‘Making the intelligence product of greater use to those for whom it is produced’: lessons from the National Security Council Intelligence Committee, 1971–1976

ABSTRACT

This article examines the role played by the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) and its working group in responding to senior policymaker criticism of IC analytic products. Established in December 1971 and abolished four years later, the NSCIC has received scant attention from intelligence historians despite representing in some ways the most ambitious initiative ever attempted to involve consumers in determining what intelligence was produced and evaluating its quality and usefulness. The NSCIC’s problematic history highlights the challenges still confronting the IC and the study of it may suggest ways to make future intelligence products more useful to consumers.

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Dr Douglas Garthoff, Professor Richard Immerman, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and insights on an earlier draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. The words ‘making the intelligence product of greater use to those for whom it is produced’ appear in a talking paper prepared for General Samuel Wilson to open an NSCIC Working Group “Critique of Intelligence” session on 20 November 1974. This document can be found via the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). CREST is available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/search_archive.asp. Documents located in the CREST database are henceforth referenced by their subject, date, and Agency Action Identifier, followed by the box, folder, and document number. Subsequent citations of the same source include only the Agency Action Identifier. Critique of ‘Intelligence Shortcomings, ND, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100090005-1.

2. The views expressed in this publication are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of Director of National Intelligence or any other U.S. Government agency.

3. Memo for Sec State et al, Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, 5 November 1971, CIA-RDP73B00296R000400010003-4.

4. Ford, 19–20.

5. Garthoff, 70, 72–4, 89–90, 96, 98, 100, 103, 106–07, 114–15.

6. Betts, 72. See also Pulcini who briefly touches on the NSCIC as part of the larger effort to improve the IC’s estimative process.

7. Davies, Intelligence and Government, Chapter 10, `DCI Agonistes, 1972–1991’.

8. Colby, Honorable Men and Kissinger, Years of Renewal.

9. See for example Warner & McDonald, US Intelligence Community Reform and Odom, Fixing Intelligence.

10. Helgerson, ‘Intelligence Support for Richard M. Nixon’, 103, 110; Hathaway, Richard Helms: As Director, 8–13; and Andrew, For the President’s Eyes, 350–96.

11. Memo, Conversation with Andrew Marshall, 4 May 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040008-8. For more on senior consumer dissatisfaction with IC efforts, see Krepinevich and Watts, The Last Warrior, 77–81, and Smith, ‘Intelligence Production’.

12. ‘A Review of the Intelligence Community’, 10 March 1971, CIA-RDP86B00269R001100030005-1. For an excellent discussion of the March 1971 report, see Warner, ‘Reading the Riot Act’, 387–417.

13. CIA-RDP73B00296R000400010003-4.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. The NSCIC was chaired by the President’s National Security Advisor and had as members the number twos from State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Attorney General, and the DCI.

16. CIA-RDP73B00296R000400010003-4.

17. A Proposed Plan for the Development of an Intelligence Product Improvement Program, 23 November 1971, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050026-2. On 1 March 1972, as part of DCI Helms' response to the President’s November 1971 memorandum, which directed him to strengthen his IC role, the NIPE Staff headed by Tweedy was renamed the IC Staff, and his title was changed to Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC).

18. Ibid.

19. Memo, First Meeting of National Security Council Intelligence Committee, 3 December 1971, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100060005-4.

20. Ibid.

21. Meeting Notes on the First Meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, December 13, 1971, 16 December 1971, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020027-4.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Memo, NSCIC Working Group, 27 January 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050020-8.

26. Memo, Notes on Second Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 4 February 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020026-5.

27. Ibid. Also NSCIC Working Group, Minutes of the Second Meeting, 4 February 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020025-6. See Memo, Notes on Second Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 4 February 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020026-5, which notes Marshall indicated that Kissinger, upon being queried, had stated a desire for product evaluations of the intelligence contributions to NSSMs.

28. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020026-5 and NSCIC Working Group, Minutes of the Second Meeting, 4 February 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020025-6. Partly underlying these sentiments was the study completed in response to NSCIC tasking that examined multiple IC surveys completed between 1955 and 1971 and concluded: ‘The record of attempts to survey consumer reaction to intelligence publications in order that intelligence producers better understand how to make their products more useful is not encouraging’. Consumer Reaction to Intelligence Products: A Historical Review, 29 February 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000900020001-7.

29. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020026-5 and Memo, Minutes of the 4 February Meeting, 8 February 1972, CIA-RDP8400506R000100020024-7.

30. Memo, Notes on Fourth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 13 June 1972, 14 June 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0. In June, the Working Group’s terms of reference were approved without change.

31. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0.

32. Ibid and NSCIC Working Group, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, 13 June 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020020-1.

33. FRUS, 1969–1976, Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 30 June 1972, Doc. 279.

34. Memo, Notes on Sixth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 3 October 1972, 3 October 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020016-6.

