Limited Access Order in Tunisia: Elements of a Political Economy of Autocratic Regimes

Abstract

In 2009, North, Wallis, and Weingast (NWW) introduced an integrative theory of institutional economics and economic history which rests on the inter-linkage of economic and political order. The article applies this novel theoretical conception to the historical development of Tunisian political economy. It is argued that the neo-Weberian concept of neopatrimonialism fills a theoretical gap as to the analysis of the structure and the dynamics of an autocratic regime and takes Tunisian economic history as an example. While the economic and political order during the pre-colonial period can be analyzed within NWW's framework, the colonial period needs conceptual modifications. Of particular interest are the mechanisms which transformed the post-colonial order into an autocratic regime and a rent-creating economic order. It is argued that a recent reformulation of neopatrimonialism, developed by political scientists based on institutional uncertainty, expands on economists’ understanding of how an autocratic regime stabilizes its political power and creates rents, doorstep conditions towards a competitive open access order notwithstanding.

Keywords:

• Africa
• political economy
• institutions and growth

Acknowledgments

We would like to offer special thanks for valuable comments and advice by Abiodun Egbetokun, Andre Grimes, Deirdre McCloskey, Elena Semenova, Joachim Zweynert, Marc Peacock, and Tom Ginsburg. This research article was partially funded by the Pro Exzellenz Programme of the Federal State of Thuringia.

Notes

¹E.g., in the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

²Retrieved from http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/09/19/000158349_20070919115851/Rendered/PDF/WPS4359.pdf.

³Ahmed Ben Salah, former Prime Minister and the leading figure of the collectivist experiment between 1961 until 1969, was sentenced to forced labor after the experiment failed; by employing this Machiavellian strategy, Bourguiba managed to retain power.

⁴See the Timm (2010) for a summary of the debate.

⁵See Weber (1985/1922) 126–130.

⁶The terms “administration” and “bureaucracy” are used synonymously.

⁷See Timm (2010).

⁸E.g., in case of Imed Trabelsi, Leila Ben Ali's cousin, well known for his disputable behavior towards customs and other administrative officials, who relied on his personal identity and relationships with the ruling coalition. If his demands were not fulfilled immediately and free of charge, the bureaucratic agents were laid off (Beau & Graciet (2010): La Régente the Carthage: Main Basse sur la Tunisie).

⁹The Mameluks were military slaves of Central-Asian or European descent.

¹⁰For the difference between cartels and the feudal system see Volkart (2012, p. 82)

¹¹For a cultural explanation of institutional stagnation in the Muslim/Arab world see Kuran (2004).

¹²For further details see Kraiem, 1973; Brown, 1974; Anderson, 1986.

¹³Bourguiba's cousin Saida Sassi, who at that time was General Ben Ali's mistress, convinced president Bourguiba to appoint Ben Ali Prime Minister. Later on, Bourguiba was proclaimed under disability and thus fell from power.

¹⁴For a similar explanation and econometric validation see Grier (2010) who shows that emerging autocratic regimes are able to outperform young democracies in terms of growth rates while later on their performance falls behind.

¹⁵See von Sivers (1987, p. 577) for the overrepresentation of elite groups from the Sahel-region.

¹⁶See Erdle (2011).

¹⁷See Le Clan de Ben Ali, une Mafia a la Tête de l‘État, Le Monde, Jan. 19, 2011.

¹⁸It is impossible to verify these details even in the post-revolutionary period.

¹⁹Also known as fiscal blackmailing, compare Nugent & Sukiassyan, 2009.

²⁰E.g., compare La Porta et al. (1999).

²¹Compare Smith (1991/1776, Vol. II, pp. 83, 106).

²²A case in point for the presence of different jurisdictions in the colonial period in Tunisia: Christian and Jewish minorities as well as settlers could rely on foreign diplomats and ambassadors in order to settle their disputes.

²³See Rodrik (2007, pp. 166–168) on the advantage of two-track liberalization reforms

²⁴The “coalition of rye and iron,” as it was called by Bismarck, is an example for the complementarities between the old elite group (the Prussian nobility) and the emerging industrial class of the late 19^th century in Germany.

²⁵See Erdle's (2010) in-depth study of modern Tunisia that posits the political order under Ben Ali to be inherently stable and promising in economic terms.

²⁶In contemporary China, political leaders also combine their political roles with personal economic interests and thus resemble the neopatrimonial regime under review.

²⁷Ben Ali maintained a personal “Fund 21” for social transfers.

²⁸See NWW (2009, p. 111).