The European Union and China's rise in Africa: Competing visions, external coherence and trilateral cooperation

Abstract

This study analyses the impact of China's rise in Africa on the European Union (EU). Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that the EU's renewed interest in Africa is not the result of China's new assertiveness in the continent, but is a consequence of the EU's ambitions to become an influential global actor and the consequent search for a more coherent external policy. Africa, thus, represented an ideal venue in which different EU actors could simultaneously pursue traditional development goals together with new political objectives. Moreover, the existence of three competing visions within the EU negatively affected its ability to constructively engage with China: the European Commission sought to affirm the EU's aspiration to become an influential global actor; the European Parliament projected its preference for a value-based development policy, blended with paternalistic overtones; the Council of the European Union was driven more by the emotional reactions of some member states, who did not want to lose their position as Africa's main reference point. Unsurprisingly, the result has been a confused message, which China has found hard to follow, never mind Africa, since they were not effectively involved in the process and were sceptical about the whole idea of ‘trilateral cooperation’.

Keywords:

• EU–Africa relations
• EU development policy
• EU–China relations
• trilateral cooperation
• policy coherence

Notes

1. To preserve their anonymity, I decided to code interviewees as follows: ‘EU diplomat’ for people working in the European Commission and the European Parliament (including politicians); ‘European diplomat’ for people working in one of the EU member states; ‘International diplomat’ for people working in China and the Development Assistance Committee; and ‘African diplomat’ for people working in the AU and one of the African countries.

2. The major changes introduced by Cotonou were as follows: aid allocation would be made conditional not only on needs but also on performance through a system of rolling programming; new free trade agreements, the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements, to be negotiated and agreed on a regional basis before January 2008, would replace the previous preferential trade regime; the political dimension, which included issues that had previously fallen outside the field of development cooperation (i.e. peace and security, arms trade, migration, drugs and corruption) would be reinforced. The two revisions in 2005 and 2010, in addition to a reference to the MDGs, contributed to a further politicisation of the relations (e.g. combating terrorism, countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), preventing mercenary activities, committing to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and flexibility in the use of development resources). On these issues, see Carbone (2007), Flint (2009), Holden (2009) and Holland (2002).

3. Since the mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis), the EU has been involved in a large number of military/humanitarian missions in Africa. On this, see Bagoyoko and Gibert (2009) and Olsen (2008a; 2008b).

4. For a review of the relations between the EU and China, see Balme and Bridges (2008), Fox and Godement (2009), Kerr and Fei (2007) and Shambaugh et al. (2008).

5. For a similar argument see Sicurelli (2010), who argues that the EU's attempt to promote African integration in the areas of conflict management, trade and environmental policy is significantly hindered by the fact that European institutions and member states project different views. See also Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008) and Farrell (2009).

6. In this sense, some bureaucratic changes are important to understanding the role of DG Development. The appointment of a new Director General, Stefano Manservisi, who came from the cabinet of President Romano Prodi, to replace Koos Richelle, who had been instrumental in the emphasis given to quantity and quality of aid, meant a partial shift of emphasis from a technocratic to a more political vision of development. Following Manservisi's appointment, there was a re-organisation of DG Development, and a new unit covering relations with new donors was created. In particular, one of the officials, Uwe Wissenbach, who had previously worked in the delegation in China and spoke Chinese fluently, managed to meet with various officials in China's Ministry of Commerce, as well as the Chinese Mission to the EU (Interviews with EU diplomats, September 2010).

7. The conference brought approximately 180 policymakers, scholars, members of think tanks and NGOs from China, the EU and Africa to discuss the issue. For a summary of the conference proceedings, see Wissenbach (2007). Another important conference was held in Shanghai in March 2008. For a summary of the discussions, see Yu (2008).

8. It is symptomatic that in his account to the British Parliament one of the development ministers endorsed the whole Commission's strategy and manifested reservations only about the lack of reference to unsustainable debt: ‘This issue is sensitive, so the decision to omit the issue from a Communication which seeks to gain support for greater cooperation is prudent. However it is a subject of concern which needs to be raised, at the appropriate time, with the parties concerned’ (See www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmeuleg/16-xxxvi/1617.htm).