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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a historical overview of the emerging post-Islamist phenomenon in the Muslim world and discusses the scope for sustainable democratic politics in Bangladesh. In the process, a model is proposed that purports to exhibit a level of compatibility with the perceived political landscape in Bangladesh. The model adopts a version of the Hotelling–Downs principle of democracy and sets it within the ‘post-Islamist’ paradigm in such a way that, if it can be implemented, even if only partially, may lead to the sustained political stability of Bangladesh. The paper highlights illiberal and undemocratic practices of the two dominant Bangladeshi political parties as a major feature of the present status quo. These practices dominate Bangladeshi politics through the continuous attempts of their exponents to impose monopolistic views on the various symbols of national identity, despite the multi-racial, multi-religious nature of Bangladesh society. The paper concludes that a democratic system of politics, which accommodates aspects of secularism, language, Muslim identity and post-Islamist ‘Islamic ethical–moral–legal codes’, remains the feasible political discourse for forming and consolidating the country’s multi-racial, multi-religious national identity over the long run and its survival as a sovereign state.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to sincerely thank two anonymous reviewers and the editor of this journal for their constructive comments and suggestions for improvement of the paper. He would also like to express his gratitude to his colleague Gregory Bauer for reading several drafts, making comments and suggestions, drawing figures, and, above all, informing him of various aspects of European religious, cultural and political history. Any remaining errors and weaknesses of the paper are the author’s sole responsibility.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Akhand Akhtar Hossain is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Newcastle, Australia. He earned B.Sc. (Honours) and M.Sc. degrees in Economics from Jahangirnagar University, Bangladesh, both with first class and having first position. Later, he earned M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in Economics from the University of Melbourne and La Trobe University, respectively. Between 1999 and 2002, Dr Hossain spent three years as International Economist at the IMF-Singapore Regional Training Institute and was World Bank Resident Economic Advisor at the Bangladesh Bank for six months in 2004. He has published 11 books, 70 journal articles and 21 edited book chapters, mostly sole-authored and in the areas of macroeconomics and monetary economics. He is currently working on a manuscript entitled Money, Monetary Policy and Price Stability, for Palgrave Macmillan.
Notes
1 Casanova (Citation1994, Citation2009) has defined secularism in two forms: (1) secularism as ideology and (2) secularism as statecraft principle. Secularism as statecraft principle refers to the principle of separation between religious and political authority. Secularism as an ideology in one respect may include the view that religion is either an irrational force or a non-rational form of discourse that should be banished from the democratic sphere. In the context of Muslim-majority countries, secularism has elements of both and hence remains undefined and vague insofar as the role of religion in state affairs and its place in democracy is concerned. In reality, there is continuum of the separation of religion from affairs of the state.
2 Islamism, or ‘political Islam’, represents the view that Islamic law and principles (shariah) should be the foundation of political discourse and governance of the state in Muslim-majority countries. For a discussion on public preferences for regimes in some Muslim-majority countries, see Norris (Citation2011).
3 Bayat (2007: 19) has defined post-Islamism as follows: ‘post-Islamism is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic or secular. Rather it represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty. … In short, whereas Islamism is defined by the fusion of religion and responsibility, post-Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights'.
4 This fits remarkably with the democratic paradigm of a modern society, as outlined by Casanova (2006: 20). He writes: ‘I cannot find a compelling reason, on either democratic or liberal grounds, to banish in principle religion from the public democratic sphere. One could at most, on pragmatic historical grounds, defend the need for separation between “church” and “state”, although I am no longer convinced that complete separation is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for democracy. The attempt to establish a wall of separation between “religion” and “politics” is both unjustified and probably counterproductive for democracy itself.’
5 This paper refers to European history, secularism and political development as an example to sharpen the arguments for incorporation of religion in the political discourse in Muslim societies. This does not imply a prescription of a Eurocentric model of political development for Muslim societies. The paper further refers to Muslim societies in global perspective and in light of recent religious and political developments across the globe. It does not make any major distinction between West Asian Muslim countries and South and Southeast Asian Muslim countries, although scholars frequently find such a distinction useful to analyse contemporary Islamic movements and political developments. In the body of the discussion, emphasis has still been given to religious and political developments in Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. For discussion on these countries, see Nasr (Citation2005), Weiss (Citation2010), Kamali (Citation2009) and Rahim (Citation2011).
