Informal water vendors and the urban poor: evidence from a Nairobi slum

ABSTRACT

In Kenya, informal urban water markets serve the poor in areas where public utilities have failed to deliver. They often charge high prices, sell low-quality water and perform water transactions in a way that is unfair to the buyers. They still remain one of the most popular alternatives for water provision, as they can offer flexibility of supply arrangements and payment systems which are beyond the scope of large-scale water providers. In the major restructuring of Kenya’s urban water delivery system towards commercialization and privatization, these private vendors are being regularized for better service delivery in terms of regulation of prices and quality of water.

KEYWORDS:

• Water vendors
• urban
• poor
• water access
• slum
• informal settlement
• Nairobi
• Kenya

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Water utilities and municipalities do not want to invest in water infrastructure in settlements that are illegally built on public or private land and have no legal sanction, as there are risks such as eviction and unpaid bills, and lack of protection for utility infrastructure.

2. ‘Safe water’ includes water from piped connections within premises, protected wells, common standpipes and kiosks.

3. Thus, utilities that charge for water deliveries are also technically water vendors. However, in the literature on informal water markets, vending only refers to the reselling or onward distribution of utility water.

4. ‘Water ATMs’ are smart-card-operated water vending machines, first introduced to urban Kenya in the Mathare slums in 2015 through a public–private partnership.

5. Some youth will stealthily cut a hole, sell the water, and fix the pipe back up. This practice seems to be common in the slums, and sellers often pay kickbacks to the utility officers who regularly come to check for such connections. This leads not only to non-revenue water but also to contamination of the entire piped system. In one of my field visits, I noticed two youths cutting into a utility pipe near the Mathare River. The site was near where sewage was getting dumped from the public toilets, and the slum had a cholera outbreak at the time.

6. Wutich et al. (2016) found that regular customer relationships in informal markets enhanced clients’ feelings of recognition and dignity.

7. Some complained of the high price of water bought from water tankers. Sometimes even after paying there is a queue, and the tankers may take one or two days to arrive.

8. Some studies have suggested that cooperative organizations (e.g. unions or trade associations) could help informal water vendors self-regulate water prices, monitor the quality of water and improve service (Collignon & Vezina, 2000; Solo, 1999). Such organizations could also provide a forum for the vendors to cooperatively agree on just rules and norms for water delivery.

9. Customers connected to the utility network have to pay up-front charges, make payments at long (monthly/quarterly) intervals and make trips (during their working day) to pay at central offices.

10. Disconnection by the utility mainly happens because of an illegal connection or non-payment of bills.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the University Grants Commission [No. F.30-50/2016 (SA-II)].