35. Memo, NSCIC, India-Pakistan Crisis Study, 5 October 1972, CIA-RDP98-00204R000100140074-4.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Memo, Agenda for 29 November NSCIC Meeting, 27 November 1972, LOC-HAK-301-9-2-5 and Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence, NSCIC Comments on India-Pakistan Study, 29 November 1972, CIA-RDP98-00204R000100140097-9.

39. LOC-HAK-301-9-2-5.

40. Memo, Progress Report on Product Improvement Program, 6 September 1972, CIA-RDP98-00204R000100140040-1.

41. Ibid.

42. Proposed Presentation to the DCI on Activities of the NSCIC Working Group, 15 February 1973, CIA-RDP00506R000100060002-7.

43. Memo, NSCIC, 1 March 1973, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110010-8. Marshall’s pessimistic assessment of the NSCIC working group’s progress was indicative of his overall view of the IC. Writing Kissinger five months earlier, Marshall remarked: ‘I share, I believe, your doubts that the intelligence bureaucracy can even routinely produce the high quality intelligence analysis you would find satisfactory. But they can do a lot better than they are now doing’. FRUS, 1969–1976, Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 24 November 1972, Doc. 287.

44. Ibid.

45. Memorandum for William Colby, 22 May 1973, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110004-5.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid. A year earlier in a progress report on the NSCIC working group sent to Kissinger, Marshall had observed: ‘There is nothing equivalent to consumer or market research undertaken by the intelligence community. They show almost no real effort to understand what the consumers need’. FRUS, 1969–1976, Memorandum From the Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council (Marshall) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), 30 June 1972, Doc. 279.

49. Memo for General Allen, NSCIC and NSCIC Working Group, 5 July 1973, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100010020-2.

50. Memo for Chairman NSCIC, NSCIC and NSCIC Working Group, 31 July 1973, CIA-RDP84B00508R000100040086-7.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid. Two of the four recommendations were acted on. The recommendation to include the Under Secretary of Treasury in the NSCIC was adopted in April 1974 and LTG Scowcroft was appointed to head the NSCIC working group in July 1975.

53. Memo, Lunch with Director of Central Intelligence, Friday, 14 September 1973, 14 September 1973, LOC-HAK-39-3-10-4.

54. Ibid. In September 1973, Nixon fired William Rogers as Secretary of State and replaced him with Kissinger.

55. Memo, Agenda for Upcoming NSCIC Meeting, 10 January 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100040047-0.

56. See Graham’s recommendations in Memo, NSCIC, Membership of the NSCIC Working Group, DCI/74–0964, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100040035-3.

57. Letter, 10 September 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200030004-7. The note announcing the NSCIC Working Group reconstitution came from Scowcroft on Kissinger’s behalf: Letter, 18 October 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180045-7.

58. The ‘consumer/user’ representatives at the 30 October meeting were: George Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at State Department; Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) at Defense; William Morrell, Special Assistant to the Secretary on National Security at Treasury; Lieutenant General Elder, Director, J-5, (Plans and Policy) for the JCS; and Richard Ober, who represented Kissinger and served as the Executive Secretary of the NSCIC. See Memo, NSCIC Working Group and Its Intelligence Panel, October 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200080005-1 and ICS Activities Report No.5, 12 November 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000700030014-1.

59. Besides Wilson, the Intelligence Panel consisted of Ed Proctor, CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence; George Carver, Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence Officers; William McAfee, Deputy Director of INR/State; LGEN Eugene Tighe, Deputy Director of DIA; and the Deputy Director for Operations at NSA. See Memo, 11 December 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180041-1.

60. Ibid.

61. Memo, Agenda for 25 October Meeting of Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group, 24 October 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180035-8.

62. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100180035-8 and Memo for D/DCI/IC, A Program for the Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group, 25 October 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200080006-0.

63. Memo, Amended Minutes of Past Two Meetings, 19 December 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200100001-2.

64. Ibid.

65. Inputs for the Critique of Intelligence at the NSCIC Working Group Meeting on 20 November 1974, 20 November 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100090018-7.

66. Ibid.

67. NSCIC Working Group, Minutes of the Tenth Meeting, Amended as of 17 December 1974, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020007-6.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Memo, Program for the NSCIC Working Group, 7 December 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200040003-7.

75. Ibid and Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working Group, Third Meeting, Minutes, 10 March 1975, CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200005-2.

76. Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, Amended, 29 January 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020006-7.

77. NSCIC, Working Group, Minutes of Twelfth Meeting, 12 March 1975, CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200003-4 and Memo for LTG Scowcroft, The NSCIC Working Group, Draft 23 July 1975, CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200022-3.

