Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance?

Abstract

This article examines the increasing engagement between the ‘emerging powers’ and African countries, and the implications for international governance. The global power dynamic is undergoing a cumulative reordering process, where countries including China, India, Brazil and Russia are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international system. In their approach to Africa, the ‘BRIC’ countries have employed a mix of soft power, public diplomacy, direct investment and private sector partnerships to deepen relations. This article suggests that strict macro-economic explanations do not allow for the myriad political, strategic and social matters that are arising in this engagement. The analytical complexities of these emerging modes of South–South cooperation are examined at state and societal levels from a political economy perspective. Despite their differing intentions, Africa and the emerging powers appear to share common goals of advancing their respective national economies and enhancing their diplomatic status. These shifts are further giving rise to a new ‘global middle’. The emergence of this multi-layered international order challenges scholars to stretch conceptions of world order, multipolarity and interdependence. The article concludes by surveying the relevance of BRIC interests in Africa for various subfields in international relations and points to areas for further research.

Notes

The N11 includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam.

See Goldman Sachs (2007b) for more information regarding the relationship and differences between BRIC and N11 nations. In particular, the size and projected growth of the BRIC economies will continue to outpace those of the N11 countries through 2050, at the earliest. This implies that while the G7 will be increasingly less influential over the N11 (at least in terms of comparative GDP), BRIC countries will grow more powerful.

However, this relationship may be beginning to change. With India growing increasingly mindful of Chinese involvement in Africa the historic connections developed through the Indian diaspora to Africa may allow Indian strategists to develop new trade ties between the emerging power and the African continent—for example, in 2007, two-way trade between India and Africa measured approximately $25 billion. Furthermore, an inaugural Indian–African summit took place in early 2008; in attendance were the heads of state of African countries, including South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda. For more information see The Economist (12 April 2008).

See World Bank (2008, p. 68) for a list of the top three export industries for African nations in 2005, and for statistics regarding the share that those industries make-up for the country's total exports.

It is possible that Beijing has drawn from Tokyo's African consultations, which started in 1993 at the height of the Asian economic miracle, namely the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD).

See Gulf Times (28 February 2007) for more information on the links between China, India and the Middle East. Trade along the ‘Internet-era Silk Road’ has doubled since 2000, as ‘the growth of corporate financing would further strengthen the ties between the Middle East and Asia’.

Using the term ‘second world’, Khanna (2008) demonstrates that the global economic middle includes a wide and diverse set of countries either moving up, down or embracing status quo, or in the case of China and India, all three directions are at play within the country.

Furthermore, the involvement of Chinese firms in Africa has dramatically increased in the past 20 years. For instance, there are now 800 Chinese businesses currently operating in Africa and are ‘engaged in trade, manufacturing, natural resource exploitation, transportation, agriculture and agricultural processing’ (He, 2006). While these investments are mutually beneficial there are concerns about the amount of foreign involvement in Africa and whether African governments can translate this money into benefits for their citizens and sustainable development; for more information see Amosu (2007).

Along with India's Bollywood film empire, other BRIC and African nations are having an impact by exporting their culture to the world at large. For example, recent Brazilian films, including Carandiru, Bus 174 and City of God, have met acclaim around the world; also, Brazilian music and fashion have become big business in the UK in recent years, as they have been used in commercials for companies, including Nissan, Sunsilk, Always and Habitat (Lane, 2004). While India's and Brazil's cultural products are meeting commercial success, African releases are more of a ‘political undertaking’. Foreign grants, from France, the European Union and other foreign patrons, allow African filmmakers to produce films. However, many African governments downplay the importance of such growth (Bakupa-Kanyinda, 2003).

