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ABSTRACT
This study proposes explanations for GPRA’s incomplete institutionalization, and how it has influenced and continues to affect the use of performance management in the US Government. It evaluates the evolving institutionalization of GPRA, PART, and GPRAMA resulting from tensions in three sets of competing PM reform values: 1) performance-performative communications, 2) discretion-accountability, and 3) politics-administration. The study concludes that experiential learning from GPRA’s incomplete institutionalization set the stage for today’s evidence and data movements and increased instrumental use of performance information in federal agencies.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1. In this study, stakeholders of GPRA and GPRAMA include federal legislators, the President, the Office of Management and Budget, federal departments and agencies, PM reform policy entrepreneurs and advocates on Capitol Hill, think tanks such as the National Academy for Public Administration and the IBM Center for the Business of Government having a focus on PM reforms and scholars of public management. Based on the preponderance of the historical evidence, we assess that the general public should not be considered to be a stakeholder in internal US Government PM reforms for which it has shown little to no interest.
2. Performative communications can legitimize the roles of elected officials and public leaders by persuading a targeted audience that they value rationality and care about government performance and transparency, regardless of whether measurable improvements in organizational or program performance are achieved (Meyer & Rowan, Citation1977; Pollitt, Citation2013; Pollitt & Bouckaert, Citation2017; Schmidle, Citation2011). Dull (Citation2006a) portrays two schools of thought on government reforms as either rational or rhetorical (or symbolic), arguing that “ … attention to the ideas that shape and motivate reform is vital” (p. 6).
3. In the Reagan administration’s waning days, OMB signaled its acceptance of the value of program evaluations, along with strategic planning, monitoring of performance and progress, program budgeting tied to strategic plan goals, and rewards tied to program performance as part of the President’s “Reform-88” (Executive Office of the President of the United States, Citation1988).
4. John Mercer testified he intended for GPRA to establish a PB system (Radin, Citation2006), and the law set the stage for it to happen, but it never materialized, much to his disappointment (Mercer, Citation2004).
5. There is some evidence PART data affected OMB development of the President’s budget; programs rated as “ineffective” suffered budget reductions of almost 38% from OMB in the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget (Brass, Citation2004, p. 9) despite widespread concerns about OMB’s assessment methodology.
6. Raines (Citation1997) noted 60% of all management waiver requests were denied. Most of the others were downgraded to agency-level actions to address localized needs.
7. Email correspondence with Mr. John Kamensky, February 8, 2023.
8. OMB sustained this guidance. Circular A-11 in 2016 stated “Agencies are expected to set ambitious goals in a limited number of areas that push them to achieve significant performance improvements beyond current levels” (Office of Management and Budget, Citation2016, italics added).
9. https://www.performance.gov/explore/goals/. In addition, Presidentially-approved cross-agency priority (CAP) goals established government-wide mechanisms of accountability for initiatives to “ … overcome management challenges,” not achieve external policy outcomes. https://www.performance.gov/about/performance-framework/#cap.
10. See, for example, written and oral testimonies by senators of both parties in U.S. Congress. Senate (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Citation2011). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CHRG-112shrg67636/CHRG-112shrg67636
11. There are several noteworthy organizational adaptations, however, such as at NASA, where existing program performance information down to the individual project manager level gets aggregated at NASA headquarters to complete GPRA reports, rather like the proverbial tail wagging the dog (Hollandsworth, Citation2021).