Congress as a Deviant Organization: An Application of Ermann and Lundman’s Organizational Deviance Framework

ABSTRACT

In 1978, Ermann and Lundman put forth the most sophisticated organizational deviance framework to date. They conceptualized organizational deviance as actions by an organization that interfere with the flow of benefits to actors with legitimate claims upon that organization. Further, they stipulated that these claims are protected by “controlling organizations.” We apply Ermann and Lundman’s framework to Congress and conclude that it is a deviant organization. We then contemplate the challenges to social control that congressional deviance poses, and contend that the “exempt status” enjoyed by Congress – in that it writes its own rules and polices itself – should be removed.

Acknowledgment

We wish to thank the editor and anonymous reviewers for their comments. This paper is dedicated to the memory of Richard J. Lundman.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Clayton D. Peoples

Clayton D. Peoples is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Nevada, Reno, where he also serves as Director of the School of Social Research and Justice Studies (SSRJS). He earned his Ph.D. in Sociology from The Ohio State University. His research and teaching interests span stratification/inequality, social movements, political corruption, and related themes. He has recently published in Crime, Law, and Social Change and The Sociological Quarterly, among other outlets.

James E. Sutton

James E. Sutton received his Ph.D. in Sociology from The Ohio State University. He is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Hobart and William Smith Colleges in Geneva, New York, where he currently serves as Chair of the Department of Sociology and Chair of the Institutional Review Board. His teaching and research interests include corrections, juvenile delinquency, research methods, and state-corporate crime.