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Abstract
The transalpine transport problem is proving very difficult to solve and risks becoming intractable. Can this be explained alone by the obstinate prioritization of economic efficiency goals over environmental protection, as the citizen protest movement would argue? Or is the problem (and solution) to be found in the modes of governance and decision‐making that characterize this issue? The paper seeks answers to these questions through a review of alpine transport policy and discourse over the last several years. The main argument is that while the belated recognition of environmental concerns is partly to blame for the problems faced by transalpine transport, the key issue is the absence of a multilateral policy framework for addressing the problem and the failure of the European Union system of governance to provide such a framework. Transalpine transport represents a local/regional problem that requires a European solution. The immaturity of the European scale of decision‐making and of appropriate governance modes is the main reason why it has become an intractable policy issue that has increased mistrust vis‐à‐vis (European) transport policy.
Acknowledgements
Research was carried out under the framework of the Thematic Network on Trans‐Alpine Transport (ALP‐NET), which was supported by the European Commission under the ‘Competitive and Sustainable Growth Programme’ (Citation1998–Citation2002) (http://www.alp‐net.org). The authors acknowledge the European Commission for supporting this thematic network and for enabling the coming together of professionals from different countries for the exchange of information and ideas.
Notes
Correspondence Address: Liana Giorgi, The Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR), Schottenfeldgasse 69/1, A‐1070 Vienna, Austria. E‐mail: l.giorgi@iccr‐international.org
Note that the main alpine road crossings relevant for transit are not in densely populated areas.
In 1995, 31 million tons of goods were transferred through the Brenner axis, of which 73% was by road and 27% by rail. This represented half of all goods transported through the Austrian alpine routes in the same year (ÖSTAT, 1996, cited in Freudensprung, Citation1997).
Austria entered into related agreements with Slovenia and Switzerland in 1997 and 2000, respectively.
In fact, in 2002, the Austrian government (unlike the regional Tyrolean government) was prepared to drop the 108% clause of the original Transit Agreement under the condition that the ecopoint system would continue to apply to all vehicles and be extended automatically by 3 years. This proposal was rejected by both Germany and Italy. Under the Danish European Presidency during the second half of 2002, the EC proposed a prolongation of the ecopoint system for 1 year, with the possibility of renewal for another 2 years, under the condition that EURO4 vehicles would be excluded from the system. Germany and Italy were apparently willing to accept this compromise, but Austria rejected it, hoping to get a better deal later on. This hope proved illusionary.
The decision at the European level was subject to the co‐decision procedure of the European Council and the European Parliament. Eventually, the Council voted 14:1 (= Austria) in favour of the continuation of the system, and in the European Parliament an overwhelming majority of more than two‐thirds of the MEPs voted in favour of the continuation of the system.
Heavy‐goods vehicles in Austria are charged on the basis of the number of axles: two axles, 13 cents per vehicle‐km; three axles, 18 cents per vehicle‐km; four or more axles, 27 cents per vehicle‐km. The Austrian system does not take into account the weight or technical standard of the vehicle.
These additional tolls (as well as their differentiation according to the time of day) have been highly contested and have also led to a legal confrontation between the EC and Austria. This case, in turn, influenced the position of Austria in the negotiations regarding the Land Transport Agreement between Switzerland and the EU. Austria was favourable to this agreement under the condition that the EC would drop its legal case against the country if the EC was to ‘stretch’ this additional toll to a longer section of the Brenner axis (Pösel, Citation1999).
The MRHVT covers all heavy road vehicles above 3.5 tonnes carrying either goods or passengers and is levied according to (1) the maximum permissible overall weight; (2) the pollutant category of the vehicle (EURO 0, EURO 1, 2, 3); and (3) the distance covered in Switzerland. However, the charge cannot be lower than €0.39 and not higher than €1.96 per metric tonne and 100 km travelled. The maximum transit price for a 40‐tonne vehicle covering 300 km (Basle–Chiasso) has been accordingly defined as amounting to €195, which would correspond to an average of €1.69 per tonne/100 km. Coaches (i.e. heavy vehicles for passengers) pay a flat yearly rate according to their size (which ranges from €1040 for vehicles between 3.5 and 8.5 tonnes to €2080 for vehicles over 18 tonnes). See the Federal Law on MRHVT SR 641.81; related decree SR 641.811, cited in ECOPLAN (Citation2002).
Related to this is the Public Transport Financing Package that foresees the setting up of a fund for the financing of major railway projects to be fed by the MRHVT (by two‐thirds), a fuel tax, a 0.1% increase in the rate of value added tax and long‐term capital market loans. See Federal Resolution on Regulations concerning the funding of large‐scale rail projects, SR 742.140; and BAV (2000), Fact Sheets: Modernisation of the Railways, cited in ECOPLAN (Citation2002).
In 2001, to 34 tonnes, and in 2005, to 40 tonnes.
See the speech by Hans Werder, Secretary General of the DETEC, at the final conference of the National Research Programme 41 on Transport & Environment (http://www.nfp41.ch/download/Tagung/abschluss/werder.doc). Note that of 27 popular votes on transport policy since 1977, only two were rejected (Vatter et al., Citation2000).
Statement by Ueli Balmer, Swiss Office for Spatial Development, at the First Workshop of the Thematic Network on Alpine Transport (ALP‐NET), October 2001.
On the French policy with regard to land transport through the Alps, see Brossier et al. (Citation1998).
Communication by Noel Lebel, Mission Alps, at the First Workshop of the Thematic Network on Alpine Transport, October 2001.
The company established to promote the construction of the Brenner Base Tunnel expects that financing for the tunnel should be divided between Italy, Austria and the EU in the following ratios: 40:40:20, respectively.
Among the most important groups were the Aktion lebenswertes Wipptal, Aktion Umwelt Tirol, Komittee Baumkirchen, Aktion Atemnot, Aktion Verkehr, Initiative Unteres Inntal, Grieb am Brenner and Medical Doctors for the Environment.
According to Hummer (Citation1999), Austria in fact thought little about alpine transport policy and the need to coordinate (at least with Switzerland) between 1993 and 1998: ‘Interessanterweise ist diese Erkenntnis, daß nämlich Österreich und die Schweiz verkehrsgeographisch und damit auch transitmäßig “in einem Boot sitzen”, in der österreichischen Öffentlichkeit in der letzten Zeit mehr und mehr in den Hintergrund getreten. Während man sich zur Zeit der Aushandlung des EWR‐Vertrages und des Transitabkommens der engen Verbindung der Transitproblematik am Brenner mit der Verkehrssituation in der Schweiz noch sehr wohl bewußt war, betrieb Österreich danach eine reine “verkehrspolitische Nabelschau” und konzentrierte sich vor allem auf den (korrekten) Vollzug und die Überwachung des sog. “Ökopunkteregelung"’.