The promotion of moral ideals in schools; what the state may or may not demand

Abstract

The content and boundaries of moral education the state may require schools to offer is a matter of contention. This article investigates whether the state may obligate schools to promote the pursuit of moral ideals. Moral ideals refer to (a cluster of) characteristics of a person as well as to situations or states that are believed to be morally excellent or perfect and that are not yet realised. Having an ideal typically means that the person is dedicated to realising the type of situation or person to which the ideal refers. Therefore generating student enthusiasm for moral ideals may be an effective way to realise a morally excellent society. This article defends the position that schools may be required to promote the recognition of ideals that all reasonable citizens endorse. Reasonable citizens will not, however, accept that the state obligates schools to promote the pursuit of moral ideals.

Keywords:

• moral ideals
• moral education
• obligation of schools

Notes

1. We should note that the aspirational dimension is not the same as the supererogatory. A detailed explication of the similarities and differences falls outside the remit of this article. Concisely put, in our view, while both are defined as exceeding what is morally demanded, the aspirational dimension is broader and includes the supererogatory. The supererogatory can be found at the higher end or top of the aspirational dimension as we call it later on. It is a type of moral excellence.

2. In addition, it is also possible to promote a particular way to pursue moral ideals. This issue will not be discussed in this article.

3. The fact that people aspire to realise a moral situation, for instance a just society, does not necessarily mean that they pursue this ideal in a morally excellent way. For example, see Baumeister (1997), who calls this ‘idealistic evil’, or Isaiah Berlin’s vehement objection to the pursuit of ideals (1999, p. 15). Thus, respect for the pursuit of moral ideals, will always be qualified (see also Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009). We will not reiterate this point every time.

4. According to Frankfurt, one’s ideals necessitate one’s will (volition) to act or abstain from acting in certain ways. Having an ideal means that one cannot bring oneself to act in a particular manner (1999, p. 111). For instance, if one has the ideal to be just, it is unthinkable that one treats another person unfairly.

5. There is an overlap between one’s ideal self and moral self, but both have other aspects too. Not all aspects of moral identity are part of one’s ideal identity. First, one’s moral identity also comprises aspects that one has realised (at least most of the time) and no longer aspires towards. For instance, one can rightly characterise oneself as an honest person. Second, moral identity also comprises aspects that one pursues, but that one does not believe to be excellent or perfect and therefore not an ideal, e.g. habitually doing one’s duties. Equally, one’s ideal identity can contain various ideals with regard to one’s personal characteristics that are not moral in character. The person one aspires to be, can and most often will also have non-moral characteristics, for instance with regard to one’s physical appearance, physical prowess, social qualities or creativeness.

6. According to Wolf, ‘moral perfection in the sense of moral saintliness, does not constitute a model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive’ (1982, p. 419).Her main arguments are that a moral saint is too good for her own well-being, that such a person is so focused on moral issues that other important non-moral issues cannot be developed. She also argues that it seems awkward to be so passionate about morality that one sacrifices everything else (one’s other talents, for instance). ‘The way in which morality, unlike other possible goals, is apt to dominate is particularly disturbing, for it seems to require either the lack or the denial of the existence of an identifiable, personal self’ (1982, p. 424).