22, 2013.

88. Podder, “From Recruitment to Reintegration.”

89. Author interview with Youth Leader, Voinjama, Lofa, Liberia, 2009.

90. Shaw, “Displacing Violence,” 65–92.

91. See Boersch-Supan, “The Generational Contract,” 25–51.

92. Field observation by author based on research in Liberia, 2008–11.

93. Meagher, “The Strength of Weak States?,” 1073.

94. Renders and Terlinden, “Negotiating Statehood,” 727.

95. Peter, “Political Legitimacy,” xvi.

96. Pham, “The Somaliland Exception,” 1–33.

97. Kaplan, “The Remarkable Story of Somaliland,” 144.

98. Guistozzi, Empires of Mud.

99. Doornbos, “Researching African Statehood Dynamics,” 747–769.

100. Pham, “The Somaliland Exception,” 32; and Kaplan, “Nations must Learn.”

101. Boege et al., On Hybrid Political Orders.

102. Justino, Shared Societies and Armed Conflict, 13.

103. I borrow this from Mac Ginty, “Warlords and the Liberal Peace,” 577.

104. See Bhabha, “Of Mimicry and Man,” 125–133; and Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” 24–28.