ABSTRACT
How do ethnic groups compete in a decentralized Indonesia? How do their political competitions to claim a new province lead to open conflict? The Indonesian government devised its massive territorial autonomy (TA) strategy—regional proliferation or pemekaran—as part of expansive decentralization reform in 1999. While scholarship is generally ambiguous regarding the relationship between regional proliferation and conflict, many districts still experience small-scale episodic conflict some of which may be fuelled by ethnic-group competition after pemekaran. This study aims to investigate ethnic groups’ political competition during the initiation stage of non-successful new province campaigns. Using four cases—two new province aspirations, one no-province claim and a null case—I argue that ethnic groups’ political competition can develop to the level of a localized small-scale episodic conflict. The evidence suggests that political competition among ethnic groups may temporarily escalate due issues of the location of the new province’s capital location and the future bid for a new gubernatorial position. This study fills a scholarly gap in the discussion of ethnic groups’ politics and conflict (e.g. Cederman, L.-E., Hug, S., Schädel, A., & Wucherpfennig, J. [2015]. Territorial autonomy in the shadow of conflict: Too little, too late? American Political Science Review, 109(2), 354–370. doi:10.1017/S0003055415000118; Cunningham, K. G. [2014]. Inside the politics of self-determination. Oxford University Press). Furthermore, this study finds support for the effectiveness of a moratorium policy, such as buying-time tactics to reduce the conflict.
Acknowledgement
The author is grateful to the BAPPENAS-World Bank for the Scholarship Program for Strengthening the Reforming Institution (SPIRIT), the School of Public Administration (STIA-LAN Jakarta Polytechnic), the National Institute of Public Administration (LAN), and Political Science Department, Loyola University Chicago, for their generous support during the period of research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 A term used by the World Bank and decentralisation advocates to indicate an abrupt implementation of decentralisation, marked by a dramatic splitting of a region (district or province) after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
2 Borrowing from Bazzi and Gudgeon’s (Citation2018) definitions, a parent or old district is an original district that eventually proliferates into a new (child) district. Child district refers to a new district generated from an old (parent) district after district proliferation.
3 Document obtained from the Regional Representatives Council, June 2017.
4 The ethnic population data is taken from the Arifin et al. (Citation2015) study on Indonesian ethnic diversity statistics based on the 2010 population census.
5 At the time of observation, a major international airport project, Kertajati, was being developed. The airport officially opened in 2018.
6 Dahuri’s opinion was not consistent with the unpublished document on Hasil Pengkajian Penataan Otonomi Daerah Jawa Barat dan Kemungkinan Pembentukan Provinsi Cirebon, a Cirebon Province assessment prepared by the University of Pajajaran team, led by the Government Science Program.
7 Aluk to dolo is a belief system that maintains the relationship among people, between people and their ancestors and deities, and between people and their environment.
8 For instance, the idea of Luwu Raya Province was widespread during Soekarno’s presidential time in the 1950s.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Ratri Istania
Ratri Istania, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor at the Polytechnic School of Public Administration, STIA-LAN Polytechnic, Jakarta, Indonesia, whom currently positioned as a visiting scholar and postgraduate research fellow at Political Science Department, Loyola University Chicago.