6 Western ethical and moral values are arguably based on the ‘Judeo-Christian’ culture and traditions. This view has gained prominence in the United States since the 1950s to reduce anti-Catholic and anti-semitic sentiments. Some suggest that Islamic traditions can be added to this concept under the banner ‘Abrahamic religions'. For further discussion, see Hughes (Citation2012) and Peters (Citation2005).
7 See Zakaria (1997) for discussion on the concept of ‘illiberal democracy’. For a review of illiberal, authoritarian practices in Bangladesh politics, see Ahmed (Citation1983) and Hossain (Citation2000, Citation2015).
8 Secularism in Bangladesh is a contentious concept that has become entangled and now almost synonymous with anti-Islamic political philosophy. Originally, secularism in Bangladesh was defined as the state's equidistance from all religions. Some critics called it ‘multi-theocracy’. In reality, secularism upstaged Hinduism and other minority religions and practices while Islam was downplayed in all affairs of the state. Presently, secularism has emerged as an ideology that aims to remove all Islamic practices from the public domain. Fundamentally, in a historical context, secularism rejects the pre-1971 history of the emergence of Bangladesh as part of Pakistan under Muslim nationalism. Socially and religiously, secularism has lately been synonymous with atheism, atheist humanism and linked to the propagation of various animist and Hindu cultural practices in the name of Bengali culture and traditions.
9 For discussion on development strategies in Muslim countries, see Khan (nd).
10 For discussion on the ideology and politics in Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Turkey, see Shepard (Citation2014).
11 The Francophone countries were influenced by extreme secularism as practised in France. For discussion on secularism in France and other countries, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/La%C3%AFcit%C3%A9
12 The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
14 Ulema is the Arabic-language collective term for learned Islamic scholars and prayer leaders.
15 Muslims refer to the Medina charter as an example of a pluralistic society that existed during the Prophet's life. For a critical analysis of pluralism and diversity in Quranic perspective, see Kamali (Citation2009).
16 For discussion on human rights issues in Muslim countries, see Monshipouri (Citation2004).
17 No consensus has emerged on the nature of political uprising in the Arab world (see Bayat, Citation2011).
18 In Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism is weakening and a group called Islamo-liberals is gaining support (se Lacroix, Citation2005).
19 In economics, Hotelling's law suggests that in many markets it is rational for producers to make similar products. This is referred to as the principle of minimum differentiation. The principle was developed by Hotelling (Citation1929). In politics, the idea was used by Downs (Citation1957) to develop conditions which may lead to political stability.
20 Yilmaz (Citation2009) has shown that Islamists are inclined to ideological moderation provided that political structures are available to them and they are politically included (also see Nasr, Citation2005; Berman, Citation2008).
21 See ‘From Arab spring to post-Islamist summer’, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article2529040.ece
22 See ‘The future of Islamism in Indonesia: neo-or-post-Islamism?—Analysis', http://www.eurasiareview.com/17072012-the-future-of-islamism-in-indonesia-neo-or-post-islamism-analysis/
23 See ‘Post-Islamism’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/oct/31/postislamism
24 Some updated materials of this section are drawn from Hossain (Citation2015).
25 For discussion on constitution-making in Bangladesh, see Huq (Citation1973) and Absar (Citation2014).
26 Before the 1947 partition of India, Bengal was one of its south-eastern provinces. Upon partition, the eastern half of Bengal then became East Bengal and later East Pakistan, leaving the rump West Bengal region with India. Ultimately, East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh in 1971.
27 The 1970 general elections are viewed as the landmark event in which ‘Bengali ethnicity‒language‒culture’ was pitted against Muslim nationalism.
28 ‘Skewed to the right’ here does not mean the political right. It is the mathematical description of a distribution curve shaped like (a). The significance of a voting distribution curve skewed to the right, in the context of this discussion about Bangladeshi politics, is that the majority of voters are located under the left-hand half of the curve, denoting a voting bias towards the political left, represented by the Awami League and its coalition.
29 Bangladeshi society has close resemblance to Indonesian and Malaysian societies. These countries have moved away from secularism as an ideology to create a multi-racial/ethnic, multi-religious composite identity that is formed through participation of consensus-oriented politics within a democratic system.
30 See Blair and Bloom (Citation1999) and Shepard (Citation2014) for discussion on Islamic culture and traditions.
32 About 75 per cent of Muslims in Bangladesh support ‘Muslim-Bangladeshi nationalism’. The remaining 25 per cent of Muslims and the religious minorities support ‘Bengali nationalism or secularism’ (Hossain, Citation2008).
33 See Hashmi (Citation2014) for a political analysis of the roots of ‘Islamist terrorism’.