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Abstract
This paper seeks to reassess the outcome of mainstream civil society promotion policies in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. While it agrees with critics that the distorting effects of funding relations have meant that the promised ‘grassroots citizen empowerment’ has not been achieved directly through NGOs, it does not agree that NGOs are therefore merely vehicles of the Western ideological agenda and international aid to the Kyrgyzstani population. It argues that the facilitation of international actors has opened up opportunities for individual NGO activists to pursue their own social and political development agendas. In recent years, some activists have begun to use these opportunities to develop strategies through which grassroots interests are represented to decision-makers, and citizens' abilities to represent their own interests are enhanced. The strategies adopted differ from the mainstream civil society model and have allowed some NGOs to function in a manner more relevant to the specific Kyrgyzstani context. This suggests that local Kyrgyzstani NGOs and activists should not all be written off as ‘artificial’ civil society, irrelevant to the dynamics of state–society relations.
Acknowledgements
The observations in this article are based on a period of work in Osh, Kyrgyzstan in 2004–2005, followed by research conducted in summer 2008 for an MSc dissertation at the School of Oriental and African Studies and supplemented by informal interviews with NGO activists in London and correspondence with NGO activists in Kyrgyzstan. I am indebted to these activists for their invaluable commentary and insights on the Kyrgyzstani NGO sector. I am also indebted to Stefan Kirmse for sharing chapters of his unpublished PhD thesis and Deniz Kandiyoti for her direction and assistance throughout the research and writing process.
Notes
‘Empowerment’ and ‘grassroots’ are overused and ambiguous terms in development literature and it is therefore necessary to clarify their use in this paper: the term ‘grassroots empowerment’ is used to denote the ability to ‘give voice to citizens and enhance their influence on the political process’ in contrast to the voice and influence of the dominant ‘economic and political elites’ of a society, as described by USAID's Democracy and Governance Office's civil society agenda (USAID Citation2005). The term ‘grassroots’ is not used here to make a distinction between the level (i.e. community level or village level) of a development intervention, as it is used in some donor literature to distinguish community-based organizations from NGOs (e.g. see Aga Khan Development Network Citation2008). ‘Grassroots empowerment’ should be understood in the context of this paper as the provision of agency to ordinary people to act on what they perceive to be of value.
According to a 2006 survey, only 514 of 8284 registered NGOs in Kyrgyzstan remain active (ACSSC Citation2006, p. 8).
See, for example, civil society definition and approaches on World Bank civil society webpages (World Bank Citation2008).
See USAID Citation(2007) for brief analysis of donor dependence.
Interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 5 July 2008.
NGO politicization is criticized by representatives of donor organizations (e.g. Eurasia Foundation Citation2007, p. 7), commentary and analysis from within the Kyrgyzstani third sector (e.g. Tretii sektor Citation2007, p. 55), local media and analysis (e.g. Gazeta Citation2007; Akhmatakhunov 2007) and some academic papers (e.g. Matveeva Citation2008, p. 9).
A further way in which it might be suggested that NGO activists are being ‘coopted’ or ‘used’ for political purposes is that since the stipulation that one-third of candidates on political party lists are to be female was introduced in 2007 the political elite has apparently approached the female-dominated NGO sector to make up numbers (interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 5 June 2008).
Some donors are reported to be taking credit for the ‘democratic revolution’ (which was, in fact, far from being based on democratic principles) by attributing a major role to NGOs that they have supported, even though there is little evidence of NGO involvement in the popular mobilization (Heathershaw Citation2007).
Interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 12 June 2008.
See, for example, the collection of articles by Kyrgyzstani NGO activists in Civil society and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan: view from within (ACSSC Citation2005); Account of the National NGO Forum 2007 (ACSSC Citation2007); the local NGO journal Tretii Sektor [The Third Sector] (Citation2007); and the Eurasia Foundation survey (Citation2007) (this survey interviewed both donors and local NGO activists about their relations and, interestingly, while donors claimed that their grantees needed to develop more ‘self-awareness’, the responses of the NGO activists display a high degree of self-awareness; this is perhaps indicative of some donors' lack of knowledge and understanding of their grantees).
Personal communication with NGO employee, July 2008 (emphasis added by author).
Interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 3 July 2008.
These are the most commonly given reasons for establishing NGOs in Kyrgyzstan (ACSSC Citation2006, p. 34).
S. Bagyshbekov, Freedom House (quoted in Shishkaraeva et al. Citation2006, p. 209).
Personal communication with various NGO staff and activists while living and working in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 2004–2005.
Simon Forrester of the International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) office in Bishkek confirms this view in his 2005 report, claiming that the NGO sector shows ‘creative and educated leadership’ that outstrips other sectors in terms of ‘credibility and capacity to innovate’ (Forrester Citation2005).
