Tied to a Tree: Culture and Self-Reflexivity

Abstract

Comparative rhetoricians are heavily involved in textual interpretation, and the quality of the interpretation largely depends on how self-reflexive the interpreter is. However, within the disciplines of textual studies there is little specific guidance on how to improve self-reflexivity. This essay is intended to ameliorate this situation by drawing on and synthesizing the relevant literatures from such areas as cultural anthropology, qualitative research, and critical theory. I begin by outlining the disputes over the concept of self-reflexivity. I then move to the different spheres that have been proposed for self-reflexivity; these spheres range from accidents of individual psychology to historical circumstances to webs of power and privilege. Next I describe the most useful techniques for refining self-reflexivity, mapping out their theoretical and practical complexities. Throughout the essay I pull from my work on traditional Chinese rhetoric for cautionary examples. I conclude with some words of warning and of encouragement.

Notes

¹Liu Jun, the first commentator on the Shishuo xinyu, added this information to the original anecdote. The first section is taken from Wang Yin's Jin shu (fourth century CE); the second from (Jin) zhongxing shu by He Fasheng (fifth century CE).

²Douglas Macbeth briefly discusses these “problems of recursion and regress for the reflexive exercise” and he references more in-depth analyses of the philosophical issues involved (39).

³See, for instance, Linda Finlay, whose article explores this topic at length.

⁴I am indebted to LuMing Mao for contributing this insight as he responded to this article.

⁵Mao's turn to Geertz represents an evolution from his earlier use of the problematic terms emic and etic (“Reflective”), problematic because etic is usually considered the better theorized, more comprehensive, and thus superior member of the pair.

⁶Joel Robbins and Alan Rumsey note that the effect of Geertz's very influential 1974 essay “From the Native's Point of View” was to make claims of empathetic understanding unfashionable, but they argue that nevertheless “a capacity like empathy is central to anthropological fieldwork techniques” (416–417).

⁷Rumsey observes that the term “empathy” may seem problematic in this context because it is usually associated with vicarious experience of another's painful, not positive, emotions or thoughts, and also that empathy is associated with benevolent, not malevolent, associations (217–218).