78. Memo for D/DCI/IC, Commitments from 2 July NSCIC Working Group Meeting, 7 July 1975, CIARDP84B00506R000100130018–2 and Memo, Documents for NSCIC Working Group, 24 October 1975, CIARDP84B00506R000100150012–6.

79. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020006-7.

80. The IC Product Review Division began systematically evaluating IC analytic products in late 1974. See Marchio, ‘Review of National Intelligence’, 15–31.

81. Letter, New Business for 20 May Meeting of the NSCIC Working Group, 21 May 1975, CIARDP84B00506R000100120014–7.

82. Memo, NSCIC Working Group Action Program on the Evaluation of Intelligence Community Product, 24 June 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100130025-4; and Memo for NSCIC Working Group, 27 June 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100130024-5. The actual minutes of the 2 July session are Draft Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of National Security Council Intelligence Committee Working Group, 2 July 1975, CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200023-2.

83. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100130025-4.

84. The criteria Mr. Ober proposed to use in evaluating intelligence products – timeliness, clarity, relevancy, uniqueness, accuracy, completeness, identification and evaluation of sources, and resolution or evaluation of conflicting reports – is certainly reflected in Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Tradecraft, which was first promulgated in 2007 and revised and reissued in 2015. ICD 203 contains five analytic standards: Objective, Independent of Political Considerations, Timely, Based on all available sources of intelligence, and implements and exhibits analytic tradecraft standards, Exhibits analytic tradecraft standards encompasses nine criteria: quality and credibility of sources, expressing and explaining uncertainty surrounding analytic judgments, distinguishing between underlying intelligence information and analyst’s assumptions and judgments, incorporates analysis of alternatives, demonstrates customer relevance, uses clear and logical argumentation, explains change or consistency of analytic judgments, makes accurate judgments, and incorporates effective visual information where appropriate.

85. NSCIC Working Group Action Program, Evaluation of Intelligence Product, N.D., CIA-RDP84B00506R000100130026-3.

86. CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200023-2.

87. NSCIC Working Group, Draft Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting, 22 October 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020002-1.

88. Memo, Product Distribution Lists, 15 August 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100140009-1 and CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020002-1.

89. Ibid.

90. Memo, Background for NSCIC Working Group Meeting, 22 October 1975, 20 October 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050029-9 and CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020002-1. The outline for the final report is at Outline for IEP’s Final Report, Selected Major Intelligence Publications: The Consumer’s View, 21 October 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070006-2.

91. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020002-1.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Memo, 28 October 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070002-6 and Evaluation of, 23 September 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070005-3.

95. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070002-6.

96. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070005-3.

97. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100070002-6.

98. Memo, Critique of Intelligence Estimates, No date but probably 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100110001-2.

99. Ibid.

100. OSD Product Evaluation Report NIAM 35/36-2-75, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150007-2. Of note, Kissinger sent a memo to President Ford forwarding this assessment and summarizing its conclusions. An earlier note from Kissinger’s staff had recommended doing so, stating ‘this NIAM is a considerable improvement on the earlier one on the same subject published last November’. Memo, from Henry A. Kissinger, Intelligence Analysis of Conflict Scenarios in Another Arab/Israeli War, 29 June 1975, LOC-HAK-74-2-8-9.

101. Memo, Evaluation of NIAM 35/36-2-75, 3 November 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150006-3 and Memo for Chairman, NSCIC Working Group, 20 November 1975, DoD Evaluation of NIAM 35/36-2-75, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100150003-6.

102. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes, 415–16.

103. Memo, An Overview of NSCIC, the NSCIC Working Group, and Other Consumer Contacts, 25 November 1975, CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210004-6.

104. Executive Order 11,905: United States Foreign Intelligence Activities (fas.org).

105. US Congress, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 48. For an example of the NSC Semiannual Intelligence Review, based on 100 interviews, see Semiannual NSC Intelligence Review, An Assessment of National Foreign Intelligence Production, Vol II Annex, ND, CIA-RDP82M00311R000100280001-1.

106. Several background papers and memos circulated in early 1976 reflect the view that the NSCIC’s disestablishment was no real loss. One memo asserted the NSCIC’s ‘inactivity has been no great loss’. See Memo, Proposed Reorganization of the National Intelligence Structure, 30 January 1976, CIA-RDP91M00696R000900070007-4.

107. Memo, NSCIC Record on Action Requests, 5 November 1973, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200030016-4 and Actions Submitted to the NSCIC to Date, 5 November 1973, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100040081-2. In an interview conducted with Thomas by Ford in 1987 he reiterated his view that the NSCIC achieved nothing—’it simply wasn’t Kissinger’s style’. See Ford, William E. Colby, 20.

108. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100010020-2.

109. For complaints about too many intelligence representatives in the Working Group, see CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020021-0; Memo, 29 May 1973, CIA-RDP82M00531R000400240023-4; and Memo, LTG Graham, IC Staff Member, Mr. Robert Macy, Murphy Commission, 28 August 1974, CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160058-0.

