![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
The growing occurrence and intensity of disasters pose complex risks to national security, yet intelligence agencies do not possess the expertise to identify and assess emerging hazards effectively. Greater cooperation with experts outside the intelligence community, particularly scientists and local experts with valuable information, can allow effective warnings in advance of catastrophic events. This article makes an argument for strategic disaster intelligence, using two cases of major earthquakes and tsunamis to illustrate both disaster warning failures and opportunities for more effective disaster and risk mitigation.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. We are also grateful to Frederick Hardman Lea for his help with cascade modelling.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1. USGS, “Remembering Mount Pinatubo.”
2. Clarke and Eddy, Warnings: Finding Cassandras.
3. Dumaine, “On a Global Foresight.” and See also Bean, “Rhetorical and Critical/Cultural Intelligence.”
4. Zenko, “The Coronavirus is the Worst;” Bronskill, “COVID-19 a ‘Failure of Early Warning’;” Breakspear, and “COVID-19, A Major Failure of Intelligence.”
5. Liljedahl et al., “Medical and Environmental Intelligence.”
6. For example, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Strategic Foresight Initiative.
7. See Lacassin et al., “Rapid Collaborative Knowledge.” At times, disaster intelligence is also related to weather intelligence – for example, the US Air Force has its own weather intelligence office with associated special operations forces. See Rempfer, “Spec Ops Weathermen.”
8. Briggs, “Developing Strategic and Operational Environmental Intelligence.”
9. Our intention here is not to sketch out a full picture of disaster intelligence, with practical steps and suggestions to overcome obstacles. A number of institutional, bureaucratic, cognitive, and communication problems that would be relevant in disaster intelligence have been discussed elsewhere (e.g, Pidgeon et al., The Social Amplification of Risk; Covello, von Winterfeldt, and Slovic, “Communicating Scientific Information;” and Cohen, March, and Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”).
10. For example, Buzan, Weaver, and de Wilde, Security: A New Framework; Dalby et al., “Environmental Security Concepts.”
11. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy; Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities.”
12. Butts, “The Case for DOD.”
13. Dalby, “The Environment as Geopolitical Threat;” and Barnett, “Security and Climate Change.”
14. Weir and Virani, “Three Linked Risks.”
15. Matejova and Briggs, “Like Oil and Water.”
16. Belhabib et al., “The Fisheries of Africa.”
17. Dumaine and Mintzer, “Confronting Climate Change.”
18. See Riley et al., Natural Hazard Uncertainty Assessment.
19. For example, Barnea, “Strategic Intelligence;” and Omand, “The Coastline of the Future.”
20. Wolfberg, “Full-spectrum Analysis.”
21. Paskal, The Vulnerability of Energy Infrastructure.
22. Andregg, “All Source Intelligence Tradecraft.”
23. Kramer, “A Failure to Communicate;” and Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report.
24. Zeytoonian, “Intelligent Design.”
25. Ostergard, “The West Africa Ebola Outbreak.”
26. Blaikie, “The Tsunami of 2004 in Sri Lanka;” and Gaillard et al., “Wave of Peace?”.
27. For example, Parker, “Who’s Still Fighting Climate Change?”.
28. Bean, No More Secrets; Ostergard, “The West Africa Ebola.”
29. Devi, “US Public Health Budget.”
30. Funes, “The Navy Created.”
31. See Wirtz, Understanding Intelligence Failure; Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures.”
32. Marrin, “Preventing Intelligence Failures,” 666.
33. Gentry, “Intelligence Failure Reframed,” 249.
34. Ibid., 249.
35. Wirtz, Understanding Intelligence Failure,15.
36. Dover et al., Routledge Companion, 29.
37. Fryer et al., “Source of the Great Tsunami.”
38. See Mooallem, This is Chance.
39. Moment magnitude scale (Mw) measuring the total energy released by an earthquake. See https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/moment-magnitude-richter-scale-what-are-different-magnitude-scales-and-why-are-there-so-many?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products.
