Exemplarist moral theory – some pros and cons

ABSTRACT

The article makes a number of critical remarks concerning Linda Zagzebski’s exemplarism. On the positive side, I argue that one of its strengths is the focus on motivation as an important factor in moral education whilst, on the negative, I draw attention to two issues. The first is that Zagzebski’s notion of moral exemplars is insufficient since it is too narrow, merely focusing as it does on high standard moral heroes while neglecting more usual moral agents who at least in some respects may also play the role of exemplars. Secondly, I find Zagzebski’s view of admiration (as a fundamental notion in building a moral theory) to be somewhat circular.

KEYWORDS:

• exemplarist moral theory
• admiration
• exemplars
• motivation
• Zagzebski

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude for helpful comments to Christian Miller, Kristján Kristjásnsson, Robert C. Roberts, Artur Szutta and the anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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Notes on contributors

Natasza Szutta

Natasza Szutta is assistant professor at the University of Gdańsk in The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Journalism. She works in ethics and moral psychology.