Statement made by E. Voronina (of Interbilim NGO) at roundtable ‘The Role of the NGO Sector in Democratic Society’, September 2007, (Soros Foundation and AUCA 2007, p. 15).
Personal communication with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, 11 July 2008.
Interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 12 June 2008.
Edil Baisalov joined the moderate Social Democrats, while the others listed here joined Ata Meken. Four to five other NGO activists have joined the presidential party, Ak Jol. There has also been discussion of forming a new political party based on the consolidation of several NGOs (see discussion below).
Personal communication with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, 11 July 2008.
Personal communication with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, 11 July 2008.
Comment made by Edil Baisalov (quoted in Seyward Citation2007).
A minimum of 0.5% must now be won by each party in every oblast in order to gain any seats in the parliament.
Despite the introduction of the party list system in the new constitution, it is rumoured that places on the party lists are sold to the highest bidder, meaning that the wealthy and well connected are in the strongest position to enter parliament (interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 3 July 2008).
This statement was made by political analyst A. Cholponkulova during a presentation at the roundtable ‘Nine Months After: The Winter of Kyrgyzstan's Spring Hope?’, 17 December 2005 (AUCA Citation2005); Ibraimov Citation(2008) notes that the capacity of government has deteriorated further since minor state officials, teachers, artists, sportsmen, etc. were elected into parliament via Ak Jol's party list in 2007.
The term ‘moral guiding force’ was used by one informant to describe how NGO activists might influence Kyrgyzstani politics (interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 5 June 2008). Shishkaraeva et al. confirm this view in their analysis of the influence of NGO leaders.
Interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 5 June 2008.
See interview with Edil Baisalov in Roberts (2007). While some might be concerned that funding cuts to NGOs will cause them to cease activities, I would argue that the activists working in the NGO sector are innovative and capable of developing alternative strategies for funding. A women's activist revealed, for example, that in her bid to become more independent of donor expectations (and the restrictions of a specific NGO mission), she has established herself as an independent/freelance consultant to international organizations and is able to work together with other women's activists in an independent ‘thinktank’ that is not reliant on any source of funding (interview with Kyrgyzstani NGO activist, London, 12 June 2008).
For example, a roundtable held at the IPP on 30 March 2006.
According to the global international financial institution watchdog Bankwatch, Kyrgyzstani NGOs received data and evidence from a global network of anti-HIPC activists. See www.bankwatch.org.
Other cases of spaces for alternative views being opened up through NGO activists' initiatives include the holding of a parallel ‘public parliament’ to ‘discuss and propose alternative viewpoints on the most important issues relating to the country's public, political and economic life’ (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] Citation2008a); and a recent ‘public trial’ of the 2002 civilian shootings in Aksy after the official trial acquitted high-ranking officials of blame (RFE/RL Citation2008b). The demonstrations and protest over the privatization of utilities constitute another case of NGO actions allowing people to form/express their opinion with regard to the government's policies while the government was attempting to make decisions behind closed doors. There has been little or no debate on the issue in parliament, so the public debate organized by NGOs (with political allies) is the only means through which the public is informed and able to take a stand on this issue (Eurasia Daily Monitor Citation2008). Furthermore, Giffen et al. (Citation2005, pp. 163–172) have shown that NGO activities are opening up such spaces at the local level in regions all over Kyrgyzstan and that these have provided opportunities for popular unrest and resistance, and have been a way of achieving leverage for the poor.
The information here is taken mostly from Naumann and Usmanalieva's (2008) detailed description of the events surrounding the UPRW.
Disputes concerned late or non-payment of wages, dilapidation of the railway and unproductive administrative staff, as well as nepotistic and political appointments of the heads of Kyrgyzstani Railways.
By helping to increase the agency of the population in its own development, these strategies have the potential to give NGO activists the type of trusteeship that is required of legitimate agents of development (see Cowen and Shenton Citation1996, p. ix).
It might be argued that, since NGOs have become involved in influencing agendas around issues of social justice and poverty reduction, they do actually represent the grassroots by representing directly relevant issues. However, it seems that, while some professional NGO activists have indeed taken up issues that affect poor or marginalized members of society, they still lack a popular mandate to represent them. In other words, the legitimacy/constituency issue is not eliminated by professional NGO activists identifying some locally relevant issues and choosing to address them. NGOs remain professional organizations without the connections to the population at large which would warrant calling them ‘representatives’ of the poor and which would provide ordinary citizens a direct voice in policy debates. Gaining legitimacy and constituency requires the sector to undertake certain changes, some of which may be occurring already. For this reason, I find Howell and Pearce's (2001) ‘alternative approach’ to civil society useful for understanding the current position and activities of NGO activists in Kyrgyzstan.