110. CIA-RDP91M00696R001000040002-0.

111. Role of NSCIC Working Group, 15 April1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100010007-7.

112. Terms of Reference of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee Working Group, ND, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050018-1 and Terms of Reference of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee Working Group, 1 January 1973, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100010025-7.

113. Memo, Improving the NSCIC Study Program, 12 December 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110018-0; NSCIC, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting, 3 October 1972, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020015-7; Memo, Lam Son 719, 5 December 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110020-7; and Memo, Establishing Permanent Review Group, 18 December 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110014-4.

114. John Huizenga noted that not all products are produced for consumers, asserting: ‘Analysts must exercise to be in a condition of readiness – they are not working at all times for the consumer’. See Memo, Notes on Eighth Meeting, NSCIC Working Group, 9 May 1973, 9 May 1973, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100020009-4.

115. Ibid.

116. Memo, 11 February 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000800030004-1.

117. DCI Helms departed in February 1973 while Schlesinger served only six months before becoming Secretary of Defense in July 1973. Colby took over from the Acting Director Lt General Vernon Walters in September 1973, serving until January 1976. General Allen assumed Tweedy’s role as D/DCI/IC in 1973 followed several months later by General Graham who left in July 1974, replaced by General Wilson who remained until early in 1976.

118. CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200023-2. See Hardy, ‘Intelligence Reform in the mid-1970s’, 1–15 for a detailed discussion of the impact of these inquiries on the IC.

119. Memo, 13 December 1973, CIA-RDP86B00269R000600030021-9. The D/DCI/NIO, in a remark at an Intelligence Working Group session, said that he ‘doubted that, given the personality and operating methods of its chairman, the NSCIC would really become a functioning entity, and noted the limitation this posed to the effectiveness of a Working Group’. CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200005-2. See Memo, Next Meeting of the NSCIC, 14 June 1973, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100080028-7 for an example of Kissinger cancelling a NSCIC session because of a Brezhnev summit meeting visit in June 1973.

120. CIA-RDP80M01133A000600210004-6.

121. Memo, NSCIC, 1 March 1973, CIA-RDP82M00531R000400230014-5.

122. Memo, 28 August 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000900100005-4. For a discussion of IC concerns over politicization during this period, see Smith, ‘Intelligence Production’ and Ford’s William E. Colby. For a lucid discussion of how intelligence analysts can work closely with policymakers while avoiding politicization, see Miller, ‘Intelligence and Policy’, 35–9.

123. Memo, Conference with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff, 12 July 1972, CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110030-6.

124. Memo, Background for NSCIC Working Group Meeting, 8 October 1975, CIA-RDP84B00506R000100050030-7.

125. CIA-RDP84B00506R000100010007-7.

126. Ibid. Based on the declassified records currently available, it is unclear how DCI Colby viewed the NSCIC and its Working Group. The correspondence I have discovered suggests he was ambivalent. Commenting on proposed topics for an anticipated NSCIC meeting in January 1974, Colby advised that he did not want to raise the subject of the NSCIC Working Group at this session, noting ‘he would prefer to operate without use of the Working Group, handling matters by ad hoc groups where necessary, but generally having the NSCIC function much as the 40 Committee does’. See Memo, NSCIC Meeting Programmed for Near Future, 11 January 1974, CIA-RDP80M01082A000200030014-6.

127. CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100200022-3.

128. CIA-RDP91M00696R001000040002-0.

129. CSI, Intelligence Monograph, National Estimates: An Assessment of the Product and Process, April 1977, CIA-RDP80-00630A000300040001-3.

130. OMB Staff Report, Intelligence Production and Customer Satisfaction: Results of a Survey, May 1978, CIA-RDP86B0269R001300040001-2; and Seminar Report: The Relationship Between Intelligence Producers and Consumers: Theory Practice, 7 December 1979, CSI, CIA-RDP80-00630A000300130001-3.

131. Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council System – The White House.

132. ICD 204 at ICD_204_National_Intelligence_Priorities_Framework_U_FINAL-SIGNED.pdf (dni.gov); Air Force Handbook 14–133, 40–41.

133. CIA-RDP98-00204R000100140074-4.

134. Mulligan and Schmitt, ‘What the Intelligence Community’.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

James Marchio

James Marchio, Ph.D., Colonel, United States Air Force, Ret., is a Professor Emeritus at the National Intelligence University (NIU) where he taught and served as the Associate Dean for the College of Strategic Intelligence before retiring in 2020. Prior to joining NIU, he served for 11 years in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Analytic Integrity & Standards Group. This followed a 26-year career in the United States Air Force during which he served in a range of service, joint, and combined assignments encompassing intelligence planning, collection, and analysis.