Success of economic sanctions threats: coercion, information and commitment

Figures & data

Figure 1. Shortest paths between France and any other country in the Formal Alliance diplomatic network

Figure 2. Top: diplomatic network of all countries based on the Formal Alliance data. Bottom: clusters from the above diplomatic network plotted on a map

Table 1. Summary statistics

Variables	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Threat	1,412	0.746	0.436	0	1
Imposition	1,412	0.598	0.490	0	1
Success	1,412	0.408	0.492	0	1
Expected cost sender	875	1.056	0.240	1	3
Expected cost target	863	1.246	0.498	1	3
Dependence target	811	0.170	0.193	0	0.935
Path	1,058	1.432	0.696	1	5
Alliance	1,058	0.663	0.473	0	1
Democracy score sender (Polity IV)	1,269	8.437	3.268	0	10
Democracy score target (Polity IV)	1,293	6.399	4.079	0	10
Democracy score sender (PR)	1,239	0.829	0.377	0	1
Electoral democracy sender (V-Dem)	1,319	0.699	0.264	0.0130	0.913
Liberal democracy sender (V-Dem)	1,271	0.611	0.267	0.0130	0.865
Freedom of expression sender (V-Dem)	1,271	0.795	0.280	0.0130	0.982
US	1,412	0.521	0.500	0	1
Salience	1,412	0.483	0.500	0	1
Security	1,412	0.305	0.461	0	1
Multilateral	1,412	0.262	0.440	0	1
Past commitment	1,247	2.327	0.599	1	3

Table 2. Estimation results for the economic cost mechanism. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses: *** indicates $p<0.01$, ** indicates $p<0.05$ and * indicate $p<0.1$

Variables	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio
Success
Expected cost target	5.862***	4.919***
	($\pm$ 2.087)	($\pm$ 1.540)
Imposition		1.077		0.644
		($\pm$ 0.639)		($\pm$ 0.214)
Imposition * Expected cost target		0.639
		($\pm$ 0.302)
Dependence target			8.765**	12.45***
			($\pm$ 8.491)	($\pm$ 11.74)
Imposition * Dependence target				0.360
				($\pm$ 0.433)
Democracy score target	0.947	0.966	0.947	0.951*
	($\pm$ 0.0326)	($\pm$ 0.0233)	($\pm$ 0.0344)	($\pm$ 0.0275)
Path	0.916	1.175	1.027	1.247
	($\pm$ 0.169)	($\pm$ 0.158)	($\pm$ 0.210)	($\pm$ 0.202)
US	1.312	1.461*	1.590	1.587
	($\pm$ 0.404)	($\pm$ 0.322)	($\pm$ 0.742)	($\pm$ 0.573)
Salience	0.680	1.027	0.711	1.119
	($\pm$ 0.257)	($\pm$ 0.268)	($\pm$ 0.262)	($\pm$ 0.322)
Security	0.558	0.991	1.518	1.807*
	($\pm$ 0.235)	($\pm$ 0.293)	($\pm$ 0.654)	($\pm$ 0.584)
Multilateral	1.284	1.258	3.693***	2.948***
	($\pm$ 0.458)	($\pm$ 0.314)	($\pm$ 1.733)	($\pm$ 0.995)
Past commitment	2.002***	1.529**	1.563*	1.454*
	($\pm$ 0.496)	($\pm$ 0.262)	($\pm$ 0.389)	($\pm$ 0.296)
Constant	0.0341***	0.0331***	0.145***	0.0964***
	($\pm$ 0.0261)	($\pm$ 0.0203)	($\pm$ 0.106)	($\pm$ 0.0587)
Observations	280	556	223	402
Interaction term	NO	YES	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.142	0.111	0.0723	0.111
Log Lik	−165.9	−334.4	−142.1	−240.3

Figure 3. Impact of expected target cost of economic sanctions on effectiveness of threats and imposed economic sanctions

Table 3. Estimation results for the uncertainty mechanism. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses: *** indicates $p<0.01$, ** indicates $p<0.05$ and * indicate $p<0.1$

