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ABSTRACT
How can international humanitarian actors support civilians in their efforts to protect themselves during armed conflicts? This study analyzes the wartime interactions between international organizations and communities with a particular focus on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) community-based protection activities. Although civilians are often viewed as weak and vulnerable noncombatants, the ICRC and other humanitarians can provide communities with crucial backing to implement nonviolent self-protection strategies. I examine these ICRC-community interactions in the municipality of El Bagre in northern Colombia in 2017 during a period of active contestation between ELN insurgents and BACRIM neo-paramilitary groups as the FARC insurgents withdrew from the area. Through participant-observation during an ICRC delegation deployment as well as interviews with civilians and ICRC staff, I find that the ICRC sharing of protection tactics, facilitation of inter-community cooperation, and other technical assistance catalyzed the civilians’ agency and their innovative efforts to avoid, negotiate with, or protest the armed groups. The civilians’ successes and perceptions of security were often amplified because of ICRC involvement. The insights suggest future research agendas and approaches for protecting civilian populations in Colombia and beyond.
¿De qué manera los actores humanitarios internacionales pueden respaldar a los civiles en sus esfuerzos por protegerse durante los conflictos armados? Este estudio analiza las interacciones en tiempos de guerra entre las organizaciones internacionales y las comunidades, enfocándose especialmente en las actividades de protección comunitaria del Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR). Aunque a menudo se considera a los civiles como no combatientes débiles y vulnerables, el CICR y otras organizaciones humanitarias pueden proporcionar a las comunidades un apoyo fundamental para poner en práctica estrategias de autoprotección no violentas. Examino estas interacciones entre el CICR y la comunidad en el municipio de El Bagre, en el norte de Colombia, en 2017, durante un período de disputa activa entre los insurgentes del ELN y los grupos neoparamilitares de las BACRIM, mientras los insurgentes de las FARC se retiraban de la zona. A partir de la observación participante durante el despliegue de una delegación del CICR, así como de entrevistas con civiles y personal del CICR, descubro que el hecho de que el CICR compartiera tácticas de protección, facilitara la cooperación intercomunitaria y prestara otro tipo de asistencia técnica catalizó la actuación de los civiles y sus esfuerzos innovadores para evitar, negociar o protestar contra los grupos armados. Los éxitos y las percepciones de seguridad de los civiles se amplificaron, con frecuencia, debido a la participación del CICR. Las conclusiones sugieren agendas de investigación futura y enfoques para la protección de la población civil en Colombia y más allá.
Comment les acteurs humanitaires internationaux peuvent-ils soutenir les civils dans leurs efforts de se protéger durant des conflits armés ? Cette étude analyze les interactions en temps de guerre entre les organizations internationales et les communautés en se concentrant en particulier sur les activités de protection communautaire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR). Bien que les civils soient souvent considérés comme des non-combattants faibles et vulnérables, le CICR et d’autres acteurs humanitaires peuvent doter les communautés d’un soutien crucial pour la mise en œuvre de stratégies d’autoprotection non violentes. J’ai examiné ces interactions entre le CICR et la communauté de la municipalité d’El Bagre, dans le nord de la Colombie. Elles ont eu lieu en 2017, période de contestation active entre les insurgés de l’ELN et les groupes néo-paramilitaires BACRIM tandis que les insurgés des FARC se retiraient de la région. Je me suis basé sur une observation des participants lors d’un déploiement d’une délégation du CICR, ainsi que sur des entretiens avec des civils et des membres du personnel du CICR, et j’ai constaté que le partage de tactiques de protection du CICR, la facilitation de la coopération intercommunautaire et d’autres assistances techniques catalysaient l’agentivité des civils et leurs efforts innovants d’évitement, de négociation ou de protestation face aux groupes armés. Les réussites et perceptions de sécurité des civils ont souvent été amplifiées par l’implication du CICR. Les renseignements acquis suggèrent de futurs programmes de recherche et de futures approches pour la protection des populations civiles en Colombie et au-delà.
