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ABSTRACT
The emergence of Eritrea as a new nation apparently required the government to transcend inherited forms of identity. It has tried to do this by forging a new political culture out of collective memories of war, but this attempt was only partially successful. Largely steeped in political symbolism and populist rhetoric of sacrifice and self-reliance, the regime's attempt to socialise the Eritrean society with valorised revolutionary values is designed to camouflage the political reality of repression. By taking the concept of political culture as a framework for analysis, this article argues that Eritrea's double tragedy has two major causes. Firstly, it emanates from the surreal, tightly controlled personal rule of Isaias Afeworki who, in the face of declining legitimacy and a tenuous grip on power, has raised the level of repression to new heights. Secondly, it has its origins in the chasm in political orientations and belief systems between the body politic and society, resulting in a culture of anomie which expresses itself in mistrust, impunity, acquiescence and fatalism. The article argues that a viable political framework of state-building is only possible when two conditions are met. In the first place it is necessary that political institutions evolve within a political structure that is rooted in a rule of law that promotes the legitimacy of incumbents and policy governance. In addition, the political framework must facilitate the promotion of civil society as a political space for political education in order to foster the stable reproduction of democratic values of tolerance and coexistence.
Acknowledgements
This article has been considerably enriched by insightful comments and suggestions from Joe McCormack, former senior lecturer in Social Policy, Ulster University, Northern Ireland to whom I wish to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation. I would like also to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of the Journal of Contemporary African Studies for their valuable comments, critiques, and guidance, which helped me revise and transform the initial manuscript into its final form. Any errors that remain are mine.
Notes on contributor
Petros Ogbazghi is a former senior lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, University of Asmara, Eritrea. He studied at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague and the University of Groningen, where he obtained his Master's Degree in Public Policy and Administration. He obtained his PhD in Politics and Administration from Tilburg University, School of Politics and Public Administration. His research interests include: state–society relations in Eritrea; politics and governance in sub-Saharan Africa; urban regimes and local governance in Western Europe. Currently he is an independent researcher and consultant in the Republic of Ireland. He can be contacted at: [email protected].
Notes
1. For a discussion of proxy wars in the Horn of Africa, see Abbink (Citation2003), Ogbazghi (Citation2011); see also Charbonneau (Citation2013).
2. In addition to arming Somalia's terrorist group – Al Shabab, the Eritrean regime is also accused of arming various African rebel groups. Thus, for example, according to the Le Journal de Brazza: ‘the arms that were used by the Seleka rebels, during the final assault on presidential palace [on 24th March, 2013] were purchased in Eritrea, and transited by Chad with the permission of [Idriss] Deby' (Sikiti da Silva Citation2013, 1). See also Humphris (Citation2013).
3. This was striking given the fact that following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, Eritrea became part of the US anti-terror military campaign and even lobbied very heavily by offering its ports for use by the USA as military bases. No sooner did relations with the USA begin to deteriorate than the US government called on the Eritrean government to release two former Eritrean employees of the US embassy. The Eritrean regime turned up the rhetoric against the USA by labelling the call as ‘unwarranted intervention’ and ‘a coup conspiracy against the Eritrean government’ (IRIN News Citation2002). The USA eventually chose Djibouti in preference to Eritrea as a strategic location for a US military base.
4. In this UN sponsored referendum, 99.8% voted for independence on a turnout of 98.5% of registered voters.
5. The macro-economic policy, which was ‘drafted in the field when the EPLF was a liberation movement, but presented when the EPLF became the provisional government’ stressed, among other things, the role of agricultural, industrial, mining and commercial sectors. To achieve the desired objectives, the government proclaimed that it would capitalise on the fund of skilled manpower, which it saw as motivated, disciplined and industrious in spite of constraints in terms of quality and quantity (for detailed discussion on Eritrea's post-independence economic policy, see, among others, Tesfagiorgis Citation1993).
6. Speech made by Former President Clinton during his trip to Africa in March 1998. See also ‘How Eritrea fell out with the west.’ BBC, September 11, 2007.