Variables	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio
Success
Path	0.916	0.915
	($\pm$ 0.169)	($\pm$ 0.159)
Imposition		0.292***		1.022
		($\pm$ 0.127)		($\pm$ 0.330)
Imposition * Path		1.729**
		($\pm$ 0.470)
Alliance			1.113	1.112
			($\pm$ 0.313)	($\pm$ 0.297)
Imposition * Alliance				0.490*
				($\pm$ 0.195)
Expected cost target	5.862***	4.046***	5.884***	4.016***
	($\pm$ 2.087)	($\pm$ 1.032)	($\pm$ 2.098)	($\pm$ 1.026)
Democracy score target	0.947	0.967	0.947	0.968
	($\pm$ 0.0326)	($\pm$ 0.0232)	($\pm$ 0.0327)	($\pm$ 0.0232)
US	1.312	1.379	1.314	1.399
	($\pm$ 0.404)	($\pm$ 0.306)	($\pm$ 0.405)	($\pm$ 0.309)
Salience	0.680	1.036	0.679	1.044
	($\pm$ 0.257)	($\pm$ 0.270)	($\pm$ 0.257)	($\pm$ 0.271)
Security	0.558	0.925	0.558	0.917
	($\pm$ 0.235)	($\pm$ 0.278)	($\pm$ 0.236)	($\pm$ 0.276)
Multilateral	1.284	1.215	1.287	1.235
	($\pm$0.458)	($\pm$ 0.305)	($\pm$ 0.458)	($\pm$ 0.309)
Past commitment	2.002***	1.577***	1.992***	1.570***
	($\pm$ 0.496)	($\pm$ 0.269)	($\pm$ 0.494)	($\pm$ 0.267)
Constant	0.0341***	0.0584***	0.0282***	0.0480***
	($\pm$ 0.0261)	($\pm$ 0.0345)	($\pm$ 0.0213)	($\pm$ 0.0274)
Observations	280	556	280	556
Interaction term	NO	YES	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.142	0.115	0.142	0.114
Log Lik	−165.9	−333	−165.9	−333.4

Figure 4. Impact of distance on the diplomatic network between the sender and the target on the effectiveness of threats and imposed economic sanctions

Table 4. Estimation results for the public commitment mechanism. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses: *** indicates $p<0.01$, ** indicates $p<0.05$ and * indicate $p<0.1$

Variables	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)
	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio
Success
Democracy score sender	1.085	1.098*
	($\pm$ 0.0608)	($\pm$ 0.0585)
Imposition		2.625		2.700
		($\pm$ 1.746)		($\pm$ 1.712)
Imposition * Democracy score sender		0.858**
		($\pm$ 0.0605)
Democracy score sender (PR)			1.549	1.858
			($\pm$ 0.797)	($\pm$ 0.927)
Imposition * Democracy score sender (PR)				0.227**
				($\pm$ 0.153)
Expected cost target	3.880***	3.170***	3.926***	3.190***
	($\pm$ 1.239)	($\pm$ 0.750)	($\pm$ 1.272)	($\pm$ 0.765)
Path	0.835	1.132	0.812	1.107
	($\pm$ 0.159)	($\pm$ 0.152)	($\pm$ 0.159)	($\pm$ 0.149)
US	1.160	1.453	1.419	1.595*
	($\pm$ 0.394)	($\pm$ 0.367)	($\pm$ 0.475)	($\pm$ 0.407)
Salience	0.642	1.131	0.644	1.137
	($\pm$ 0.215)	($\pm$ 0.275)	($\pm$ 0.223)	($\pm$ 0.279)
Security	0.688	0.917	0.611	0.856
	($\pm$ 0.290)	($\pm$ 0.274)	($\pm$ 0.258)	($\pm$ 0.254)
Multilateral	1.231	1.462	1.399	1.513
	($\pm$ 0.446)	($\pm$ 0.368)	($\pm$ 0.518)	($\pm$ 0.392)
Past commitment	1.906**	1.390*	2.134***	1.519**
	($\pm$ 0.488)	($\pm$ 0.238)	($\pm$ 0.541)	($\pm$ 0.261)
Constant	0.0258***	0.0244***	0.0240***	0.0243***
	($\pm$ 0.0237)	($\pm$ 0.0175)	($\pm$ 0.0214)	($\pm$ 0.0171)
Observations	264	536	267	536
Interaction term	NO	YES	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.105	0.0880	0.121	0.0959
Log Lik	−163.2	−332.8	−161.5	−329.4

Figure 5. Impact of democracy level of the sender on effectiveness of threats and imposed economic sanctions