Notes
1 The sign in Spanish read, “United against extortion and kidnapping; Grupo Gaula Militar Bajo Cauca” (the military’s anti-kidnapping unit of the region), and included a smartphone app and phone number to call to denounce suspicious or criminal activities.
2 The naming and characterizing of this collection of non-insurgent armed groups that arose after the demobilization of the AUC paramilitaries from 2003-2006 – either through rearming or newly mobilizing – is a delicate issue. Directive 14 of the Colombian Ministry of Defense of May 27, 2011 determined that BACRIM are ‘organized criminal groups’ and therefore are not ‘illegal organized armed groups.” However, as the ICRC annual report (2017) notes, “In mid-2016, the State began implementing a policy instituted by the Ministry of Defense called ‘Directive 015 to fight ‘organized armed groups’ (AGC – Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia–also known as ‘Clan del Golfo’).” The ICRC uses non-descript language in relation to these actors, simply including them as another “armed group” involved in an armed conflict in which IHL applies (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] Citation2017). The Colombian government (and as a result, other international analysts) have adopted the term BACRIM, in part to avoid conferring political status upon them. Groups such as the AGC view themselves as “self-defense” groups, implying a more political and counter-insurgent legacy from the AUC. Some human rights advocates take issue with this nomenclature, asserting that they are not merely actors involved in criminal activities but reflect a continuation of Colombia’s long-running and harmful paramilitarism, and employ descriptors such as “narco-paramilitarism” or “neo-paramilitarism” (e.g., Indepaz Citation2015; Medina Uribe Citation2016). Although multiple terms and descriptors are used, for simplicity I refer to them here as BACRIM. According to government and press accounts, some of these groups have been involved in various criminal activities including acts of violence and drug trafficking, however, any such references contained herein do not reflect the position of the ICRC.
3 El Bagre is the real name of the municipio, though identifiers for sub-municipal locations such as villages are omitted as a precaution (though in any case the risks are minimal since the ICRC’s activities are conducted openly).
4 Rather than physical protection, the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations first conceive of protection as referring to legal protection to “prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles” as well as “efforts to prevent or put a stop to actual or potential violations of IHL and other relevant bodies of law or norms.” They also engage in activities to protect victims and “provide them with assistance” (International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] Citation2008).
5 Activities that “support, rather than undermine, communities’ and individuals’ self-protection mechanisms and coping strategies” (Cotroneo et al. Citation2016).
6 Interviews were conducted anonymously and are cited with a prefix of either “JAC” (to designate a leader of a village council, or Junta de Acción Comunal) or “ICRC” (to designate an ICRC staff member) along with a unique identifying number for the individual.
7 One staff person commented on the importance of my work for the organization, “We need academics to question our work because ICRC people don’t always do that” (ICRC#13). My access depended on the delegation but staff did not limit my access or the questions I could ask. When I presented to the delegation they were open to findings that were critical of their work.
8 However, the Colombian military’s misuse of ICRC emblems in 2008 during the “Operation Checkmate” hostage rescue weakened trust with other armed actors (ICRC#9). In that operation, the military recovered 14 kidnapping victims, including the former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three American contractors by deceiving the FARC front that held them by directing them to what they were led to believe were humanitarian helicopters to help transfer the hostages (Bronstein Citation2008). One of the military soldiers involved was photographed wearing a shirt with a Red Cross emblem, a possible violation of the Geneva Conventions.
9 For the delegation, “protection” functions to “prevent” violence by preventing re-victimization and aiding victims.
10 The aid projects (WatHab, EcoSec, WeC, Health, etc.) give entrée to communities through development programs to support community resilience. If armed actors see the ICRC helping communities it can help start protection dialogs (ICRC#6).
11 The Colombia delegation previously developed the FOCCOS approach, or Workshops for Strengthening Community Capacity, for an integrated push for protection (Cruz Roja Colombiana Citation2013b). They provided information and conducted threat mapping to leave something tangible for communities, such as a contingency plan, training, participation, and ownership (ICRC#6). The delegation transitioned away from this model and toward more direct self-protection activities (Cotroneo and Pawlak Citation2016).