7. The Guardian, October 25, 2013. See also Amnesty International (Citation2013), Child Soldiers International (Citation2012) and UNHCR (Citation2009).
8. Largely born out of pragmatism and necessity, Sudan is the only neighbouring country Eritrea enjoys friendly diplomatic relations with after the two countries agreed to normalise relations in the mid-1990s following Eritrea's abandonment of its policy of regime change in Sudan, with the latter complementing it by ceasing to give military aid to the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which was carrying out cross-border attacks against government military garrisons. Throughout the late 1990s however, relations, seemed to be punctuated with periodic tensions resulting from cross-border attacks and Eritrea's involvement by proxy in Sudan's civil war, as well as its continued military and logistical support to various Sudanese eastern front rebel factions. However, since the outbreak of the Ethiopia–Eritrea war, cordial relations with Sudan seemed to be restored once again as Eritrea began to play a peacemaker role by hosting and engaging government and various rebel factions of Sudan in peace talks.
9. For a detailed account of Eritrea–Djibouti relations, see, for example, Mesfin (Citation2008).
10. See also UNSC Report (http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/eritrea/).
11. Although there is a Ministry of Defence, it exists nominally as its importance has long diminished with the establishment of military zones, which are run by five of the most powerful military generals in Eritrea today who report directly to the President's Office rather than to the Ministry of Defence (Ogbazghi Citation2011, 6). The President's Office is, in turn, constituted by the President and his inner circle ‘which consists primarily of top-ranked military officers, and a handful of advisors’ (Connell Citation2011, 422).
12. Personal conversation with Sarah Ammanuel (name changed), who fled Eritrea to the Netherlands, 10 May 2010, Den Hague, the Netherlands. The author had a similar conversation with a group of Eritrean refugees who fled Eritrea and made the UK their new home (January 2015, Leeds, UK).
13. Gramscian social reform approaches purport to undo what Antonio Gramsci called the hegemonic culture of the bourgeoise, which finds expression in traditional and religious values and belief systems and becomes popular and dominant enough to secure the consent of the rest of society through tacit coercion. If these centrifugal forces are left to themselves unchallenged, Gramsci argued, they could potentially undermine the revolution of the counter hegemony movements by working classes or alternative civil society groups (Gramsci Citation1971).
14. Nicole Hirt's extensive focus group study covered the impact of the national military service on a wide set of social, political, psychological and economic life of the national service conscripts, with a special emphasis on family disintegration and anomic patterns of social relationships in the city of Asmara, Eritrea (2010).
15. Samuel Hedray, a former Eritrean Television Service Operator who fled to Ethiopia and gave interview to an opposition radio, Sallinna.com. January 2015.
16. Nakfa, to which the Eritrean currency also owes its name, is a town in northern Eritrea, which served as a military base during the struggle period and is commonly identified with resistance, heroism and sacrifice.
17. In 2009, for example, Human Rights Watch reported that ‘Isaias told the UN Children's fund that Eritrea was suffering from famine though the government officially denied food shortages’ (Clottey Citation2012, 1).
18. Officially, there are nine ethnic groups in Eritrea, many of which share similar identities with Eritrea's neighbours. Thus, for example, the Afar ethnic group shares similar linguistic, religious and traditional values with the Afars found in both Djibouti and Ethiopia; the Tigre and Haderab ethnic groups with similar tribes in Sudan; the Tigrigna, Saho, Bilen, Kunama and Nara groups share identities with groups in Ethiopia, parts of Sudan and some parts of the Eritrean highlands; the Hidareb/Beja, with Eastern Sudan and Southern Egypt; and the Rashaida with Sudan and groups found in the Arabian Peninsula.
19. Between 1996 and 1998, the government suspended all NGO activities and eventually removed all but one foreign NGO (Garcetti and Gruber Citation2000).
20. For detailed discussion on Rousseau's critique of the Social Contract, including the concepts of the General Will, the Legislator and Civil Religion, see, among others, Bloom (Citation1997, 143–167).