Historical connections are unlikely to be of much relevance or insight today; i.e., African nationalist parties and newly independent states were connected to China and India in the ‘non-aligned movement’, especially the former's support for some of the southern African liberation movements, but such an inheritance is of limited use as a guide to contemporary economic, social and technological prospects. At times, longstanding ideological connections may actually complicate relationships between the BRICs and Africa. An interesting case that came to the fore in April 2008 concerned the ship carrying Chinese arms for the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe (historically backed by Beijing) which was refused unloading in Durban, through the actions of COSATU, the trade union movement in South Africa with ties with the Soviet Union. Even here, ideology is mixed with economic instrumentalism, as COSATU has become increasingly vocal about its displeasure over the loss of local jobs due to the influx of low-priced Chinese goods.

In particular, as is evident in the case of China, contemporary relations mainly revolve around the trade of natural resources, especially oil (Zafar 2007). Socially, China is exercising a ‘hands-off’ form of diplomacy, and not attaching the commitments to trade and investment deals that most Western interests do. Technologically, China's investment and trade with African countries has led to the development of new forms of infrastructure; however, these advances necessitate the development of African participation in the projects, in order to better create sustainable growth and development (The Economist, 15 March 2008).

In November 2006, 48 African leaders attended a three-day summit in Beijing, where they met with Chinese heads of state to discuss the potential for economic cooperation and growing investment from China in the continent. For more information see Financial Times (2 November 2006).

In January 2007 workers from the largest textile mill in Zambia, Mulungushi Textiles, protested outside of the Chinese embassy to demonstrate against ‘poor wages, mistreatment and the temporary closure of the plant that left 700 workers without pay’ (AsiaNews, 2 May 2007). This can be seen as an expression of ‘a growing tide of anti-Chinese sentiment’ that was seen surfacing during the presidential campaign in 2006, where incumbent Levy Mwanawasa was opposed by the populist and anti-Chinese platform of Michael Sata (Hare, 2007). As Hare notes, echoes of this anti-Chinese discontent surfaced during trips to South Africa and Namibia by President Hu Jintao in February 2007.

For example, there are reports that as early as 1963 members of the African National Congress (ANC) were sent to the Soviet Union for training in guerrilla warfare, training that would last for nearly three decades; see Shubin (2007).

In September 2006 Russian President Vladimir Putin travelled to South Africa to meet with President Thabo Mbeki about increasing bilateral ties between the two countries. However, Putin's stay in ‘black Africa’ was short lived, as he moved onto Morocco following his meetings in South Africa. See Klomegah (2006).

For more on China's expanding use of soft-power see Pan (2006). Also, more on the BRICs' emergence as an influence on soft power can be found in Armijo (2008).

For more on the debate to enact R2P in Darfur, see Williams and Bellamy (2005) and de Waal (2008).

Along with China (Financial Times, 2 November 2006), India (The Hindu, 15 March 2008) has recently discussed increased involvement and interaction with African nations.

Despite these actions, BRICs has recently reaffirmed their collective commitment to UNSC reform. See ‘Tshwane IBSA Summit Declaration, 17 October 2007’, Joint Statement, Department of Foreign Affairs http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2007/ibsa1018.htm. Meanwhile, the African Union has also expressed agreement on UNSC reform; see Japan Policy and Politics (2005).

For more on the L20 and its possible manifestations, as well as other attempts at greater representation for marginalized states, see Fues (2007).

The ‘R’ is in parentheses due to Russia's pre-existing membership of the G8.

For more information see ‘Chinese, Russian, Indian Foreign Ministers meet in Harbin’, Consulate General of the People's Republic of China. http://www.sanfrancisco.chineseconsulate.org/eng/xw/t375631.htm; India Chronicle (2008); Feigenbaum (2007).

For more on this relationship see Davies (2004).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Timothy M. Shaw

*Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (Waterloo, Canada); Professor and Director of the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies (St Augustine, Trinidad). Email: [email protected]

Andrew F. Cooper

 **Associate Director and Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (Waterloo, Canada) and Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. Email: [email protected]

Gregory T. Chin

***Senior Fellow at The Centre for International Governance Innovation (Waterloo, Canada) and Assistant Professor of Political Science at York University (Toronto, Canada). Email: [email protected]