Generativity and flourishing

Abstract

The psychological construct of ‘generativity’ was introduced by Erik Erikson in Childhood and Society in 1950. This rich and complex notion encompasses the constellation of desires, concerns and commitments that motivate individuals and societies to pass on legacies to future generations. ‘Flourishing,’ which means, very roughly, living life well, is another rich and complex notion, interpretations of which are found in ancient philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. In this article I relate interpretations of these two concepts by arguing that certain forms of generativity can be considered an Aristotelian-type virtue, and that the virtue of generativity is necessary, but not sufficient, for flourishing in the Aristotelian sense. In other words, one can be generative without flourishing. The reverse, however, does not seem true: it is hard to see how one can fully flourish without being generative.

Keywords:

• generativity
• flourishing
• Erikson

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to my commentators, the audience at the 2014 Kohlberg Memorial Lecture, and Darcia Narvaez for helpful comments.

Notes

1. As of the first week of July, 2014, when I began writing this article, a search of the term ‘generativity’ on PsycInfo surfaced 277 entries. Interest in generativity among psychologists is obviously alive and well.

2. See, for example, Ryff and Singer (2008), Ryff (1989) and Bradburn (1969).

3. See also Snarey (1993, p. 20).

4. Interestingly, McAdams and Logan (2004, pp. 21–23), report on large-scale empirical studies in which parents who score high on generativity questionnaires are more involved with their childrens’ education than lower-scoring parents. They also report on two studies suggesting that generativity is associated with an authoritative parenting style.

5. A useful overview of features of generativity is found in McAdams and Logan (2004).

6. One might be tempted to regard this as a case of pseudospeciation. I think it is worse. The belief in pseudospeciation leads to a lack of care, rejecting some people from the scope of one’s generativity on the basis of a false belief. Hitler did not simply exclude members of some groups from care; he sought to exterminate them.

7. The Stoics distinguish between the value of virtue and other things, including what Aristotle would call ‘external goods.’ The Stoics value virtue because it is the perfection of our rational natures. Other things are called ‘indifferents,’ and fall into the categories of ‘preferred,’ ‘dispreferred,’ and ‘absolute.’ Preferred indifferents are things that are in accordance with nature, such as life, health, strength, wealth and noble birth. Dispreferred indifferents are contrary to nature, and include disease, pain, ugliness and low birth. Absolute indifferents include such things as the number of hairs on one’s head. See Stephens (2014); Long (1986, 189ff).

8. Many thanks to the Association for Moral Education for inviting me to give this lecture.