Government ideology and bailout conditionality in the European financial crisis

Figures & data

Table 1. EU bailouts.

Country	Duration	Quantity%
Hungary	November 2008–October 2010	15.6 out of €20bn.
Latvia	December 2008–December 2011	4.5 out of €7.5bn.
Romania I	May 2009–June 2011	19.6 out of €20.6bn.
Greece I and II	May 2010–June 2015	215.9 out of €245.6bn.
Ireland	November 2010–December 2013	68.2 out of €68.2bn.
Romania II	March 2011–June 2013	1.15 out of €6.15bn.
Portugal	May 2011–June 2014	76.8 out of €79bn.
Spain	July 2012–December 2013	41.3 out of €100bn.
Cyprus	May 2013–March 2016	10 out of €10bn.
Romania III	October 2013–September 2015	2.6 out of €6.5bn.
Greece III	August 2015–August 2018	86 out of €86bn.

For each EU crisis country, we report the bailout programme period from beginning of negotiations to end of commitment. For reference, we also report the amount of negotiated assistance out of proposed assistance in Euros (€).

Figure 1. Financial conditions across countries and time.

Figure 2. Public sector labour conditions across countries and time.

Table 2. Variables summary.

Variable	Mean	S. dev	Min	Max	Obs
Financial sector conditions
Overall	0.8	2.0	0.0	16.0	288
Between		0.3	0.4	1.1	8
Public sector labour conditions
Overall	0.3	0.8	0.0	6.0	288
Between		0.2	0.0	0.7	8
Other labour conditions
Overall	0.6	1.8	0.0	14.0	288
Between		0.6	0.0	1.9	8
Sum of all conditions
Overall	6.2	15.2	0.0	116.0	288
Between		5.5	0.9	14.8	8
Government partisanship: L–R
Overall	5.4	1.7	1.1	8.4	288
Between		0.9	4.2	7.2	8
Public debt
Overall	76.4	41.6	8.2	181.8	288
Between		37.3	28.4	145.2	8
Balance of payments
Overall	–3.8	7.3	–37.4	16.3	232
Between		3.3	–8.5	0.6	8
Interest rate
Overall	6.1	3.4	0.8	25.4	288
Between		1.7	4.1	9.3	8

This table describes the main variables specified in our models.

See the Appendix for the description of the variable distribution across time.

Table 3. The effect of government partisanship on EU bailout conditions.

	Financial sector conditions	Public sector labour conditions	Non-public sector labour conditions	Sum of all conditions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government partisanship: L–Rt–2	–0.156**	0.379**	–0.120	–0.280
	(0.0301)	(0.0682)	(0.149)	(0.152)
δ Public debtt–4	0.0129	0.0315	0.0354	0.0195
	(0.0123)	(0.0301)	(0.0215)	(0.0121)
δ Balance of paymentst–4	–0.00264	0.0313	–0.0120	–0.0325*
	(0.00884)	(0.0251)	(0.00847)	(0.0130)
δ Interest ratet–4	–0.0511	0.0783	0.135*	0.132**
	(0.0750)	(0.133)	(0.0617)	(0.0270)
Time spline	0.225	0.576*	0.355*	0.462**
	(0.142)	(0.230)	(0.164)	(0.121)
Quadratic time spline	–0.00779*	–0.0189**	–0.0106*	–0.0136**
	(0.00314)	(0.00663)	(0.00466)	(0.00227)
Constant	0.984	–6.877**	–1.747	0.0484
	(1.704)	(2.093)	(1.787)	(1.584)
Ongoing bailout (inflated)	–5.798**	–4.686**	–4.586**	–4.838**
	(0.996)	(0.875)	(1.095)	(1.049)
Constant (inflated)	4.511**	2.954*	3.308**	2.583**
	(1.051)	(1.264)	(1.145)	(0.946)
Constant (ln(α))	–3.928	–13.57**	–1.217	–0.686**
	(2.601)	(2.203)	(0.720)	(0.222)
AIC	383.1	226.3	352.7	807.2
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	224	224	224	224
Number of zeroes	154	181	166	126

The columns report estimates of four zero-inflated negative binomial models of the four dependent variables described at the top of the table. The first stage of the regressions, which models the zeroes with a dummy of ongoing bailout negotiations and a constant, is reported at the bottom of the table.

Standard errors clustered around countries in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.

Figure 3. The effect of government partisanship on bailout financial sector conditions. These plots report the predicted number of conditions as Government Partisanship goes from low to high values. The estimations of the predictions (solid line) are based on Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 3. The bars report 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4. Substantive effects for changes in government partisanship (from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean) on bailout conditions. The two dots refer to the substantive effects (first differences) estimated for the two models of Financial Sector Conditions and Public Sector Labour Conditions, respectively, based on 1,000 simulation draws with estimates of Models 3 and 4 in Table 4 as specifications. Error bars indicate 83% confidence intervals, which show that the two mean effects are significantly different from each other.

Table 4. The effect of government partisanship: alternative specifications.

	Financial sector conditions	Public sector labour conditions	Financial sector conditions	Public sector labour conditions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Government partisanship: L–Rt–2	–0.156**	0.381**	–0.126**	0.239**
	(0.0292)	(0.0641)	(0.0407)	(0.0363)
δ Public debtt–4	0.0126	0.0329	0.0159	–0.0303**
	(0.0124)	(0.0299)	(0.0116)	(0.00960)
δ Balance of paymentst–4	–0.00264	0.0303	–0.00599	–0.0169
	(0.00880)	(0.0243)	(0.00787)	(0.0124)
δ Interest ratet–4	–0.0507	0.0787	–0.0843	0.0781
	(0.0748)	(0.126)	(0.0629)	(0.125)
Time spline	0.224	0.526*	0.157	0.311**
	(0.144)	(0.213)	(0.132)	(0.0658)
Quadratic time spline	–0.00773*	–0.0180**	–0.00588*	–0.0116**
	(0.00317)	(0.00583)	(0.00294)	(0.00180)
Constant	0.994	–6.216**	1.382	–2.511**
	(1.727)	(2.083)	(1.454)	(0.701)
Constant (inflated)	–1.284**	–1.629**
	(0.354)	(0.516)
Constant (ln(α))	–3.888	–14.57**
	(2.509)	(1.514)
AIC	370.1	205.7	257.2	125.4
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	106	106	70	43
Number of zeroes	37	65

Models 1 and 2 report estimates of zero-inflated negative binomial models for the subsample of quarter-countries for which there was an ongoing bailout negotiation (the first stage, which models the zeroes with a constant, is reported at the bottom of the table). Models 3 and 4 report estimates of Poisson models for quarter-countries where one or more conditions are observed.

Standard errors clustered around countries in parentheses.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.