40. See TETJSG, “Nationwide Field Survey.”
41. Noegerath, “Fukushima: The Myth of Safety.”
42. McCann, “Japan’s Energy Security Challenges.”
43. See note 41 above.
44. Abe, Sugeno, and Chigama, “Estimation of the Height;” Minoura et al., “The 869 Jogan Tsunami;” and Minoura and Shyu Nakaya, “Traces of Tsunami Preserved.”
45. See note 41 above.
46. Kaczur, Aurelio, and Joloya. An Analysis of United States Naval Participation in Operation Tomodachi.
47. Burke, “16 US ships.”
48. Johnston, “Oi ruling could signal trouble.”
49. Hayashi and Hughes, “The Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Its Effect.”
50. BBC, “Germany: Nuclear Power Plants.”
51. Wittneben, “The Impact of the Fukushima.”
52. Grossi, Heim, and Waterson,“The Impact of the German Response.”
53. Briggs and Matejova, Disaster Security, 92–100.
54. For example, Lahneman, “Outsourcing the IC’s Stovepipes?”.
55. Quiggin, “Seeing the invisible,” 184.
56. Schwartz and Randal, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario; the CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat.
57. Hendrix and Salehyan, “Climate Change, Rainfall.”
58. The Port of Los Angeles, “Annual Facts and Figures.”
59. USGS, “SAFRR Tsunami Scenario.”
60. Estimates are in 2010 US dollars.
61. Dura et al., “Changing Impacts.”
62. Refers to “Representative Concentration Pathway.”
63. GlobalInt, “Hawaiian Infrastructure Security.”
64. McConnachie and Tudge, The Rough Guide; de Young et al, and “Death Was Not in the Agenda.”
65. Danyk and Briggs, “Features of Ensuring Cybersecurity.”
66. Rosoff and Von Winterfeldt, “A Risk and Economic Analysis.”
67. Briggs and Matejova, Disaster Security.
68. For example, Bean, “Rhetorical and Critical/Cultural.”
69. Friedman and Zeckhauser, “Assessing Uncertainty in Intelligence.”
70. See Briggs and Matejova, Disaster Security, 74–75.
71. Lenton, “Early Warning.”
72. For example, Schoemaker, Day, and Snyder, “Integrating Organizational Networks;” and Rossel, “Early Detection.”
73. See Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision;” and Kahn, “The Intelligence Failure.”
74. Bean, No More Secrets.
75. Walsh, “Improving ‘Five Eyes’.”
76. Fountain, “Scientists Warn.”
77. Reuters, “Forest Fire;” and Philipps, “An Air Force Base.”
78. See note 21 above.
79. Wolbers et al., “A Systematic Review.”
80. USGS, “President’s FY22 Budget.”
81. Betts and Mahnken, “Politicization of Intelligence;” Zscheischler et al., “Future Climate Risk;” Lenton et al., “Climate tipping points.”
82. Steinhäusler, “Gap Analysis.”
Additional information
Funding
Notes on contributors
Chad M. Briggs
Chad M. Briggs holds a PhD in political science from Carleton University in Canada, and currently serves with the US State Department. Briggs has previously worked on climate, disaster, and conflict issues in Alaska, Ukraine, Kosovo, and was Minerva Chair and Professor of Energy and Environmental Security with the US Air Force. Also, previously a senior intelligence advisor for the US Department of Energy, Briggs has developed environmental scenario planning methods that translate scientific data into risk and threat assessments. He has published on disaster planning, climate security, post-conflict reconstruction, public health, and hybrid/cyber warfare. (All views expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the US State Dept. or the federal government.)
Miriam Matejova
Miriam Matejova is an assistant professor in political science at the Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University and a fellow at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. She holds a PhD in political science from the University of British Columbia. She has published articles on energy and environmental security, global environmental activism, foreign intelligence, and international conflict management.
Robert Weiss
Robert Weiss is a Professor of Natural Hazard in the Department of Geosciences at Virginia Tech. He directs the Virginia Tech’s Center for Coastal Studies, the graduate education program in Disaster Resilience and Risk Management, and the Academy of Integrated Science in Virginia Tech’s College of Science. He has authored and co-authored over 60 publications on the impact of coastal hazards, especially tsunamis.