12 Sect is not a primary cleavage of conflict in Colombia though Evangelical pastors have been some of the few actors to engage with the most isolated rural communities.
13 They eat Guagua a la parilla (a large grilled rodent called Paca in English) with rice, plantains, and yucca (“It’s the best dish!”). Though there is some contention, as another leader said the best dish is clearly Sancocho de Gallina (game hen stew) with arroz con coco (coconut rice; JAC#4).
14 One man pointed with his finger to indicate that the territory was FARC-controlled and became ELN-controlled (JAC#1).
15 In 2016, eight villages were displaced and 200 families had to spend two months in Puerto Claver (with rampant fear, only 38 families denounced the act). The ICRC helped dialogue with armed actors to facilitate their return.
16 The peace agreement had them confused and wondering which armed group awaits them next. Even with the agreement, “We are under brutality here in the campo” (JAC#4,5).
17 I wrote field notes by hand in a notebook, and no recording devices were used. Direct quotes were recorded verbatim and transcribed for clarity.
18 For a prior survey, the ICRC was concerned about social desirability bias among respondents – either inhibitions from revealing certain information or offering preferred responses. The ICRC commissioned independent local research partners to conduct parallel surveys in three countries, including Colombia. They found “little evidence of significant or systematic discrepancies” between the partners’ surveys and ICRC surveys, with the smallest discrepancies in Colombia. Views were largely consistent on International Humanitarian Law, acceptable practices during armed conflict, the distinction between combatants and civilians, and the treatment of prisoners. With ICRC enumerators, respondents were more likely to be familiar with the Geneva Conventions and see them as effective, possibly overstating its role in protection.
19 This latter term is used over “mine risk education” to avoid stigmatizing armed actors, recognizing the risks are not just guerrillas laying mines, but also unexploded ordinance (ICRC#14).
20 For example, one community deemed their condition as safe or “green” if only four people died in one month and at-risk if fewer boats passed along the river. One community noted that they listen for the animal calls used by armed actors as warnings of armed activity.
21 In that village, they do not discuss security in the junta because they do not know people’s affiliations. They have no early warning system.
22 They share their cell phone numbers at meetings to stay in touch. WhatsApp groups help for early warning, sharing news articles, and uniting victims. When communicating, they will not mention specific armed groups, just that someone is injured.
23 If they do not obey, the leaders call the individual again, and then call the commander of the armed group the individual abetted. They will explain the situation and ask the commander to remove that person from the area.
24 Though machista literally means male-chauvinist, for this context in Colombia it is translated as “rude” or “aggressive.”
25 To minimize trips and exposure to risks during travel, the village leaders often carry the documents of others to the cabecera (JAC#1).
26 To reiterate, such references to criminal activities by interview respondents reflect their opinions and perceptions and do not reflect the position of the ICRC.
27 Some BACRIM in Colombia have approached ICRC staff and actually inquired about assistance to improve their behavior, saying, “We want to learn IHL.”
28 Further, if they were to dialogue for an individual and that person were killed, they could be liable, and the ICRC cannot adjudicate every case (ICRC#10).
29 There was also resounding support for the ICRC among the communities and a demand for additional projects, such as building schools, aqueducts, etc., and IHL trainings.
30 I shared my initial research and insights with in-country staff and dialogued about its implications.
31 The ICRC’s community work may only be a palliative, or even ineffective, given Colombia’s structural social problems. As one leader noted, land tenancy issues supersede almost all others and limit their ability for longer-term social advancement, “We need land titles and can’t get government benefits or loans without them. The government won’t even invest in schools without them” (JAC#1).
32 Although this did not appear to occur, it merits further empirical and ethical inquiry.
33 Though it was only their second training with the ICRC in El Bagre, “Given the vast distances, even their trainings are an excuse to visit and unite people because they feel secure” (JAC#1).
34 As Peace Brigades International observes, “[A]rmed groups have transformed the area into strategic corridors … and exercise powerful social control over the communities where Aheramigua works” (Peace Brigades International [PBI] Citation2018).
35 For instance, two members from AHERAMIGUA attended the workshop, so the ICRC already had basic contact with that organization.